Moreover, Brown's incarceration and his limited access to the prison law library do not entitle him to equitable tolling. Brown was not denied total access to the library. Indeed, he states the library was open one evening per week. Again, courts in this circuit have consistently held that a prisoner's incarceration and his limited access to legal materials are not extraordinary circumstances warranting equitable tolling. Chandler, 224 Fed.Appx. at 520 (citing Johnson v. McCaughtry, 265 F.3d 559, 566 (7th Cir. 2001)); see Posada v. Schomig, 64 F.Supp.2d 790, 796 (C.D.Ill. 1999) (holding that the fact that a prisoner was sometimes unable to access the law library, was not an extraordinary circumstance that justified equitable tolling); see also United States ex rel. Lacey v. Gilmore, 1998 WL 397842, at *3 (N.D.Ill. 1998) (finding that denial of access to the law library for limited periods of time did not excuse late filing of habeas petition). In addition, Brown's claim that he was misled by the prison law clerk does not establish extraordinary circumstances.
(quoting Turner v. Johnson, 177 F.3d 390, 392 (5th Cir. 1999))); United States v. Griffin, 58 F. Supp.2d 863, 868 (N.D. Ill. 1999). Further, other courts have held that the fact that a prison was sometimes on lock-down, preventing access to the prison law library, does not establish "extraordinary circumstances"justifying equitable tolling. Posada v. Schomig, 64 F. Supp.2d 790, 796 (C.D. Ill. 1999); see also United States ex rel. Morgan v. Gilmore, 26 F. Supp.2d 1035, 1039 (N.D. Ill. 1998). In this case, Ford states that he was ignorant of the time period and that, at some unspecified time during his incarceration, the prison was on lock-down preventing him from accessing the law library.
Moreover, petitioner's claim that his access to "law library, courts, personal legal work" was "limited" during administrative segregation does not constitute a viable argument that petitioner was "actually impeded" in his ability to timely file the petition. See e.g., Posada v. Schomig, 64 F. Supp.2d 790, 794 (C.D. Ill. 1999) (concluding that Petitioner's fairly "run-of-the-mill" claims that he was misled by his appellate counsel, that the prison was sometimes on lock-down and that prison law clerk did not provide adequate assistance do not establish "extraordinary circumstances" justifying equitable tolling of the AEDPA's one-year period of limitations); Ego-Aguirre v. White, 1999 WL 155694 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (finding that 180 days of lockdown and limited library access do not support equitable tolling). It goes without saying that the petitioner's catalogue of concerns likely caused some difficulty. The problem is that under present law no matter how "limiting" administrative segregation may have been, without a showing of diligence while subject to segregation, it is not a sufficient excuse.
However, that does not explain why he could not have filed his federal petition, which, of necessity, had to repeat claims already presented to the state court. Taken alone, that limited loss of materials does not justify equitable tolling. SeePosada v. Schomig, 64 F.Supp.2d 790, 796 (C.D.Ill.1999), aff'd,Posada v. Neal, 234 F.3d 1273 (7th Cir.2000) (unpublished), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 945, 121 S.Ct. 1411, 149 L.Ed.2d 353 (2001); United States v. Van Poyck, 980 F.Supp. 1108, 1111 (C.D.Cal.1997). The only other excuse Higgins offers is the occasional difficulty of prison lockdowns, which made it hard for him to use the library at times.
See, e.g., Miller v. Marr, 141 F.3d 976, 978 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding that equitable tolling did not apply where access to legal materials that would have given notice of the limitations period was delayed); Chaffer v. Prosper, 592 F.3d 1046 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting a state inmate was not entitled to equitable tolling of limitations period for filing federal habeas corpus petition based on inmate's reliance on helpers who were transferred or too busy to attend to his petitions); United States v. Cicero, 214 F.3d 199, 204-05 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (federal inmate was not entitled to equitable tolling on the ground that prisoner gave his legal papers to “jailhouse lawyer” whose placement in segregation resulted in separation of prisoner from his papers, as prisoner entrusted his papers to another at his own peril); Posada v. Schomig, 64 F.Supp.2d 790, 796 (C.D. Ill. 1999) (claim that prison law clerk did not provide adequate assistance does not establish “extraordinary circumstances”) aff'd, 234 F.3d 1273 (7th Cir. 2000) (unpublished); Crump v. United States, No. 12-768, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109398
To the extent Petitioner argues that Parcher was in some manner ineffective, the Court also rejects any argument that misinformation or ineffectiveness from a prison law clerk provides a basis for equitable tolling of the one-year period of limitation. See Posada v. Schomig, 64 F. Supp. 2d 790, 796 (C.D. Ill. 1999) (determining that the petitioner's claim that the prison law clerk did not provide adequate assistance did not establish a basis for tolling). -------- Because the Petition was not filed by October 8, 2015, it was untimely.
" Movant's conclusory allegations are insufficient to justify equitable tolling. See Miller v. Marr, 141 F.3d at 978; Akins v. U.S., 204 F.3d 1086, 1089 (11th Cir. 2000); Bryant v. Arizona Atty. Gen., 499 F.3d 1056, 1060 (9th Cir. 2007) (lack of access to case law during relevant time period was not an impediment for purposes of statutory tolling because there was no showing it prevented petitioner from filing his petition); cf. Roberts v. Cockrell, 319 F.3d 690, 695 (5th Cir. 2003) (petitioner failed to supply "the necessary details concerning his hospitalizations, such as when and for how long and at what stage of the proceedings they occurred, so as to allow a determination of whether they could have interfered with his ability to file his § 2254 application in a timely manner."); Posada v. Schomig, 64 F. Supp. 2d 790, 795 (C.D. Ill. 1999) (no tolling where petitioner failed to identify dates of prison lockdown and failed to show lockdowns were the cause for his not filing timely petition); Hizbullah-Ankhamon v. Walker, 255 F.3d 65, 75 (2d Cir. 2001) (no causal connection between period in solitary confinement and failure to file timely petition). For these reasons, the Court will dismiss this case as time-barred. Therefore,
Moreover, courts have held that incarceration is not the type of extraordinary circumstance that justifies equitable tolling. See Johnson v. McCaughtry, 265 F.3d 559, 566 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding that "we decline to find that this circumstance [of incarceration] is so extraordinary as to warrant application of this rarely applied doctrine"); see also Posada v. Schomig, 64 F. Supp. 2d 790, 796 (C.D. Ill. 1999) (holding that the fact that a prisoner was sometimes unable to access the law library, was not an extraordinary circumstance that justified equitable tolling). The Court finds that, on these facts, Plaintiff has not shown the type of extraordinary circumstance that would justify equitable tolling.
Petitioner's legal inexperience, pro se status, and state of incarceration are not extraordinary circumstances that justify his untimely filing — those kinds of "run-of-the-mill difficulties" are not legally-sufficient excuses for complying with AEDPA's timeliness provisions. Janssen, 2010 WL 3521962, at *1 (citing Tucker v. Kingston, 538 F.3d 735, 735 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that lack of legal experience is not an extraordinary circumstance justifying equitable tolling); Johnson v. McCaughtry, 265 F.3d 559, 566 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding that incarceration is not an extraordinary circumstance justifying equitable tolling)); see also United States v. Cook, 105 F. Supp. 2d 1013, 1014-15 (E.D. Wis. 2000) (holding that "neither a plaintiff's unfamiliarity with the legal process nor his lack of representation during the applicable filing period merits equitable tolling"); Posada v. Schomig, 64 F. Supp. 2d 790, 796 (C.D. Ill. 1999) (the fact that a prison was sometimes on lockdown, preventing access to the prison law library, does not establish "extraordinary circumstances" justifying equitable tolling). Furthermore, if Petitioner had argued that he was ignorant of the fact that his successive postconviction petition would not toll the statute of limitations, such ignorance of the law or of the limitations period would not be sufficient to warrant equitable tolling. U.S. ex rel Ford v. Page, 132 F. Supp. 2d 1112, 1115-1116 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (collecting cases); U.S. ex rel. Gilyana v. Sternes, 180 F. Supp. 2d 978, 984 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (citing Miller v. Runyon, 77 F.3d 189, 191 (7th Cir. 1996)). Second, the record does not show that Petitioner has been diligently pursuing his rights.
The threshold to trigger equitable tolling is very high, and a claim of excusable neglect or a run-of-the-mill claim of ignorance is not sufficient to invoke equitable tolling of the limitations period. See United States v. Marcello, 212 F.3d 1005, 1010 (7th Cir. 2000); Posada v. Schomig, 64 F. Supp. 2d 790, 796 (C.D. Ill. 1999) (citing United States ex rel. Morgan v. Gilmore, 26 F. Supp. 2d 1035, 1039 (N.D. Ill. 1998)). Rather, Alvarez must demonstrate that "extraordinary circumstances outside of [his] control prevent[ed] timely filing of the habeas petition." Lo v. Endicott, 506 F.3d 6572, 576 (7th Cir. 2007).