See 18 U.S.C. § 116. It is also prohibited in Illinois, see 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/12-34, as well as in other nations, see, e.g., Female Genital Mutilation Act, 2003, c. 31 (Eng.); see also UK: New Female Circumcision Bill Closes Loophole, ANSA-Eng. Media Serv., Mar. 3, 2004, at 1, available at 2004 WL 64006952 ("Parents who take their daughters abroad to undergo genital circumcision will be sentenced to up to 14 years of prison under a new law."), and has been roundly criticized by the international community, see Abankwah, 185 F.3d at 23 (citing United Nations reports criticizing the practice of FGM). The notion that Ms. Olowo's daughters will be removed to Nigeria and subjected to this brutal procedure offends our sense of decency, and allowing Ms. Olowo to make this decision unilaterally disregards the legal rights of the children.See Polovchak v. Meese, 774 F.2d 731 (7th Cir. 1985); cf. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170, 64 S.Ct. 438, 88 L.Ed. 645 (1944) ("Parents may be free to become martyrs themselves. But it does not follow they are free . . . to make martyrs of their children before they have reached the age of full and legal discretion when they can make that choice for themselves.").

First, we cannot say that the foundation of the policy — the INS determination that six-year-old children necessarily lack sufficient capacity to assert, on their own, an asylum claim — is unreasonable.See Polovchak v. Meese, 774 F.2d 731, 736-37 (7th Cir. 1985) (presuming that twelve-year-old child was "near the lower end of an age range in which a minor may be mature enough to assert" an asylum claim against the wishes of his parents). Because six-year-old children must have some means of applying for asylum, see 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1), and because the INS has decided that the children cannot apply personally, the next element of the INS policy — that a six-year-old child must be represented by some adult in applying for asylum — necessarily is reasonable. In other words, we do not think that the INS, as a matter of law, must individually assess each child's mental capacity; we cannot say that looking at capacity instead of age for young children is required.

Plaintiff's interest in the custody of her children did not evaporate merely because she had temporarily lost their legal custody. See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753, 102 S.Ct. at 1394; Polovchak v. Meese, 774 F.2d 731, 735 (7th Cir. 1985); Staples, 706 F.2d at 990. Plaintiff's interest in the physical custody of her children could not be terminated without compliance with the requirements of due process.

In two of the cases, the minor aliens filed asylum applications that ran contrary to their parents' wishes. Polovchak v. Meese , 774 F.2d 731 (7th Cir.1985) ;seeGonzalez v. Reno , 212 F.3d 1338 (11th Cir.2000). Although the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits held in those cases that the parents' views should ordinarily trump those of young children, both matters involved asylum applications, not removal proceedings, and in neither situation was a parent serving or seeking to serve as a “representative” for a child in removal proceedings.

One exception to this rule exists: the government need not provide notice and a hearing prior to a deprivation of an interest in extraordinary or emergency situations. United States v. $8,850, 461 U.S. at 562 n. 12, 103 S.Ct. at 2011 n. 12; Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n., 452 U.S. 264, 299-300, 101 S.Ct. 2352, 2372, 69 L.Ed.2d 1 (1981); Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 90, 92 S.Ct. at 1999; Polovchak v. Meese, 774 F.2d 731, 736 (7th Cir. 1985). The "meaningful manner" requirement is less susceptible to a neat delineation in a single rule, in part because "no single model of procedural fairness, let alone a particular form of procedure, is dictated by the Due Process Clause . . . 'The very nature of due process negates any concept of inflexible procedures universally applicable to every imaginable situation.'"

The answer to this question turns out to be murkier than the district court thought. Polovchak v. Meese, 774 F.2d 731 (7th Cir. 1985), holds that parents who are citizens of another country cannot remove their own child from the United States to their native land, over the child's objection, unless the child first is afforded a hearing to determine whether living in another nation is in the child's interests. Walter Polovchak was only 12 when he balked at his parents' desire to return home, but we held that this was not conclusive.

The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Behagen, v. Amateur Basketball Ass'n of the United States, 774 F.2d 731, 733 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1010 (1985).

"Plaintiff's interest in the physical custody of her children could not be terminated without compliance with the requirements of due process." Id. at 200-01 (citing Polovchak v. Meese, 774 F.2d 731, 735-36 (7th Cir. 1985); Doe v. Staples, 706 F.2d 985, 990 (6th Cir. 1983)). The record evidence suggests that the defendants lied, coached a child to make false allegations of abuse, summarily denied Davis the lawful custody of her child, and afforded no meaningful consideration to her rendition of the circumstances, despite the fact that there was no evidence that any abuse had occurred, and despite Kendrick's admissions that she thought the abuse allegations were false. Any reasonable official in the defendants' positions would have recognized that conduct as a clear and plain denial of Davis's substantive and procedural due process rights.

See 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (a)(2)(c) (providing that if an alien has applied for and been denied asylum, he or she may not apply for asylum again); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (d)(6) ("If the Attorney General determines that an alien has knowingly made a frivolous application for asylum — the alien shall be permanently ineligible for any benefits under this chapter. . . ."); see also Polovchak v. Meese, 774 F.2d 731 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding that the government violated the due process rights of a minor resident alien's parents by granting asylum to the alien without giving the parents notice and an opportunity to be heard). Consider, as an example, the erase in which a child is kidnapped abroad, brought to the United States, and an application for asylum is filed on his or her behalf by the kidnapper.

See also Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. at 34, 103 S.Ct. at 330; Bark v. INS, 511 F.2d 1200, 1201 (9th Cir. 1975); Chan v. Bell, 464 F. Supp. at 130. Here too, a burden on familial association triggers due process even in the absence of an absolute prohibition. Polorchak v. Meese, 774 F.2d 731, 734 (7th Cir. 1985). Therefore, Section 5(b) indisputably burdens a constitutionally protected interest.