Opinion
No. 3-408 / 02-1583
Filed August 27, 2003
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Iowa County, William L. Thomas, Judge.
Jackman Corporation appeals from the district court ruling on judicial review reversing the Employment Appeal Board's decision determining a claimant was disqualified from receiving unemployment compensation benefits. AFFIRMED.
Kevin Visser and Brenda Wallrichs of Moyer Bergman, P.L.C., Cedar Rapids, for appellant Jackman Corporation.
Robert F. Wilson, Cedar Rapids, for appellee.
Considered by Zimmer, P.J., and Hecht and Eisenhauer, JJ.
The Jackman Corporation (Jackman) appeals from a district court's ruling on judicial review reversing an agency decision denying unemployment benefits to former Jackman employee, Patricia Porazil. Jackman contends the Employment Appeal Board's (Board) decision finding that Porazil voluntarily quit is supported by substantial evidence. We affirm the district court.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
Jackman owns a truck stop and restaurant known as the Quarter Post Truck Stop. Porazil began working at the truck stop as a food attendant in April 1999. In June 2001, she requested time off to have surgery on a non-employment related thumb injury. Jackman informed Porazil she had six weeks and two days of leave available under the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA). Porazil had surgery. Jackman approved FMLA leave and informed Porazil her leave would begin on July 13, 2001, and expire on August 28, 2001.
On August 16, 2001, Porazil's treating physician released her to work, with restrictions, effective September 26, 2001. On August 18, 2001, Porazil requested Jackman to extend her leave to September 26, 2001, in accordance with the work release form signed by her physician. Jackman's office manager responded by letter on August 20, 2001, stating:
We have received your request for an extended leave due to surgery. This request is denied. The Quarter Post is very understaffed at this time and we are running ads in the surrounding papers for immediate employment to fill the positions. Due to the fact that you have requested another month off and would then only be able to return with limitations we can no longer hold your position for you.
Because Porazil believed she had already been terminated, she did not contact Jackman following the expiration of her FMLA leave or when her physician released her for work.
Porazil filed a claim for unemployment benefits with Iowa Workforce Development — Unemployment Insurance Division. The agency granted benefits. Jackman appealed and an administrative law judge reversed the agency's decision. The administrative law judge concluded Porazil was unavailable for employment while in her physician's care and, after being released from her physician's care, voluntarily quit by not returning to work. Porazil sought further review before the Board. Two members of the Board reviewed the record. Because those members were not in agreement, the decision of the administrative law judge was affirmed by operation of law. Porazil then sought judicial review and the district court reversed, granting her benefits. Jackman appeals.
II. Scope of Review.
Our review of unemployment benefits cases is governed by the Iowa Administrative Procedure Act, Iowa Code chapter 17A. Lee v. Employment Appeal Bd., 616 N.W.2d 661, 664 (Iowa 2000). The district court acts in an appellate capacity to correct errors at law on the part of the agency when engaging in judicial review under Iowa Code section 17A.19(10) (2001). Holland Bros. Constr. v. Bd. of Tax Review, 611 N.W.2d 495, 499 (Iowa 2000).
When we review a district court's judicial review decision, we apply the standards of section 17A.19(10) to determine whether our conclusions are identical to those of the district court. Id. A party challenging agency action bears the burden of demonstrating the action's invalidity and resulting prejudice. Iowa Code § 17A.19(8)(a). This can be shown in a number of ways, including proof that the action was ultra vires, unconstitutional, legally erroneous, arbitrary or capricious. See generally Iowa Code § 17A.19(10). We are bound by agency fact findings that are supported by substantial evidence. See Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(f); Norland v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv., 412 N.W.2d 904, 913 (Iowa 1987). Evidence is substantial when reasonable minds could accept it as adequate to reach the same finding. Id.
III. Discussion.
Jackman contends the district court exceeded its scope of review and substituted its own judgment in place of the Board's. Jackman argues the Board's decision to affirm the denial of benefits is supported by substantial evidence. Specifically, Jackman asserts Porazil voluntarily quit without good cause by not returning to work on September 20, 2000.
On September 19, 2001, Porazil's doctor changed her release to work date and released her to employment without restrictions effective the next day, September 20, 2001.
Under Iowa Code section 96.5(1), a claimant is disqualified from collecting unemployment compensation benefits if that person has left work without good cause attributable to the individual's employer. However, a person is not disqualified if:
The individual left employment because of illness, injury or pregnancy upon the advice of a licensed and practicing physician, and upon knowledge of the necessity for absence immediately notified the employer, or the employer consented to the absence, and after recovering from the illness, injury, or pregnancy, when recovery was certified by a licensed and practicing physician, the individual returned to the employer and offered to perform services and the individual's regular work or comparable suitable work was not available, if so found by the department, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.
The administrative law judge concluded Porazil voluntarily quit her position by failing to inform Jackman she was available for work after her physician released her to return to work effective September 20, 2001. On judicial review, the district court concluded the administrative law judge's decision was "without basis in the facts of this case." The district court concluded Porazil was entitled to benefits because Jackman had terminated her employment prior to the expiration of her original request for leave.
We conclude the decision of the administrative law judge is not supported by substantial evidence. Porazil notified Jackman of her impending surgery. She requested and was granted a leave of absence, which was scheduled to expire August 28, 2001. On August 16, Porazil's physician released her to work effective September 26, 2001, with lifting restrictions. Porazil asked Jackman to extend her leave to September 26. On August 20, 2001, Jackman responded with a letter terminating Porazil's employment. It would be an erroneous and unreasonable application of the law to require Porazil to report to work on September 20, 2001, the actual date of her release to return to work, when her employer had already terminated the employment relationship. We affirm the district court's ruling remanding the case to the Board for purposes of determining the amount of unemployment compensation owed Porazil.