Further, the proceedings raise important state interests because Phelps-Roper challenges the constitutionality of state statutes. See Postscript v. Peach, 878 F.2d 1114, 1116 (8th Cir. 1989) ("vital state interests" implicated where plaintiff raised the issue of constitutionality of state statutes). Accordingly, the first two parts of the Middlesex analysis are met.
Under Younger, a federal court may decline to hear a case in which the federal court is requested to enjoin an on-going criminal or civil state judicial proceeding if 1) the proceeding provides an adequate opportunity for the state defendant (who in all probability is the federal plaintiff) to raise constitutional challenges in the state proceeding; and 2) the proceeding implicates state interests. Postscript Enterprises v. Peach, 878 F.2d 1114, 1116 (8th Cir. 1989) citing Younger, 401 U.S. at 44, 49. The doctrine may be applied even in cases where only declaratory relief is sought since such relief usually has the same practical effect as a formal injunction.
Therefore, these claims will not be treated separately from the issue of whether the Fourth Amendment was violated by failure to follow Fourth Amendment requirements when materials presumptively protected by the First Amendment are searched or seized. In Postscript Enterprises, Inc. v. Peach, 878 F.2d 1114 (8th Cir. 1989), the plaintiff, an operator of an adult bookstore, made similar claims: Postscript alleged that the state statutes in question violate its first, fourth, fifth and fourteenth amendment rights because they permitted and encouraged the police to seize materials presumptively protected by the first amendment to the United states Constitution.
See also Middlesex County Ethics Comm'n. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 102 S.Ct. 2515, 73 L.Ed.2d 116 (1982); Kelm v. Hyatt, 44 F.3d 415, 419 (6th Cir. 1995). We find persuasive the Eighth Circuit's perspective in Postscript Enterprises, Inc. v. Peach, 878 F.2d 1114, 1116 (8th Cir. 1989), in which the court held that forfeiture proceedings are quasi-criminal in nature and of such a character as to warrant application of the Younger doctrine. "The state's interest in these forfeiture proceedings is likely to be as great as its interest in its criminal law proceedings." Id. Citing Huffman, 420 U.S. at 605, 95 S.Ct. 1200 (internal citations omitted), the court in Postscript Enterprises said, "Under the Younger abstention doctrine the federal courts must abstain from interfering with the efforts of states or local governments `to protect the very interests which underlie [their] criminal laws and to obtain compliance with precisely the standards which are embodied in [their] criminal laws.
Since Warmus is the "beneficial owner, officer, and director" of AFSLIC, he is subject to Younger considerations otherwise applicable only to AFSLIC. See Doran v. Salem Inn, 422 U.S. 922, 928, 95 S.Ct. 2561, 2566, 45 L.Ed.2d 648 (1975) ("there plainly may be some circumstances in which legally distinct parties are so closely related that they should all be subject to the Younger considerations which govern any one of them"); see also Postscript Enters., Inc. v. Peach, 878 F.2d 1114, 1116 (8th Cir. 1989); Women's Serv., P.C. v. Douglas, 653 F.2d 355, 358 (8th Cir. 1981). Warmus cannot, and does not, seriously dispute that the second Middlesex factor can be satisfied.
The court finds this reasoning persuasive and concludes that the civil forfeiture proceedings at issue are quasi-criminal such that the Younger abstention doctrine may apply. See also Postscript Enters., Inc, v. Peach, 878 F.2d 1114, 1116 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding that civil forfeiture proceedings are quasi-criminal in nature and explaining that "[t]he state's interest in these forfeiture proceedings is likely to be as great as its interest in its criminal law proceedings."); Fairfield Cmty. Clean Up Crew Inc, v. Hale, 735 Fed.Appx. 602, 605 (11th Cir. 2018) ("[T]he state-court civil-forfeiture action is the type of which the Younger abstention principles generally apply[.]"); Garcia v. Wyoming, 587 Fed.Appx. 464, 467 (10th Cir. 2014) ("The forfeiture proceedings in the Wyoming courts present the kind of civil enforcement action that mandates abstention by the federal courts.")
Second, while it is true that Younger abstention bars federal challenges to civil forfeiture proceedings “before the forfeiture hearing in state court” has occurred, see Loch v. Watkins, 337 F.3d 574, 577 (6th Cir. 2003), or where those proceedings “were pending in state court at the time” the federal action was initiated, see Postscript Enterprises, Inc. v. Peach, 878 F.2d 1114, 1116 (8th Cir. 1989), that is not the situation here. The civil forfeiture proceedings in which these Plaintiffs had their assets seized
Regarding the third factor, undoubtedly the state's interest in its forfeiture proceedings, which are quasi-criminal in nature, implicates important state interests. See Postscript Enterprises, Inc., v. Peach, 878 F.2d 1114, 1116 (8th Cir. 1989) (citing Huffman v. Pursue Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 604 (1975)) (“Under the Younger abstention doctrine the federal courts must abstain from interfering with the efforts of states or local government to protect the very interests which underlie their criminal laws and to obtain compliance with precisely the standards which are embodied in their criminal laws.”)
Loch, 337 F.3d at 579 (“The state's interest in these forfeiture proceedings is likely to be as great as its interest in its criminal law proceedings.” (quoting Postscript Enterprises, Inc. v. Peach, 878 F.2d 1114, 1116 (8th Cir. 1989))). Plaintiff also attempts to escape abstention under Gerstein v. Pugh and Habich v. City of Dearborn.
Those factors also clearly weigh in favor of abstention: the proceeding is judicial, the state has an important interest in the enforcement of its criminal laws and vehicle regulations, and any constitutional challenges to the proceeding may be asserted in state trial and appellate courts. See Postscript Enterprises, Inc. v. Peach, 878 F.2d 1114, 1116 (8th Cir. 1989); Cook v. Hinrichs, 500 F.Supp.2d 1225, 1228 (D.S.D. 2007). Finally, there's no exception to Younger abstention that applies here: the Court finds no reason to believe the state court proceeding was based on bad faith, harassment, or some other extraordinary circumstance (as opposed to a good-faith disagreement about the applicability of Nebraska's motor vehicle laws).