Pouliot v. Box

10 Citing cases

  1. Sledge v. Law

    149 S.E.2d 758 (Ga. Ct. App. 1966)   Cited 8 times
    In Sledge v. Law, 113 Ga. App. 746, 149 S.E.2d 758 (1966), the plaintiff, injured in an automobile collision, based his action on the "family car" doctrine.

    We disagree. See Pouliot v. Box, 56 N. M. 566 ( 246 P.2d 1050); Harper and James, The Law of Torts, Vol. 1, 661, 662, § 8.13, Vol. 2, 1419 et seq. § 26.15. The Georgia courts in adopting the family car doctrine, like those of many other states, applied principles of agency.

  2. Madrid v. Shryock

    106 N.M. 467 (N.M. 1987)   Cited 8 times
    Explaining that this policy statement reflects "a more accurate justification of family purpose decisions [than] the [agency-based] legal fiction that the automobile owner makes the pleasure and convenience of his family his business when he provides a vehicle for the use of his family."

    The family purpose doctrine is well established in New Mexico. Peters v. LeDoux, 83 N.M. 307, 491 P.2d 524 (1971); Burkhart v. Corn, 59 N.M. 343, 284 P.2d 226 (1955); Pouliot v. Box, 56 N.M. 566, 246 P.2d 1050 (1952); Stevens v. Van Deusen, 56 N.M. 128, 241 P.2d 331 (1951); Boes v. Howell, 24 N.M. 142, 173 P. 966 (1918). The applicable section of the family purpose doctrine to be considered is set out in SCRA 1986, 13-1210:

  3. Peters v. LeDoux

    491 P.2d 524 (N.M. 1971)   Cited 6 times
    In Peters v. LeDoux, 83 N.M. 307, 491 P.2d 524 (1971), our supreme court ruled that ownership, as evidenced by the certificate of title to an automobile, is not essential to liability under this state's Family Purpose Doctrine. Nothing in LeDoux, however, precludes a finding of ownership based on such title.

    Thus, we agree with the trial court's conclusion that plaintiff should recover from defendant under the family purpose doctrine. The opinion of the Court of Appeals, that defendant's contention is inconsistent with New Mexico decisions, is first predicated upon the assertion that the decisions in Pouliot v. Box, 56 N.M. 566, 246 P.2d 1050 (1952) and Stevens v. Van Deusen, 56 N.M. 128, 241 P.2d 331 (1951), "* * held heads of families liable under the doctrine when they did not own the automobile in question, and when the vehicle was not maintained for the general use and convenience of the family. * * *"

  4. Lopez v. Barreras

    77 N.M. 52 (N.M. 1966)   Cited 19 times

    Ownership of the car is not a controlling factor in determining the applicability of the family purpose doctrine. Stevens v. VanDeusen, 56 N.M. 128, 241 P.2d 331; Pouliot v. Box, 56 N.M. 566, 246 P.2d 1050. The family purpose doctrine applies to Fidel Barreras regardless of whether he is the owner; the guest statute applies to him only because he is the owner.

  5. Tart v. Register

    125 S.E.2d 754 (N.C. 1962)   Cited 32 times
    In Tart v. Register, 257 N.C. 161, 125 S.E.2d 754, the North Carolina court anticipated the inequitable consequences of failing to give a tortfeasor credit for medical payments made available under his own policy where he is otherwise not insured or where recovery exceeds the limits of his liability coverage.

    Matthews v. Cheatham, supra; Goode v. Barton, 238 N.C. 492, 78 S.E.2d 398." For analagous cases from other jurisdictions see: Stevens v. Van Deusen, 241 P.2d 331 (N.M. 1951); Pooliet v. Box, 246 P.2d 1050 (N.M. 1952); Robinson v. Ebert, 39 P.2d 992 (Wash. 1935); Hanson v. Eilers, 2 P.2d 719 (Wash. 1931).

  6. Zengerle v. Commonwealth Ins. Co. of N.Y

    60 N.M. 379 (N.M. 1956)   Cited 17 times

    Defendants declare under their point two that the record affirmatively shows the existence of genuine, controverted issues of fact, precluding the entry of a summary judgment, and we agree with counsel. Cf. Agnew v. Libby, 53 N.M. 56, 201 P.2d 775; McLain v. Haley, 53 N.M. 327, 207 P.2d 1013; Michelson v. House, 54 N.M. 197, 218 P.2d 861; and Pouliot v. Box, 56 N.M. 566, 246 P.2d 1050. Applying the rules of law above stated, it is clear that the trial court should have denied plaintiffs' motion for a summary judgment so that the issue raised between the parties hereto as to defendants' liability, if any, under their contractual undertaking might be tried upon its merits.

  7. Burkhart v. Corn

    59 N.M. 343 (N.M. 1955)   Cited 11 times
    Finding sufficient proof of agency to impose family purpose doctrine

    We have repeatedly held that the "family purpose doctrine" is followed in this jurisdiction. Boes v. Howell, 24 N.M. 142, 173 P. 966, L.R.A. 1918F, 288; Pouliot v. Box, 56 N.M. 566, 246 P.2d 1050; Stevens v. Van Deusen, 56 N.M. 128, 241 P.2d 331. It is first asserted that the evidence fails to establish a prima facie case under the doctrine.

  8. Le Doux ex rel. Gallegos v. Peters

    82 N.M. 661 (N.M. Ct. App. 1971)   Cited 4 times

    Our decisions have held heads of families liable under the doctrine when they did not own the automobile in question, and when the vehicle was not maintained for the general use and convenience of the family. Pouliot v. Box, 56 N.M. 566, 246 P.2d 1050 (1952); Stevens v. Van Deusen, 56 N.M. 128, 241 P.2d 331 (1951). Also, as the doctrine is applied in New Mexico when a child uses an automobile owned by his parents there is a presumption of agency arising from such ownership and use.

  9. Hately v. Hamilton

    81 N.M. 774 (N.M. Ct. App. 1970)   Cited 3 times

    We are called upon to determine whether the Guest Act bars an action under the family purpose doctrine. Although the motorcycle was owned by Charles, the family purpose doctrine was invoked by plaintiff under Pouliot v. Box, 56 N.M. 566, 246 P.2d 1050 (1952). In our opinion Cortez v. Martinez, 79 N.M. 506, 445 P.2d 383 (1968), supplies the answer to the issue presented under this point.

  10. Pesqueira v. Talbot

    441 P.2d 73 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1968)   Cited 19 times
    Finding a family existed for purposes of the doctrine where mother and daughter shared the same home and mother provided daughter with room and board

    At least two decisions regard a gift of the car by the parent as being equivalent to furnishing the car. See Pouliot v. Box, 56 N.M. 566, 246 P.2d 1050 (1952), and Robinson v. Ebert, 180 Wn. 387, 39 P.2d 992 (1935). Insofar as this intra-familial type of loan is concerned, at such times as it might be repaid, the element of "furnishing" may cease, but this is not before us now, as it is undisputed there was a substantial "loan" still outstanding at the time of this accident.