Opinion
# 2013-045-030 Motion No. M-83457
08-21-2013
KEITH POOLER v. THE STATE OF NEW YORK
Synopsis
Pro Se claimant's unclear motion. Possibly a motion to file a late claim.
Case information
UID: 2013-045-030 Claimant(s): KEITH POOLER Claimant short POOLER name: Footnote (claimant name) : Defendant(s): THE STATE OF NEW YORK Footnote The caption has been amended, sua sponte, to reflect the (defendant name) : State of New York as the only properly named defendant. Third-party claimant(s): Third-party defendant(s): Claim number(s): None Motion number(s): M-83457 Cross-motion number(s): Judge: GINA M. LOPEZ-SUMMA Claimant's Keith Pooler, Pro Se attorney: Defendant's Hon. Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General attorney: By: Theresa N. Wilson, Assistant Attorney General Third-party defendant's attorney: Signature date: August 21, 2013 City: Hauppauge Comments: Official citation: Appellate results: See also (multicaptioned case) Decision
The following papers were read and considered by the Court on this motion: Claimant's Notice of Motion, Claimant's document entitled "Claims" and Defendant's Affirmation in Opposition with annexed Exhibits A-B.
Claimant, Keith Pooler, a pro se inmate, has filed a document entitled "Claims" with a cover sheet entitled Notice of Motion. The portion of the Notice of Motion where the relief requested should be stated only contains the date upon which claimant will move the Court for some unspecified relief. In his Affidavit of Service claimant states that he served a true copy of the attached "All Motion" on defendant. The document entitled "Claims" does not mention any references to any motion provisions contained in the Court of Claims Act or the CPLR.
Defendant, the State of New York, treats the motion as if it were one seeking an order granting permission to file a late claim pursuant to Court of Claims Act § 10(6).
Although it is not clearly stated in his papers, it appears that claimant is alleging that on September 14, 2010 his request for a waiver of filing fees in an Article 78 action was denied. As a result, claimant alleges that his due process rights and his right to poor person status were violated.
It is well settled that "[t]he Court of Claims is vested with broad discretion to grant or deny an application for permission to file a late claim" (Matter of Brown v State of New York, 6 AD3d 756, 757 [2004]). In determining whether relief to file a late claim should be granted the Court must take into consideration the factors set forth in Court of Claims Act § 10(6) (Bay Terrace Coop. Section IV, Inc. v New York State Employees' Retirement Sys. Policemen's & Firemen's Retirement Sys., 55 NY2d 979 [1982]). The factors are not necessarily exhaustive, nor is the presence or absence of any particular one controlling (id.). Those factors are whether the delay in filing the claim was excusable; whether the defendant had notice of the essential facts constituting the claim; whether the defendant had an opportunity to investigate; whether the defendant was substantially prejudiced; whether the claim appears to be meritorious and whether the claimant has any other available remedy. A proposed claim to be filed, containing all of the information set forth in Court of Claims Act § 11, shall accompany any late claim application.
Claimant does not offer any legally acceptable excuse for the delay in serving the claim in this matter. Claimant also does not address the next three factors, notice, an opportunity to investigate and prejudice which are interrelated and as such will be considered together. Given the 2-year and 8-month delay here and claimant's failure to address these factors, defendant is found to be substantially prejudiced in this matter (Matter of Maurantonio v State of New York, 266 AD2d 290 [2d Dept 1999]). Additionally, claimant does have an alternative remedy in this matter such as appellate review of his Article 78 proceeding.
The most significant issue to be considered is that of merit. To permit the filing of a legally deficient claim would be an exercise in futility (Savino v State of New York, 199 AD2d 254 [2d Dept 1993]).
It is well settled that defendant is entitled to absolute immunity from suit for those governmental actions involving the exercise of discretion of a judicial nature (Arteaga v State of New York, 72 NY2d 212 [1988]; Tarter v State of New York, 68 NY2d 511 [1986]; Tango v Tulevech, 61 NY2d 34 [1983]). The doctrine of judicial immunity is broad. "Allegations of improper motives and even malicious wrongdoing are insufficient to circumvent absolute immunity" (Mertens v State of New York, 73 AD3d 1376 [3d Dept 2010]). Thus, "judicial immunity absolutely protects judges in the performance of their judicial functions" (Greer v Garito, 47 AD3d 677, 678 [2d Dept 2008]). Accordingly, this Court finds that the doctrine of judicial immunity applies in regard to the actions taken by the Supreme Court Judge who denied claimant's poor person status since issuing an order was within the performance of his judicial functions (Montesano v State of New York, 11 AD3d 435 [2d Dept 2004]).
Therefore, for the foregoing reasons, claimant's motion is denied.
August 21, 2013
Hauppauge, New York
GINA M. LOPEZ-SUMMA
Judge of the Court of Claims