Opinion
Civil No. 9:01-CV-0100 (LEK/GLS)
July 11, 2002
Derrick Pittman, Auburn, NY, Plaintiff, Pro Se.
Hon. Eliot Spitzer, Attorney General State of New York, Steven H. Schwartz, Esq., Asst. Attorney General Albany, New York, for Defendants.
REPORT-RECOMMENDATION
I. INTRODUCTION
This matter was referred to the undersigned for a Report-Recommendation by the Hon. Lawrence E. Kahn, United States District Judge, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 72.3(c). Pending is a motion to dismiss filed on May 9, 2001, by defendants Dr. Anthony Forte ("Forte") and Z. Hoefling ("Hoefling") in lieu of an answer (Dkt. No. 12). Plaintiff, pro se, Derrick Pittman ("Pittman") responded to the motion (Dkt. No. 18). Pittman brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claiming that the defendants violated his civil rights under the First, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. After reviewing Pittman's claims and for the reasons set forth below, the defendants' motion to dismiss should be granted.
Defendant Erickson does not join in this motion to dismiss.
The claim of excessive force against defendants Miller, McDonald and Erickson will not be addressed since Erickson, who was the only one served, has not joined the current motion to dismiss.
II. Facts
On March 25, 1998, Corrections Officer Miller confiscated two tapes and a pair of headphones that belonged to Pittman, claiming that they were unauthorized. After Pittman's cell search, he claimed that he was assaulted by Officers Miller, McDonald and Erickson. Thereafter, he was transported in a wheelchair to the Special Housing Unit ("SHU") since he was having difficulty walking. When he arrived at the SHU, Hoefling conducted a body search. As he watched, Hoefling withdrew a dark colored object from his pocket and wrapped it in a pair of underwear that did not belong to him. Thereafter, Hoefling reported that he had found a razor blade in a pair of Pittman's underwear.
On March 31, 1998, a disciplinary hearing was conducted for the altercation in Pittman's cell, and the weapon incident in the SHU. However, Pittman was unable to attend the hearing since his request for a wheelchair, crutches, or a cane was denied, and he was unable to walk to the hearing. Forte testified during the hearing that in his opinion, Pittman did not need a walking aid to walk the limited distance to the hearing. Subsequently, the hearing was conducted in his absence. He was sentenced to sixty months in the SHU, sixty months loss of packages, and twelve months loss of good time credits.
III. DISCUSSION A. Legal Standard
In deciding a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings, the court applies the same standard as is used in deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). See Sheppard v. Beerman, 18 F.3d 147, 150 (2d Cir. 1994). Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides that a cause of action shall be dismissed if a complaint fails "to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." In other words, the court should dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the complaint which would entitle him to relief. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957); Harris v. City of New York, 186 F.3d 243, 247 (2d Cir. 1999); S.E.C. v. U.S. Environmental, Inc., 155 F.3d 107, 110 (2d Cir. 1998). "The task of the court in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion `is merely to assess the legal feasibility of the complaint, not to assay the weight of the evidence which might be offered in support thereof.'" Cooper v. Parsky, 140 F.3d 433, 440 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting Ryder Energy Distribution Corp. v. Merrill Lynch Commodities Inc., 748 F.2d 774, 779 (2d Cir. 1984)). Therefore, in analyzing a motion to dismiss, the facts alleged by a plaintiff are assumed to be true and must be liberally construed in the light most favorable to him. See e.g., Easton v. Sundram, 947 F.2d 1011, 1014-15 (2d Cir. 1991). With this generous standard in mind, the court turns to the sufficiency of Pittman's claims.
B. Denial of Adequate Medical Care and Due Process Violation
Pittman is suing defendant Forte for deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs, and for aiding in the denial of his right to attend his disciplinary hearing. Both claims fail for the following reasons.
1. Due Process Claim
The Supreme Court has determined that an inmate, who implicates the invalidity of his conviction or sentence in a § 1983 action, must first demonstrate that his sentence or conviction has been reversed or invalidated by another tribunal, or called into question by the issuance of a federal habeas corpus petition. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-487, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 2372, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994). The Court has applied this reasoning to a § 1983 action in which the plaintiff challenges the loss of his good time credits in an administrative hearing. Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 643-644, 117 S.Ct. 1584, 1586-1587, 137 L.Ed.2d 906 (1997). The Court held that a claim for damages under § 1983 brought by a state prisoner whose allegations necessarily challenge the validity of the procedures used to deprive him of good time credits is not actionable under § 1983, unless the decision in question has previously been invalidated. See Edwards, 520 U.S. at 648, 117 S.Ct. at 1589.
The Supreme Court's decision in Edwards engendered great confusion regarding the applicability of the Heck rule to intra-prison administrative actions. See Jenkins v. Haubert, 179 F.3d 19, 25 (2d Cir. 1999). The source of that confusion was whether Heck barred challenges to disciplinary decisions that do not affect the overall length of an inmate's confinement. Id. at 26. The Second Circuit resolved this question in Jenkins when it held that Heck does not apply to such cases. Id. at 27.
However, despite the Circuit's recent interpretation in this area of law, it is clear that the Heck rule, through Edwards, still applies to cases where a prisoner challenges the procedures used in a disciplinary hearing that results in the loss of good time credits.
In this case, Pittman alleges that he was improperly issued a misbehavior report, then prohibited from attending his disciplinary hearing, which resulted in sixty months of SHU confinement and loss of good time credits. The defendants contend that this cause of action must be dismissed because it is barred by Edwards. The defendants maintain that Pittman has not demonstrated that the determination imposing a penalty has been overturned. Since his penalty included the loss of good time credits, his claim is not cognizable under § 1983.
This court finds that Edwards clearly applies to this claim because Pittman challenges the validity of a disciplinary hearing which affected the overall length of his confinement. Although Pittman does not specifically attack the loss of his good time credits, his claim, if successful, would require the invalidation of his disciplinary hearing. Since there is no indication that the disciplinary hearing has been invalidated either administratively or by a state court proceeding, Edwards does apply here. Accordingly, this court recommends that Pittman's due process claim against defendant Forte should be dismissed.
2. Eighth Amendment Claim
Pittman also contends that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. The Eighth Amendment does not mandate comfortable prisons, yet it does not tolerate inhumane prisons either, and the conditions of an inmate's confinement are subject to examination under the Eighth Amendment. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 1975, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994). Nevertheless, deprivations suffered by inmates as a result of their incarceration only become reprehensible to the Eighth Amendment when they deny the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298, 111 S.Ct. 2321, 2324, 115 L.Ed.2d 271 (1991) (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347, 101 S.Ct. 2392, 2399, 69 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981)).
Moreover, the Eighth Amendment embodies "broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency . . ." against which penal measures must be evaluated. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 102, 97 S.Ct. at 290. Repugnant to the Amendment are punishments hostile to the standards of decency that "`mark the progress of a maturing society.'" Id. (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101, 78 S.Ct. 590, 598, 2 L.Ed.2d 630 (1958). Also repugnant to the Amendment, are punishments that involve "`unnecessary and wanton inflictions of pain.'" Id. at 103, 97 S.Ct. at 290 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 2925, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976)).
In light of these elementary principles, a state has a constitutional obligation to provide inmates adequate medical care. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 54, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 2258, 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1988). By virtue of their incarceration, inmates are utterly dependant upon prison authorities to treat their medical ills and are wholly powerless to help themselves if the state languishes in its obligation. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103, 97 S.Ct. at 290. The essence of an improper medical treatment claim lies in proof of "deliberate indifference to serious medical needs." Id. at 104, 97 S.Ct. at 291. Simply put, "in order to allege deliberate indifference, plaintiff must assert facts establishing that either his access to physicians for necessary medical care was unreasonably delayed or denied, or that prescribed medical treatment was withheld by a defendant for the sole purpose of causing plaintiff unnecessary pain." Nunez v. Horn, 72 F. Supp.2d 24, 28 (N.D.N.Y. 1999).
The standard of deliberate indifference includes both subjective and objective components. The objective component requires the alleged deprivation to be sufficiently serious, while the subjective component requires the defendant to act with a sufficiently culpable state of mind. See Chance v. Armstrong, 143 F.3d 698, 702 (2d Cir. 1998). A prison official acts with deliberate indifference when he "`knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.'" Id. (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837, 114 S.Ct. at 1979). However, "`the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.'" Id. However, an Eighth Amendment claim may be dismissed if there is no evidence that a defendant acted with deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. An inmate does not have a right to the treatment of his choice. See Murphy v. Grabo, 1998 WL 166840, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. April 9, 1998) (citation omitted). Also, mere disagreement with the prescribed course of treatment does not always rise to the level of a constitutional claim. See Chance, 143 F.3d at 703. Moreover, prison officials have broad discretion to determine the nature and character of medical treatment which is provided to inmates. See Murphy, 1998 WL 166840, at *4 (citation omitted).
While there is no exact definition of a "serious medical condition" in this circuit, the Second Circuit has indicated what injuries and medical conditions are serious enough to implicate the Eighth Amendment. See Chance, 143 F.3d at 702-703. In Chance, the Second Circuit held that an inmate complaining of a dental condition stated a serious medical need by showing that he suffered from great pain for six months. The inmate was also unable to chew food and lost several teeth. The Circuit also recognized that dental conditions, along with medical conditions, can vary in severity and may not all be severe. Id. at 702. The court acknowledged that while some injuries are not serious enough to violate a constitutional right, other very similar injuries can violate a constitutional right under different factual circumstances. Id.
The Second Circuit provided some of the factors to be considered when determining if a serious medical condition exists. Id. at 702-703. Factors that the court mentioned were "`[t]he existence of an injury that a reasonable doctor or patient would find important and worthy of comment or treatment; the presence of a medical condition that significantly affects an individual's daily activities; or the existence of chronic and substantial pain'" are highly relevant. Id. at 702-703 (citation omitted).
In this case, Pittman claims that he "needed the assistance of a wheelchair, crutches or a walking cane to be transported to his hearing, due to the extreme pain he was suffering to his left leg and foot" (Compl. ¶ 16). He alleges that Forte's failure to authorize a walking aid constituted deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. Pittman claims that this action by Forte clearly established a substantive due process violation.
The defendants contend that Pittman has failed to state a cause of action against Forte for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. They argue that Pittman was not suffering from a serious medical need. Furthermore, they argue that even assuming that Pittman was suffering extreme pain to his leg and foot, they maintain that, at best, Forte's actions may have constituted negligence, but not deliberate indifference.
As previously noted, in order to allege deliberate indifference, Pittman must assert facts establishing that either: (1) his access to a physician for necessary medical care was unreasonably delayed or denied; or (2) that prescribed medical treatment was withheld by a defendant for the sole purpose of causing plaintiff unnecessary pain. Pittman has failed to establish facts which, even if true, provide a basis for the relief sought.
The fact that two weeks after the hearing Pittman was issued a wheelchair is insufficient to show that he needed it prior to that time. There is nothing in the record to show that Forte denied him a walking aid in order to cause unnecessary pain. Accordingly, this court recommends that Pittman's Eighth Amendment claim against Forte should be dismissed.
C. False Misbehavior Report
The Second Circuit has held that "a prison inmate has no general constitutional right to be free from being falsely accused in a misbehavior report." Boddie v. Schnieder, 105 F.3d 857, 862 (2d Cir. 1997); see Freeman v. Rideout, 808 F.2d 949, 951 (2d Cir. 1986). "As long as prison officials grant the inmate a hearing and an opportunity to be heard, `the filing of unfounded charges d[oes] not give rise to a per se constitutional violation actionable under § 1983.'" Franco v. Kelly, 854 F.2d 584, 587 (2d Cir. 1988). There must be more such as retaliation against the prisoner for exercising a constitutional right. See Franco, 854 F.2d at 588-590.
In this case, Pittman alleges that Hoefling filed a misbehavior report against him in response to the assault of his fellow officers by Pittman. Specifically, Pittman claims that after Hoefling completed a body search, he asked Hoefling about being issued a toothbrush, washcloth and additional clothing for the SHU. Pittman claims that Hoefling replied by stating that he should not "worry about any additional SHU items . . . because [he] was going to have plenty of time in the SHU to get the stuff once [Hoefling] and his brother officers (who Hoefling claimed plaintiff assaulted) got through with [him]" (Compl. ¶¶ 11-12). Subsequent to this exchange, Hoefling turned his attention away from Pittman and while stepping out of the view of the surveillance camera stationed just outside the exit, Pittman watched Hoefling retrieve a dark colored object from his pocket and wrap the object in a pair of SHU underwear nearby, that did not belong to him. Thereafter, Hoefling claimed that he found a razor blade concealed in a pair of underwear that he falsely reported belonged to Pittman. On the other hand, the defendants maintain that Hoefling must be dismissed from the suit because Pittman's claim regarding denial of due process is barred by Edwards.
Pittman alleges that Hoefling planted the razor blade in response to the assault that occurred between Pittman and his fellow officers. This court finds that Pittman has no cause of action against Hoefling for allegedly filing a false misbehavior report because despite not attending the hearing, Pittman was provided a hearing. Additionally, Pittman's due process claim is also barred by Edwards since nothing in the record shows that his conviction was invalidated. Accordingly, this court recommends that the false misbehavior report claim against Hoefling should be dismissed.
WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, it is hereby RECOMMENDED, that the motion to dismiss be GRANTED in all respects in favor of defendants Forte and Hoefling. However, this court makes no recommendation as to defendant Erickson as he has not filed a motion; and it is further
ORDERED, that the Clerk of the Court serve a copy of this Report-Recommendation upon the parties by regular mail.
NOTICE: Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties may lodge written objections to the foregoing report. Such objections shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court within TEN days. FAILURE TO SO OBJECT TO THIS REPORT WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW. Roldan v. Racette, 984 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1993); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72, 6(a), 6(e).