Opinion
2 CA-CV 2021-0043
01-25-2022
PINAL COUNTY, A POLITICAL SUBDIVISION OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA, Plaintiff/Appellee, v. SANTINA JOHNSON, Defendant/Appellant.
Kent P. Volkmer, Pinal County Attorney By Geraldine Roll, Deputy County Attorney, Florence Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee Santina Johnson, Bismarck, Arkansas In Propria Persona
Not for Publication - Rule 111(c), Rules of the Arizona Supreme Court
Appeal from the Superior Court in Pinal County No. S1100CV201900983 The Honorable Stephen F. McCarville, Judge The Honorable Joseph R. Georgini, Judge
Kent P. Volkmer, Pinal County Attorney By Geraldine Roll, Deputy County Attorney, Florence Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee
Santina Johnson, Bismarck, Arkansas In Propria Persona
Judge Espinosa authored the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Eckerstrom and Chief Judge Vásquez concurred.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
ESPINOSA, JUDGE
¶1 Santina Johnson appeals from the trial court's judgment in favor of Pinal County ("County") stemming from violations of the Pinal County Building Code ("Code") at her real property in Pinal County. Because any violations have been removed, Johnson no longer owns the property, and the judgment at issue has been vacated, we dismiss her appeal as moot.
Procedural Background
¶2 In 2018, the Pinal County Code Compliance office sent a letter to Johnson identifying "Code violations" for the unpermitted installation of a 320 square foot "metal cargo or shipping container" on her property. In September, a complaint was filed in the Pinal County Hearing Office which resulted in Johnson being found "in violation" and the imposition of a $700 penalty. In 2019, the County filed in the trial court a complaint and request for preliminary injunction seeking an order for Johnson "to abate the violations of the . . . Code" and pay the $700 penalty. Johnson, appearing in propria persona, denied she had violated the Code, asserting "containers are not structures and are personal property" and, because "cargo containers are portable they are not real property by definition" so the Code "does not apply."
¶3 Johnson filed an unsuccessful motion to dismiss and then, represented by counsel, moved for summary judgment. The County cross-moved for summary judgment contending "there is no dispute [Johnson] has maintained a storage structure on her property, the shipping container, without obtaining a permit and the associated anchors required" by the Code. Following oral argument, the trial court granted the County's motion, rejecting Johnson's "narrow interpretation" of the Code that she need not have a permit for the shipping container because she did not build or construct it but it was "just placed on the property." The court entered judgment against Johnson awarding the County payment of the $700 fine and issuing a permanent mandatory injunction stating "Johnson, her agents, servants, employees, and any and all persons in active concert or participation with them . . . are . . . permanently restrained and enjoined from violating the [Code] by failing to apply for and acquire a permit for the shipping container and secure the same to the ground." Johnson filed a timely appeal.
Discussion
¶4 After the filing of Johnson's opening brief in this court, the County successfully moved to vacate the judgment in the trial court because the cargo container had been removed and Johnson had sold the property.Accordingly, in its answering brief, the County asserts this appeal should be dismissed as moot. We agree.
Johnson filed an untimely response to the motion to vacate stating counsel had not received the motion by mail and received the motion by email when he was "out and away from the office due to the passing of a family member and subsequent funeral." Counsel requested leave to submit the untimely response and requested Johnson be given "the opportunity to be heard on this matter as she is in the process of obtaining new counsel or will appear pro per." Johnson also filed an objection to the County's proposed order stating she "does not want the case dismissed pending the appeal." Counsel then successfully moved to withdraw as attorney of record in the trial court without Johnson's consent, based on an ethical conflict. If the trial court expressly ruled on Johnson's other filings, it does not appear in our record, but the court granted the County's motion to vacate the judgment based on the "time for response to that motion having expired, and good cause showing," vacated the judgment and permanent mandatory injunction, dismissed the case with prejudice, administratively closed the case, and vacated all future hearing dates.
¶5 As the County notes, our appellate jurisdiction is confined to appeals taken by a "party aggrieved by a judgment." Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 1(d); Kondaur Cap. Corp. v. Pinal County, 235 Ariz. 189, ¶ 6 (App. 2014). And, relatedly, we typically decline to consider moot or abstract questions as a matter of judicial restraint because "[i]t is not an appellate court's function to declare principles of law which cannot have any practical effect in settling the rights of litigants." Kondaur Cap. Corp., 235 Ariz. 189, ¶ 8 (quoting Progressive Specialty Ins. Co. v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Ariz., 143 Ariz. 547, 548 (App. 1985)).
¶6 Johnson is not a party aggrieved by the judgment here - and therefore lacks standing-because she no longer owns the property where the Code violations had occurred and, more importantly, the judgment against her has been vacated and no longer exists. See id. ¶ 6. Nor are we persuaded any of the typical exceptions to the mootness doctrine apply. See Cardoso v. Soldo, 230 Ariz. 614, ¶¶ 5-9 (App. 2012) (recognizing we have considered moot appeals "when they present an issue of great public importance or one capable of repetition yet evading review" or "if the consequences of [an] order will continue to affect a party"). We cannot say this case is one of great public importance, especially because the trial court resolved the sole issue through a straightforward application of the relevant authorities. See Kondaur Cap. Corp., 235 Ariz. 189, ¶ 10. And "[i]ssues are typically characterized as 'evading review' where time constraints prevent an appeal from being heard," id. ¶ 12, but Johnson's case evades review because of her own choice to sell her property. Finally, although Johnson has identified several consequences, not found in the record, that she claims stem from the County's actions underlying this suit against her, even were we to accept them as true, she has cited no relevant authority demonstrating they are of the sort recognized by Arizona law. See, e.g., Cardoso, 230 Ariz. 614, ¶ 9 (describing collateral consequences stemming from court-ordered mental health treatment, suspension of driver license, and criminal cases).
See Pinal County Building Code, Ordinance No. 091912-BCO, §§ 301, 301.2 (2012) (adopting "International Residential Code, 2012 Edition"); Int'l Residential Code for One- and Two-family Dwellings §§ R105.1 (permit required when owner or authorized agent "intends to construct, enlarge, alter, repair, move, demolish or change the occupancy of a building or structure"), R105.2(1) (permit not required for "[o]ne-story detached accessory structures used as tool and storage sheds, playhouses and similar uses, provided the floor area does not exceed 200 square feet"), R202 (defining accessory structure as "[a] structure not greater than 3, 000 square feet . . . in floor area, and not over two stories in height, the use of which is customarily accessory to and incidental to that of the dwelling(s) and which is located on the same lot") (Int'l Code Council 2012); A.R.S. § 11-815(H) (allowing for enforcement of code violations).
For example, Johnson contends the County "forced" her to sell her home, cost her the support of "doctors, family and friends," "caused [her] to develop [l]upus from the constant stress and harassment" and the trial court "forced on [her]" over $30,000 in attorney fees.
Disposition
¶7 For the reasons outlined above, this appeal is dismissed.
Johnson's request for an award of attorney fees "incurred in having to bring this appeal, to be awarded at such time as she prevails by an adjudication on the merits herein" is also denied as moot.