Opinion
A02A0117.
DECIDED: APRIL 17, 2002.
Aggravated assault, etc. Carroll Superior Court. Before Judge DUFFEY.
Dennis T. Blackmon, for appellant.
Peter J. Skandalakis, District Attorney, Jeffery W. Hunt, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
A jury found Perry Pless guilty of aggravated assault upon a police officer and simple battery. Pless appeals, asserting error in the court's jury charge. For the following reasons, we find the appeal untimely, and it is, accordingly, dismissed.
The record shows that Pless was represented by counsel at trial. The trial court entered judgment on the jury's guilty verdict on April 26, 1994. On May 5, 1994, Pless filed a pro se motion for new trial. Six days later, Pless filed another pro se motion for new trial. The record shows, however, that Pless was still represented by counsel when he filed both pro se motions. No other motions for new trial were filed, and the trial court denied Pless's pro se motions in an order dated March 2, 1999. Pless filed his notice of appeal on March 5, 1999.
The record is silent about the almost five year lapse of time between Pless's filing the motions and the trial court's ruling.
As a consequence of Pless's representation by counsel, his pro se motions are void. In Georgia, "[a] criminal defendant no longer has the right to represent himself and also be represented by an attorney. . . . As [Pless] was represented by counsel when he filed the pro se [motions, those motions were] of no legal effect whatsoever."
(Punctuation omitted.) Daniels v. State, 235 Ga. App. 296, 298 ( 509 S.E.2d 368) (1998) (addressing pro se motion for speedy trial filed by represented defendant). See also Johnson v. State, 266 Ga. 775, 778-779 (9) ( 470 S.E.2d 637) (1996) (holding that trial court erred in considering pro se motion for new trial filed when defendant was represented by counsel); Beattie v. State, 240 Ga. App. 327 (1) ( 523 S.E.2d 389) (1999) (because defendant was represented by counsel, trial court properly denied his pro se motion for continuance); Schaefer v. State, 238 Ga. App. 594 (1) ( 519 S.E.2d 248) (1999) (pro se motion for speedy trial void where defendant represented by counsel).
Although Pless, represented by new counsel, filed his notice of appeal within 30 days after the trial court denied his pro se motions for new trial, his "void motion[s] for new trial did not toll the 30-day limit within which he was required to file a notice of appeal from the underlying judgment and sentence." Accordingly, notwithstanding the merits of Pless's appeal, it is dismissed as untimely. Appeal dismissed. POPE, P.J., and BARNES, J., concur.
Keller v. State, 252 Ga. App. 813, 815 (1) ( 558 S.E.2d 5) (2001).
See id.