Opinion
Civil Action 3:20-CV-799
12-07-2021
MARKI PILGRIM, Plaintiff v. OFFICER JASON HYLER, et al., Defendants
MARIANI, D.J.
REPORT & RECOMMENDATION
William I. Arbuckle U.S. Magistrate Judge
I. INTRODUCTION
State inmate Marki Pilgrim (“Plaintiff”) commenced this pro se civil rights action against two police officers alleging that Plaintiff was arrested and imprisoned without probable cause. Plaintiff has since pleaded guilty to the state court criminal charges underlying that arrest.
After Plaintiff was convicted, Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 23). Plaintiff has not responded, after being directed to do so and advised of the consequences of a failure to respond. Plaintiff also has not produced any evidence to contradict the officers' account that they observed Plaintiff emptying drugs out of his pockets as he attempted to flee the scene of the arrest.
Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED that:
(1) Plaintiff's Complaint be DISMISSED pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b); or in the alternative,
(2) Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 23) be GRANTED.
(3) The Clerk of Court be DIRECTED to CLOSE this case.
II. BACKGROUND & PROCEDURAL HISTORY
According to the Complaint, on February 21, 2020, Plaintiff arrived at his apartment in a Jesse's Express van. (Doc. 1). When he stepped out of the van and began to walk towards his apartment, Plaintiff was approached by two officers-Jason Hyler (“Defendant Hyler”) and Defendant Kyle Gilmartin (“Defendant Gilmartin”)-and was arrested. Id. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges:
On or about February 21, 2020, Marki Pilgrim (“Plaintiff”) had stepped out of the Jesse's Express van and began walking towards his apartment. As the Plaintiff was walking he was approached by officers Jason Hyler and Kyle Gilmartin (“Defendants”) of the Scranton Police Department. The Plaintiff was ordered to stop by the Defendants. The Plaintiff did not stop as he did not have to stop at the order of the Defendants.
The Defendants was fully knowledgeable that there ordering of the plaintiff to stop was not upon reasonable suspicion to detained the plaintiff because: 1. They had not witnessed with there own eyes that the Plaintiff engaged in criminal activity.
The Plaintiff alleges that all the Defendants seen the plaintiff do was step out of Jesse's van and walking. Nothing that the officers, Defendants, seen gave them reasonable suspicion to detain the plaintiff for investigation into any criminal activity.
The officers, Defendants, continued to pursue the plaintiff when they caught up to the plaintiff they had threw the plaintiff on the ground, placed the plaintiff in hand-cuffs, then placed the plaintiff in a police vehicle against the plaintiff's will and transported him to a courthouse jail cell.
The plaintiff was not a pretrial detainee at this moment when he was unlawfully detained by the Defendants. This detention of the Plaintiff
was unreasonable as it was not: 1. Pursuant to legal process; 2 Based on evidence in the possession of the Defendants from a crime committed by the Plaintiff; and 3. Supported by probable cause.
The plaintiff was not under arrest at this moment when the Defendants ordered the Plaintiff to stop. It is this moment of detention that the Plaintiff claims is unreasonable. Also, it is this moment that the Defendants detention of the Plaintiff was in the absence of probable cause.
The plaintiff was held by the Defendants in an unlawful detention for about 24 hours in a jail cell without any reason. This detention was unlawful and unreasonable within the Fourth amendments meaning and the plaintiff believes the Defendants is liable under section 1983 as they caused the plaintiff to endure such an unreasonable detention. The plaintiff believes that the Fourth (4th) Amendment prohibits government officials from detaining a person in the absence of probable cause.(Doc. 1).
According to publicly available court records, on Monday February 24, 2020, a criminal complaint was filed charging Plaintiff with: manufacture, deliver, or possession with intent to manufacture or deliver; intent to possess a controlled substance; use/possession of drug paraphernalia; resisting arrest; and tampering with/fabricating physical evidence. Commonwealth v. Pilgrim, MJ-45106-CR-132-2020 (Magis. Ct. Lackawanna Cty); (Doc. 24, ¶ 5). At the preliminary hearing, the resisting arrest and evidence tampering charges were dismissed. Id. The remaining charges were bound over to the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas. Commonwealth v. Pilgrim, CP-35-CR-643-2020 (C.C.P. Lackawanna Cty); (Doc. 24, ¶ 6).
On May 15, 2020, while his criminal charges were still pending, Plaintiff initiated this civil rights action in federal court. (Doc. 1). In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that his rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution were violated because Defendants arrested and imprisoned him without probable cause.
As relief, Plaintiff requests:
1. Granting Plaintiff judgment compensatory damages in the amount deemed just and proper by the court for loss of time the Plaintiff suffered being detained against each Defendants jointly and severally;
2. Granting Plaintiff judgment punitive damages in the amount deemed just and proper by the court against each Defendant jointly and severally;
3. Plaintiff seeks a jury trial on all issues triable by jury;
4. Plaintiff seeks recovery of all cost in this suit;
5. Plaintiff seeks a declaration from the Defendants that at the moment they detained the Plaintiff when the ordered the Plaintiff to stop this detention was unreasonable and violated the 4th Amendment right of the Plaintiff;
6. Plaintiff seeks any additional relief this court deems just, proper, and equitable.(Doc. 1, pp. 4-5).
On July 21, 2020, Defendants filed an Answer to Plaintiff's Complaint (Doc. 13). Upon receipt of the Answer, the Court issued an order setting out case management deadlines. (Doc. 15). On December 4, 2020, Defendants filed a motion requesting that the case management deadlines set by the court be stayed until the pending criminal charges were resolved. (Doc. 17). Defendants' motion was granted. (Doc. 21).
On July 16, 2021, Defendants notified the Court by letter that the pending criminal charges were resolved by a plea of guilty and sentencing. (Doc. 27). The Court issued an order lifting the stay. (Doc. 28).
Also on July 16, 2021, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 23). Along with their motion, Defendants filed a statement of facts (Doc. 24), brief in support (Doc. 25), and supporting exhibits (Doc. 23-1).
On July 19, 2021, the Court issued an order advising Plaintiff that he was required to respond to Defendants' motion for summary judgment on or before August 9, 2021. (Doc. 30). In that order, the Court advised Plaintiff that the failure to respond may result in the dismissal of his case. Id. Plaintiff did not file a response.
On August 16, 2021, the Court issued a second order granting Plaintiff an extension of time to respond to the pending motion for summary judgment sua sponte. (Doc. 31). Plaintiff was advised that his response was due on to before September 15, 2021, and that the failure to respond may result in the dismissal of his case. Id.
On September 7, 2021, Plaintiff requested an extension of time to respond to Defendants' motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 32). Plaintiff's motion was granted. (Doc. 33). Plaintiff was afforded until November 15, 2021 to respond to Defendants' motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 33). To date, the Court has not received a response.
III. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Dismissal Under Rule 41(b)
Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes a court to dismiss a civil action for failure to prosecute, stating that: “If the plaintiff fails to prosecute or to comply with these rules or a court order, a defendant may move to dismiss the action or any claim against it.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b). Decisions regarding dismissal of actions for failure to prosecute rest in the sound discretion of the Court, and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of that discretion. Emerson v. Thiel College, 296 F.3d 184, 190 (3d Cir. 2002) (citations omitted). That discretion, however, while broad is governed by certain factors, commonly referred to as Poulis factors. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has noted:
To determine whether the District Court abused its discretion [in dismissing a case for failure to prosecute], we evaluate its balancing of the following factors: (1) the extent of the party's personal responsibility; (2) the prejudice to the adversary caused by the failure to meet scheduling orders and respond to discovery; (3) a history of dilatoriness; (4) whether the conduct of the party or the attorney was willful or in bad faith; (5) the effectiveness of sanctions other than dismissal, which entails an analysis of alternative sanctions; and (6) the meritoriousness of the claim or defense. Poulis v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 747 F.2d 863, 868 (3d Cir.1984).Emerson, 296 F.3d at 190.
In exercising this discretion “there is no ‘magic formula' that we apply to determine whether a District Court has abused its discretion in dismissing for failure to prosecute.” Lopez v. Cousins, 435 Fed.Appx. 113, 116 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Briscoe v. Klaus, 538 F.3d 252 (3d Cir. 2008)). Therefore, “[i]n balancing the Poulis factors, [courts] do not [employ] a . . . ‘mechanical calculation' to determine whether a District Court abused its discretion in dismissing a plaintiff's case..” Briscoe, 538 F.3d at 263 (quoting Mindek v. Rigatti, 964 F.2d 1369, 1373 (3d Cir. 1992)). Consistent with this view, it is well-settled that “no single Poulis factor is dispositive, ” and that “not all of the Poulis factors need be satisfied in order to dismiss a complaint.” Briscoe, 538 F.3d at 263 (internal citations and quotations omitted). Moreover, recognizing the broad discretion conferred upon the district court in making judgments weighing these six factors, the court of appeals has frequently sustained such dismissal orders where there has been a pattern of dilatory conduct by a pro se litigant who is not amenable to any lesser sanction. See, e.g., Emerson, 296 F.3d 184; Tillio v. Mendelsohn, 256 Fed.Appx. 509 (3d Cir. 2007); Reshard v. Lankenau Hospital, 256 Fed.Appx. 506 (3d Cir. 2007); Azubuko v. Bell National Organization, 243 Fed.Appx. 728 (3d Cir. 2007).
B. Motion for Summary Judgment
We will examine the motion for summary judgment under a well-established standard. Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides as follows:
A party may move for summary judgment, identifying each claim or defense - or the part of each claim or defense - on which summary judgment is sought. The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The court should state on the record the reasons for granting or denying the motion.Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). For purposes of Rule 56, a fact is material if proof of its existence or nonexistence might affect the outcome of the suit under the applicable substantive law. Haybarger v. Laurence Cnty. Adult Prob. & Parole, 667 F.3d 408, 412 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). For an issue to be genuine, “all that is required is that sufficient evidence supporting the claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth at trial.” Id. (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248-49).
In adjudicating a summary judgment motion, the court must view the evidence presented in the light most favorable to the opposing party, Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, and draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, Big Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of North America, Inc., 974 F.2d 1358, 1363 (3d Cir. 1992). When the non-moving party's evidence contradicts that advanced by the movant, then the non-movant's must be taken as true. Big Apple BMW, 974 F.2d at 1363 .
Accordingly, the moving party must show that if the evidence of record were reduced to admissible evidence in court, it would be insufficient to allow the non-moving party to carry its burden of proof. See Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The parties must rely on admissible evidence when meeting their burdens for summary judgment, but their evidence only needs to be admissible in content and not in form. Bender v. Norfolk S. Corp., 994 F.Supp.2d 593, 599 (M.D. Pa. 2014).
Provided the moving party has satisfied its burden, “its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007). Instead, if the moving party has carried its burden, the non-moving party must then respond by identifying specific facts, supported by evidence, that show a genuine issue for trial, and it may not rely upon the allegations or denials of its pleadings. See Martin v. Godwin, 499 F.3d 290, 295 (3d Cir. 2007); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). A non-moving party's failure to show a genuine issue of material fact for even one essential element of a claim after the moving party has met its burden renders all other facts immaterial, and it is enough to permit summary judgment for the moving party. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Further, once a moving party's burden has been met, a non- moving party's attack on settled legal precedent is also insufficient unless there is a significant justification for the opposition to precedent. See Bucklew v. Precythe, 139 S.Ct. 1112, 1126, 1134 (2019).
Also, once the moving party has satisfied the burden of proving there is no genuine issue of material fact, the non-moving party may not survive summary judgment by simply alleging that the moving party's discovery materials are incomplete or inconsistent. See Williams v. Office of DA, 751 Fed.Appx. 196, 199 (3d Cir. 2018) (citing Podobnik, 409 F.3d at 594). The non-moving party may request that the court compel discovery to address inconsistent and incomplete discovery that may lead to evidence proving a genuine issue of material fact, but inconsistency and incompleteness of discovery is not inherently sufficient to prove the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. See id.
If the non-moving party requests to acquire contradictory evidence in the moving party's possession that is relevant to establishing a genuine issue of material fact, the court abuses its discretion if it does not properly consider the non-moving party's requests. In re Avandia Mktg., Sales & Prods. Liab. Litig., 945 F.3d 749, 761 (3d Cir. 2019) (citing Shelton v. Bledsoe, 775 F.3d 554, 568 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting Murphy v. Millennium Radio Grp. LLC, 650 F.3d 295, 309-10 (3d Cir. 2011))).
Once the evidence is gathered, the court is not to decide whether the evidence unquestionably favors one side or the other, or to make credibility determinations. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. It instead must decide whether a fair-minded jury could return a verdict for the plaintiff on the evidence presented. Id.; see also Big Apple BMW, 974 F.2d at 1363. In reaching this determination, the Third Circuit has instructed:
To raise a genuine issue of material fact . . . the opponent need not match, item for item, each piece of evidence proffered by the movant. In practical terms, if the opponent has exceeded the “mere scintilla” threshold and has offered a genuine issue of material fact, then the court cannot credit the movant's version of events against the opponent, even if the quantity of the movant's evidence far outweighs that of its opponent. It thus remains the province of the factfinder to ascertain the believability and weight of the evidence.Big Apple BMW, 974 F.2d at 1363 . In contrast, “[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted); NAACP v. North Hudson Reg'l Fire & Rescue, 665 F.3d 464, 476 (3d Cir. 2011).
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Plaintiff's Complaint Should be Dismissed Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b).
In this case, assessment of the Poulis factors weighs in favor of dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P 41(b).
The first Poulis factor, the extent of Plaintiff's personal responsibility, weighs in favor of dismissal. Plaintiff, as a pro se litigant, is personally responsible for complying with the Court's orders-including those directing him to respond to Defendants' motion for summary judgment. Emerson, 296 F.3d at 190.
The second Poulis factor, the prejudice to the adversary caused by Plaintiff's failure to abide by court orders directing him to respond to Defendants' motion for summary judgment, weighs in favor of dismissal. As explained by the Third Circuit:
“[e]vidence of prejudice to an adversary would bear substantial weight in support of a dismissal or default judgment.” Adams v. Trustees of N.J. Brewery Employees' Pension Trust Fund, 29 F.3d 863, 873-74 (3d Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Generally, prejudice includes “the irretrievable loss of evidence, the inevitable dimming of witnesses' memories, or the excessive and possibly irremediable burdens or costs imposed on the opposing party.” Id. at 874 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).Briscoe, 538 F.3d at 259.
In this case, Plaintiff's failure to litigate his claims (by responding to Defendants' motion for summary judgment) or comply with the court's orders (directing Plaintiff to respond to Defendants' motion) now wholly frustrates and delays the resolution of this action. In such instances, Defendants are plainly prejudiced by Plaintiff's inaction. See Naslanic v. Gula, No. 3:15-CV-2208, 2018 WL 1886526, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 29, 2018) (finding prejudice where a Plaintiff failed to respond to a motion for summary judgment) report & recommendation adopted by 2018 WL 1886493 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 19, 2018).
The third Poulis factor, Plaintiff's history of dilatoriness weighs in favor of dismissal. As explained in Briscoe:
“Extensive or repeated delay or delinquency constitutes a history of dilatoriness, such as consistent non-response to interrogatories, or consistent tardiness in complying with court orders.” Adams, 29 F.3d at 874; see also Ware, 322 F.3d at 224 (finding that a history of dilatory conduct existed because the plaintiffs “failed repeatedly” to provide a damages calculation for the defendant); Emerson, 296 F.3d at 191 (finding that a history of dilatory conduct existed because the “procedural history of this case reflects continuous dilatoriness” as demonstrated by the plaintiff's multiple requests for stays and failure to comply with multiple deadlines).538 F.3d at 260. Here, Plaintiff has failed to respond to Defendants' motion for summary judgment, and has disregarded two orders directing him to do so. Plaintiff also requested (and received) additional time, and failed to file a response. Thus, Plaintiff's conduct begins to display the type of repeated delay or delinquency which constitutes a history of dilatoriness. See Naslanic, 2018 WL 1886526 at *4 (finding that the failure to respond to a summary judgment motion, and failure to comply with two court orders begins to display a history of dilatoriness).
The fourth Poulis factor, whether Plaintiff's conduct was willful or in bad faith, weighs in favor of dismissal. In this setting we must assess whether this conduct reflects mere inadvertence or willful conduct, in that it involved “strategic, ” “intentional or self-serving behavior, ” and not mere negligence. Adams v. Trs. of N.J. Brewery Emps.' Pension Trust Fund, 29 F.3d 863, 875 (3d Cir. 1994). Plaintiff's failure to comply with instructions from the Court directing him to take specific action in this case (i.e., respond to Defendants' motion for summary judgment), compel the Court to conclude that Plaintiff's failure to take this action is not accidental or inadvertent. See Naslanic, 2018 WL 1886526 at *4.
The fifth Poulis factor, the effectiveness of other sanctions also weighs in favor of dismissal. Other courts analyzing the Poulis factors have found that, in a situation like this one where a pro se litigant proceeding in forma pauperis refuses to comply with court orders, lesser sanctions may not be an effective alternative. See, e.g., Briscoe, 538 F.3d at 262-63; Emerson, 296 F.3d at 191. Based on Plaintiff's status as a pro se litigant proceeding in forma pauperis, and because the Court has attempted to counsel Plaintiff on his obligations in its prior orders (Docs. 30, 31, 33) were unsuccessful, I find that there is no effective alternative to dismissal.
The sixth, and final, Poulis factor, the meritoriousness of Plaintiff's claims, cannot save this particular Plaintiff's claims since he is now wholly non-compliant with his obligations as a litigant. Furthermore, as discussed in detail below, Defendants' are entitled to summary judgment.
B. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment Should be Granted
The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he rights of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV . To assert a false arrest claim a plaintiff must allege that he or she was arrested without probable cause. Dillard v. Cornick, No. 1:18-CV-70, 2018 WL 4679952, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 28, 2018); citing Andrews v. Scuilli, 853 F.3d 690, 697 (3d Cir. 2017) (internal citation omitted). “[P]robable cause to arrest exists when the facts and circumstances within the arresting officer's knowledge are sufficient in themselves to warrant a reasonable person to believe that an offense has been or is being committed by the person to be arrested.” Orsatti v. N.J. State Police, 71 F.3d 480, 483 (3d Cir. 1995).
Like a claim for false arrest, a claim for false imprisonment under § 1983 is based in the Fourth Amendment and the guarantee against unreasonable seizures. Garcia v. County of Bucks, 155 F.Supp.2d 259, 265 (E.D. Pa. 2001). “[W]here the police lack probable cause to make an arrest, the arrestee has a claim under § 1983 for false imprisonment based on a detention pursuant to that arrest.” Groman v. Twp. of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 636 (3d Cir. 1995). Therefore, where a claim for false arrest is sustained, a claim for false imprisonment may also be sustained.
In Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), the Supreme Court ruled that a constitutional cause of action for damages does not accrue “for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, ” until the plaintiff proves that the “conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” Id. at 486-87; see also Tayler v. Sanders, Civ. No. 11-1291, 2012 WL 4104871, at *8 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 18, 2012) (citing Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81-82 (2005)) (“‘[A] state prisoner's § 1983 action is barred (absent prior invalidation-no matter the relief sought (damages or equitable relief), no matter the target of the prisoner's suit (state conduct leading to conviction or internal prison proceedings)-if success in that action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration.'”).
In their Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendants argue that Plaintiff's false arrest and false imprisonment claims fail because probable cause existed at the time Plaintiff was arrested. Because Plaintiff did not respond to the Motion, pursuant to LR 56.1, Defendants' statement of material facts is deemed admitted. Thus, it is undisputed that at the time of the February 21, 2020 arrest, Defendants observed Plaintiff “emptying drugs out of his pockets and throwing them on the ground.” (Doc. 24, ¶ 4). It is also undisputed that, on May 3, 2021 Plaintiff pleaded guilty to possession of a controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia. (Doc. 24, ¶ 7). Based on these undisputed facts, Plaintiff is barred from seeking damages based on a claim that he was falsely arrested and imprisoned because a judgment in his favor would imply the invalidity of his conviction and criminal sentence. Accordingly, I find that Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on this claim.
V. RECOMMENDATION
Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED that:
(1) Plaintiff's Complaint be DISMISSED pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b); or in the alternative,
(2) Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 23) be GRANTED.
(3) The Clerk of Court be DIRECTED to CLOSE this case.
NOTICE OF LOCAL RULE 72.3
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that any party may obtain a review of the Report and Recommendation pursuant to Local Rule 72.3, which provides:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses, or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.