Specifically, the Sixth Circuit and most district courts that have addressed the issue have held that the corporate structure does not insulate shareholders, officers, or directors from personal liability under the FDCPA. Kistner v. Law Offices of Michael P. Margelefsky, L.L.C., 518 F.3d 433, 437-38 (6th Cir. 2008); del Campo v. Kennedy, 491 F. Supp. 2d 891, 903 (N.D. Cal. 2006); Brumbelow v. Law Offices of Bennett Deloney, P.C., 372 F. Supp. 2d 615, 618-21 (D. Utah 2005); Albanese v. Portnoff Law Assocs., Ltd., 301 F. Supp. 2d 389, 400 (E.D. Pa. 2004); Musso v. Seiders, 194 F.R.D. 43, 46-47 (D. Conn. 1999); Brink v. First Credit Res., 57 F. Supp. 2d 848, 861-62 (D. Ariz. 1999); Pikes v. Riddle, 38 F. Supp. 2d 639, 640 (N.D. Ill. 1998); Ditty v. Checkrite, Ltd., 973 F. Supp. 1320, 1337-38 (D. Utah 1997);Newman v. Checkrite Cal., Inc., 912 F. Supp. 1354, 1372 (E.D. Cal. 1995); Teng v. Metro. Retail Recovery Inc., 851 F. Supp. 61, 67 (E.D. N.Y. 1994). On the other hand, the Seventh Circuit has held that, regardless of an individual's personal involvement with the corporation's debt collecting activities, a shareholder or officer of a debt collecting corporation cannot be personally liable unless the plaintiff pierces the corporate veil.

Specifically, the Sixth Circuit and most district courts that have addressed the issue have held that the corporate structure does not insulate shareholders, officers, or directors from personal liability under the FDCPA. Kistner v. Law Offices of Michael P. Margelefsky, L.L.C., 518 F.3d 433, 437-38 (6th Cir. 2008); del Campo v. Kennedy, 491 F. Supp. 2d 891, 903 (N.D. Cal. 2006); Brumbelow v. Law Offices of Bennett Deloney, P.C., 372 F. Supp. 2d 615, 618-21 (D. Utah 2005);Albanese v. Portnoff Law Assocs., Ltd., 301 F. Supp. 2d 389, 400 (E.D. Pa. 2004); Musso v. Seiders, 194 F.R.D. 43, 46-47 (D. Conn. 1999); Brink v. First Credit Res., 57 F. Supp. 2d 848, 861-62 (D. Ariz. 1999); Pikes v. Riddle, 38 F. Supp. 2d 639, 640 (N.D. Ill. 1998); Ditty v. Checkrite, Ltd., 973 F. Supp. 1320, 1337-38 (D. Utah 1997); Newman v. Checkrite Cal., Inc., 912 F. Supp. 1354, 1372 (E.D. Cal. 1995); Teng v. Metro. Retail Recovery Inc., 851 F. Supp. 61, 67 (E.D. N.Y. 1994). On the other hand, the Seventh Circuit has held that, regardless of an individual's personal involvement with the corporation's debt collecting activities, a shareholder or officer of a debt collecting corporation cannot be personally liable unless the plaintiff pierces the corporate veil.

White v. Goodman, 200 F.3d 1016, 1019 (7th Cir. 2000) (Posner, J.); Pettit v. Retrieval Masters Creditors Bureau, Inc., 211 F.3d 1057, 1059 (7th Cir. 2000); see also, Ernst v. Jesse L. Riddle, P.C., 964 F. Supp. 213, 216 (M.D. La. 1997).See e.g., Brink v. First Credit Resources, 57 F. Supp. 2d 848, 861-62 (D. Ariz. 1999); Piper v. Portnoff Law Assoc., 274 F. Supp. 2d 681, 689 (E.D.Pa. 2003); Albanese v. Portnoff Law Assoc., 301 F. Supp. 2d 389, 400 (E.D.Pa. 2004); Musso v. Seiders, 194 F.R.D. 43, 46-47 (D.Conn. 1999); Teng v. Metropolitan Retail Recovery, Inc., 851 F. Supp. 61, 67 (E.D.N.Y. 1994); Newman v. Checkrite California, Inc., 912 F. Supp. 1354 (E.D. Cal. 1995) (same); Pikes v. Riddle, 38 F. Supp. 2d 639, 640 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (same); United States v. ACB Sales Serv., Inc., 590 F. Supp. 561 (D. Ariz. 1984). In this district, Judge Tena Campbell has agreed with those courts which have held that individuals, even within a corporation, can be liable as "debt collectors."

First Credit explains that the district courts are not all in agreement on the issue, citing two cases involving the same defendant in which the courts reached opposite conclusions. Ernst v. Jesse L. Riddle, P.C., 964 F.Supp. 213 (M.D.La.1997) (court refused to pierce the corporate veil to hold individuals liable); Pikes v. Riddle, 38 F.Supp.2d 639 (N.D.Ill.1998) (an individual personally involved in debt collection practices is within meaning of "debt collector"). While it is true that the courts are not in agreement, the decision of the district court in Louisiana appears to be an anomaly.

The Court agrees that "it is highly unlikely that Congress wished to restrict liability to the often small corporate vehicle used for collection, and [that] the statutory language clearly brings all those personally involved within the ambit of 'debt collector.'" Pikes v. Riddle, 38 F.Supp.2d 639, 640 (N.D.Ill. 1998); see also Schwarm, 552 F.Supp.2d at 1071 (allowing employees to be held personally liable is "consistent with the FDCPA's broad language.") The Court therefore holds that employees of a debt collection organization may be "debt collector[s]" under the FDCPA, and thus may be held personally liable under the FDCPA for acts committed during the scope of employment.

See also Pope v. Vogel, No. 97 C 1835, 1998 WL 111576, *5 (N.D.Ill. Mar.5, 1998) (denying motion to dismiss because one who directly and regularly attempts to collect debts is a debt collector); Slater v. Credit Sciences, Inc., No. 98 C 0769, 1998 WL 299803, *2 (N.D.Ill., May 29, 1998) (denying motion to dismiss where plaintiff alleged individual defendant's personal involvement); Pikes v. Riddle, 38 F. Supp.2d 639, 639 (N.D.Ill. 1998) (denying motion to dismiss where complaint made allegations of individual defendant's personal involvement). The court is not persuaded by Plaintiff's lengthy string cites to non-FDCPA cases which are not factually similar to this case: Federal Trade Comm'n. v. Amy Travel Service, 875 F.2d 564 (7th Cir. 1989) (sales of vacation vouchers); Guziak v. Federal Trade Comm'n., 361 F.2d 700 (8th Cir. 1966) (false representations in advertising); Federal Trade Comm'n. v. International Diamond Corp., 1983-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 65,506, at p. 68, 458, 1983 WL 1851 (.N.D.Cal. 1983); Federal Trade Comm'n. v. H.N. Singer, Inc., 1982-83 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 65,011 (N.D.Cal. 1982).

Id. at *2. See also Pope v. Vogel, No. 97 C 1835, 1998 WL 111576, *5 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 5, 1998) (denying motion to dismiss because one who directly and regularly attempts to collect debts is a debt collector); Slater v. Credit Sciences, Inc., No. 98 C 0769, 1998 WL 299803, *2 (N.D. Ill, May 29, 1998) (denying motion to dismiss where plaintiff alleged individual defendant's personal involvement); Pikes v. Riddle, No. 98 C 568, 1998 WL 483601, *1 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 12, 1998) (denying motion to dismiss where complaint made allegations of individual defendant's personal involvement). The court is not persuaded by Plaintiff's lengthy string cites to non-FDCPA cases which are not factually similar to this case: Federal Trade Comm'n. v. Amy Travel Services, 875 F.2d 564 (7th Cir. 1989) (sales of vacation vouchers); Guziak v. Federal Trade Comm'n., 361 F.2d 700 (8th Cir. 1966) (false representations in advertising); Federal Trade Comm'n. v. International Diamond Corp., 1983-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 65,506, at p. 68,458 (N.D. Cal. 1983); Federal Trade Comm'n. v. H.N. Singer, Inc., 1982-83 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 65,011 (N.D. Cal. 1982). Nor does the Court find it necessary to consider trademark cases by analogy as the Plaintiff suggests, because ample authority exists about FDCPA cases and individual defendant liability.