Opinion
Civ. 4:21-CV-1425
08-23-2021
THERIN POWELL, Plaintiff, v. LYCOMING COUNTY PRISON, et al., Defendants.
Brann, Chief Judge
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Martin C. Carlson, United States Magistrate Judge
I. Factual Background
This pro se lawsuit comes before us for a legally mandated screening review of the pro se plaintiff's complaint. (Doc. 1). The plaintiff, Therin Powell, is a prisoner housed in the Lycoming County Prison. Powell's complaint names the prison, its warden and deputy warden, and two unnamed secretaries as defendants. (Id., at 2-3). The complaint also lists a person, “Brad Besore, ” in the caption of the case, but this defendant is never further mentioned or identified by Powell in the body of his pleading.
In fact, other than listing these various defendants, none of the individual defendants are ever referred to in the body of the complaint. Instead, Powell simply alleges in a summary fashion that someone made inappropriate housing expense deductions from his inmate account beginning in July 2021. According to Powell, this action by unidentified actors violated his constitutional rights. (Id.)
Along with his complaint, Powell has filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (Doc. 2). We will direct that the lodged complaint be filed on the docket for screening purposes and will conditionally GRANT the plaintiff's motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. However, for the reasons set forth below, it is recommended that the complaint be dismissed.
II. Discussion
A. Screening of Pro Se Complaints-Standard of Review
This Court has an ongoing statutory obligation to conduct a preliminary review of pro se complaints brought by plaintiffs given leave to proceed in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Specifically, we are obliged to review the complaint to determine whether any claims are frivolous, malicious, or fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. This statutory text mirrors the language of Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that a complaint should be dismissed for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).
With respect to this benchmark standard for legal sufficiency of a complaint, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has aptly noted the evolving standards governing pleading practice in federal court, stating that:
Standards of pleading have been in the forefront of jurisprudence in recent years. Beginning with the Supreme Court's opinion in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) continuing with our opinion in Phillips [v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 230 (3d Cir. 2008)] and culminating recently with the Supreme Court's decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009) pleading standards have seemingly shifted from simple notice pleading to a more heightened form of pleading, requiring a plaintiff to plead more than the possibility of relief to survive a motion to dismiss.Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 209-10 (3d Cir. 2009).
In considering whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, the court must accept as true all allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom are to be construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Jordan v. Fox Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, Inc., 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). However, a court “need not credit a complaint's bald assertions or legal conclusions when deciding a motion to dismiss.” Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). Additionally, a court need not “assume that a ... plaintiff can prove facts that the ... plaintiff has not alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). As the Supreme Court held in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), in order to state a valid cause of action a plaintiff must provide some factual grounds for relief which “requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of actions will not do.” Id. at 555. “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id.
In keeping with the principles of Twombly, the Supreme Court has underscored that a trial court must assess whether a complaint states facts upon which relief can be granted when ruling on a motion to dismiss. In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), the Supreme Court held that, when considering a motion to dismiss, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. at 678. Rather, in conducting a review of the adequacy of complaint, the Supreme Court has advised trial courts that they must:
[B]egin by identifying pleadings that because they are no more than conclusions are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.Id. at 679.
Thus, following Twombly and Iqbal a well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere legal labels and conclusions. Rather, a complaint must recite factual allegations sufficient to raise the plaintiff's claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere speculation. As the Third Circuit has stated:
[A]fter Iqbal, when presented with a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, district courts should conduct a two-part analysis. First, the factual and legal elements of a claim should be separated. The District Court must accept all of the complaint's well-pleaded facts as true but may disregard any legal conclusions. Second, a District Court must then determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a “plausible claim for relief.” In other words, a complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff's entitlement to relief. A complaint has to “show” such an entitlement with its facts.Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210-11.
Two years after Fowler, the Third Circuit further observed:
The Supreme Court in Twombly set forth the “plausibility” standard for overcoming a motion to dismiss and refined this approach in Iqbal. The plausibility standard requires the complaint to allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955. A complaint satisfies the plausibility standard when the factual pleadings “allow[ ] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955). This standard requires showing “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. A complaint which pleads facts “merely consistent with” a defendant's liability, [ ] “stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement of relief.'”Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 220-21 (3d Cir. 2011).
In practice, consideration of the legal sufficiency of a complaint entails a three-step analysis:
First, the court must “tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1947. Second, the court should identify allegations that, “because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id. at 1950. Finally, “where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.” Id.Santiago v. Warminster Tp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010).
In addition to these pleading rules, a civil complaint must comply with the requirements of Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, which defines what a complaint should say and provides that:
(a) A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain (1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction, unless the court already has jurisdiction and the claim needs no new jurisdictional support; (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and (3) a demand for the relief sought, which may include relief in the alternative or different types of relief.Fed. R. Civ. P. 8.
Thus, a well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere legal labels and conclusions. Rather, a pro se plaintiff's complaint must recite factual allegations that are sufficient to raise the plaintiff's claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere speculation, set forth in a “short and plain” statement of a cause of action.
It is against the legal benchmarks that we assess the sufficiency of Powell's complaint and, for the reasons set forth below, find that the complaint should be dismissed.
B. Powell May Not Sue the County Prison.
At the outset, Powell may not bring a federal civil rights claim against the county jail as an institutional defendant. As we have recently explained when presented with a similar claim:
To the extent that the plaintiff attempts to bring a lawsuit against the county prison as an institution, the plaintiff may not maintain a prisoner civil rights action against this particular defendant. Rather, inmate civil rights actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 may be brought against:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws [of the United States].42 U.S.C. § 1983 (emphasis added).
Thus, § 1983 limits liability to persons who violate constitutional rights, a limitation that courts have construed as not reaching county jails as institutions. In short, “the ‘County Jail' is not a proper defendant in this § 1983 case[ ], because it is not a ‘person.' ” Crooks v. Passaic County Sheriff's Dep't/Jail, CIV. 07-0092 (FSH), 2007 WL 923330 (D.N.J. Mar. 26, 2007) (citing Grabow v. Southern State Correctional Facility, 726 F.Supp. 537, 538-39 (D.N.J. 1989) (stating that New Jersey Department of Corrections and state prison facilities not “persons” under § 1983); Mitchell v. Chester County Farms Prison, 426 F.Supp. 271, 274 (D.C. Pa. 1976); Marsden v. Federal BOP, 856 F.Supp. 832, 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (county jail not an entity amenable to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); Powell v. Cook County Jail, 814 F.Supp. 757, 758 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (Cook County Jail not a ‘person' under § 1983);
McCoy v. Chesapeake Correctional Center, 788 F.Supp. 890, 893-94 (E.D. Va. 1992) (local jail not a ‘person' under § 1983)); see also Thomas v. Wilbert, CIV.A. 09-4796 GEB, 2011 WL 91001 (D.N.J. Jan. 11, 2011) (“County Correctional Institution is not a proper defendant in a § 1983 case and must be dismissed from this action”).
This limitation on the reach of proper defendants in a § 1983 civil rights case compels dismissal of this claim, as stated in this pro se complaint, with respect to the county jail, which is not a proper defendant in a civil rights action brought under § 1983.Dempsey v. Tyson, No. 1:21-CV-852, 2021 WL 2229085, at *6 (M.D. Pa. May 12, 2021), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Dempsey v. York Cty. Cts., No. 1:21-CV-00852, 2021 WL 2222717 (M.D. Pa. June 2, 2021). This institutional defendant should, therefore, be dismissed.
C. Powell's Complaint Fails to State a Claim Against the Named Individual Defendants.
Likewise, Powell's complaint names the prison warden, deputy warden, and two unnamed secretaries as defendants, along with a person named “Brad Besore, ” who is not otherwise identified. While these individuals are listed in the caption of the complaint, they are never mentioned by Powell in the body of his pleading. Therefore, it is impossible to determine what role, if any, they played in the acts alleged by the plaintiff.
This form of pleading is legally insufficient to state a claim against these defendants. As we have observed recently when considering a similarly vague complaint:
In this regard, it is well settled that a claim of a constitutional deprivation cannot be premised merely on the fact that the named defendants were government officials or supervisors when the incidents set forth in the complaint occurred. Quite the contrary, to state a constitutional tort claim, the plaintiff must show that the defendants actively deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution. Morse v. Lower Merion School Dist., 132 F.3d 902 (3d Cir. 1997); see also Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980). Constitutional tort liability is personal in nature and can only follow personal involvement in the alleged wrongful conduct shown through specific allegations of personal direction or of actual knowledge and acquiescence in the challenged practice. Robinson v. City of Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286 (3d Cir. 1997). In particular, with respect to supervisory officials, it is well established that: “A[n individual government] defendant in a civil rights action must have personal involvement in the alleged wrongdoing; liability cannot be predicated solely on the operation of respondeat superior. Personal involvement can be shown through allegations of personal direction or of actual knowledge and acquiescence.” Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 353 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988)).
As the Supreme Court has observed:
Government officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior .... See Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978) (finding no vicarious liability for a municipal “person” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); see also Dunlop v. Munroe, 7 Cranch 242, 269, 3 L.Ed. 329 (1812) (a federal official's liability “will only
result from his own neglect in not properly superintending the discharge” of his subordinates' duties); Robertson v. Sichel, 127 U.S. 507, 515-516, 8 S.Ct. 1286, 3 L.Ed. 203 (1888) (“A public officer or agent is not responsible for the misfeasances or position wrongs, or for the nonfeasances, or negligences, or omissions of duty, of the subagents or servants or other persons properly employed by or under him, in the discharge of his official duties”). Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to Bivens and § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009).
Applying these benchmarks, courts have frequently held that, in the absence of evidence of supervisory knowledge and approval of subordinates' actions, a plaintiff may not maintain an action against supervisors based upon the misdeeds of their subordinates. O'Connell v. Sobina, No. 06-238, 2008 WL 144199, * 21 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 11, 2008); Neuburger v. Thompson, 305 F.Supp.2d 521, 535 (W.D. Pa. 2004). Rather, “[p]ersonal involvement must be alleged and is only present where the supervisor directed the actions of supervisees or actually knew of the actions and acquiesced in them. ” Jetter v. Beard, 183 Fed.Appx. 178, 181 (3d Cir. 2006) (emphasis added).
Here, [the plaintiff] does little more than name [officials] in the caption of the case, and then seek to hold th[ese] official[s] personally liable based upon his supervisory status without making any specific factual allegations about this defendant in the body of this pleading. More is needed here. To the extent that [the plaintiff] simply premises the liability of the defendants] upon [their] government position or supervisory status without setting forth any further factual basis for a claim in the body of this pleading, this cursory style of pleading is plainly inadequate to state a claim against a prison supervisor and compels dismissal of the defendants] See Hudson v. City of McKeesport, 244 Fed.Appx. 519 (3d Cir. 2007)
(affirming dismissal of defendant who was only named in caption of case).Vance v. McGinley, No. 1:21-CV-892, 2021 WL 2906070, at *5-6 (M.D. Pa. June 21, 2021), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:21-CV-892, 2021 WL 2894826 (M.D. Pa. July 9, 2021). This principle is equally applicable here, where Powell has named individual supervisory officials as defendants in the caption oof his complaint without setting forth any well-pleaded facts with respect to these defendants in the body of his pleading. In the absence of some well-pleaded allegations of participation or acquiescence in unconstitutional actions, these defendants should be dismissed from this lawsuit.
In sum, in its current form, this complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. While this screening merits analysis calls for dismissal of this action, we recommend that the plaintiff be given another, final opportunity to further litigate this matter by endeavoring to promptly file an amended complaint. We recommend this course mindful of the fact that in civil rights cases pro se plaintiffs often should be afforded an opportunity to amend a complaint before the complaint is dismissed in its entirety, see Fletcher-Hardee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, 482 F.3d 247, 253 (3d Cir. 2007), unless granting further leave to amend is not necessary in a case such as this where amendment would be futile or result in undue delay. Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 235 (3d Cir. 2004). Accordingly, it is recommended that the Court provide the plaintiff with an opportunity to correct these deficiencies in the pro se complaint, by dismissing this deficient complaint without prejudice to one final effort by the plaintiff to comply with the rules governing civil actions in federal court.
III. Recommendation
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the plaintiff's motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, (Doc. 2), is CONDITIONALLY GRANTED but IT IS RECOMMENDED that the plaintiff's complaint be dismissed without prejudice to the plaintiff filing an amended complaint which complies with federal pleading requirements.
The plaintiff is further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.