His Honor, therefore, properly assumed the duty of determining the question in this case, there being no conflict in the testimony bearing upon the point. In the same case, relying upon the authority of Powell v. Brinkley, 44 N.C. 154, it was said, that the presumption of payment under the statute, unlike that which is raised, by law, of the death of a party from a continued absence of seven years, has reference to the particular time at which the debt became due, and that anything offered to repel the presumption — whether it be proof of insolvency or of actual non-payment — must, in order to be effectual, run through (38) the entire period of ten years next after the maturity of the debt. This view of the law is clearly supported by the case of McKinder v. Littlejohn, 26 N.C. 198, though at first glance, it may seem not to be so. There, the debt was contracted in this state, but the debtor being insolvent soon removed to Mississippi — more than a thousand miles distant — where he resided until his death, many years afterwards.
PER CURIAM. Decree accordingly. Cited: Powell v. Brinkley, 44 N.C. 156; Hughes v. Blackwell, 59 N.C. 76; Ray v. Pearce, 84 N.C. 487; Pemberton v. Simmons, 100 N.C. 320; Simmons v. Ballard, 102 N.C. 109; Menzel v. Hinton, 132 N.C. 673; Woodlief v. Wester, 136 N.C. 166.