Opinion
No. C01-0046
May 6, 2003
ORDER
This matter comes before the court pursuant to petitioner Bennie Pierson Jr.'s petition for a writ of habeas corpus and request for a certificate of appealability (docket number 37). The only issue remaining from his habeas petition pertains to the voluntariness of his statement to police. The parties have consented to the exercise of jurisdiction by a United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).
In this case, Pierson submitted an application for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (docket number 5). He brings this collateral attack on his conviction for the second degree murder of Michael Heidersheit. In his habeas petition, among other claims, Pierson argues that the Iowa Court of Appeals unreasonably found his pretrial statement to police to be voluntary under the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Procedural and Factual Background
Evidence presented at trial established that on the evening of September 15, 1994, Pierson met the victim at his work and then accompanied him to cash his paycheck. Shortly thereafter, after stopping at a Hy-Vee and a Handimart convenience store together, the two began drinking at the victim's residence. Later that evening, they met some friends at Bully's, a bar located in northwest Cedar Rapids. According to witness testimony, Pierson left the bar at about 11:00 p.m. with the victim and returned alone about an hour later. Several witnesses stated that upon returning to the bar, Pierson went into the bathroom and made some incriminating statements about having hit someone and displayed a wallet with cash inside. Some witnesses also recalled seeing spots of blood on Pierson's hands. The victim's body was found at the Roller Dam on September 18, 1994. He had been badly beaten and died of massive head injuries.
Detective Richard Hamblin was assigned to investigate the death. He was told that Pierson may have some information about the crime because he was one of the last people to see the victim alive. Detective Hamblin went to Pierson's home but did not find him there. When Detective Hamblin arrived back at the police station, Pierson was already there. He wanted to talk. At around 5:30 or 5:45 on September 18, 1994, Detective Hamblin took Pierson into an interview room. At that point, Pierson was not yet considered a suspect, rather, he was interviewed because he was one of the last people to see the victim alive. Pierson told Detective Hamblin that he met the victim at his work, they went to Hy-Vee, drank at the victim's apartment, went to some bars, and he then dropped the victim off at his apartment. Pierson stated he then drove to a Texaco gas station and went to Checker's, a bar in Cedar Rapids. While at Checker's, Pierson said he vomited in the bathroom and stated this was unusual because he never got sick while drinking beer. Pierson stated he got sick because his insides were turning over because he knew he had done something bad.
At around 8:30 p.m., Detective Hamblin concluded Pierson was a murder suspect. Pierson was given a Miranda warning and he signed a Miranda waiver form before he was transferred to the county jail. While there, Pierson requested that his friend Linn County Deputy Sheriff Barry Brandt be called to come down to see him. Deputy Brandt was called and he arrived sometime around midnight. Pierson was interviewed until approximately 1:45 a.m. At that time, Pierson signed a statement relating his story of the events that occurred on September 15, 1994. The statement included:
I took Mike home and then about that time everything went blank. In my head, I remember hitting him in the face but don't remember anything else until I was at the Texaco station by Hawkeye Downs. I got a quart of beer that I left in my car and did not drink it and then I went to Checker's but I felt bad and went to the bathroom and threw up.
Pierson was charged with murder in the first degree of Michael Heiderscheit. Pierson did not testify at trial, but his signed statement to police was admitted. On November 16, 1994, Pierson filed a motion to suppress the statement he gave to police arguing that Detective Hamblin coerced it out of him. On January 12, 1995, the district court denied the motion. At trial, Pierson used the blackout mentioned in the statement to present an intoxication defense. On February 21, 1995, a jury found Pierson guilty of second-degree murder. He was sentenced to a term of incarceration not to exceed fifty years. Pierson's conviction was affirmed by the Iowa Court of Appeals.
On direct appeal, Pierson argued that Officer Hamblin coerced him into signing the statement by interrogating him too long. On May 31, 1995, the Iowa Court of Appeals rejected Pierson's involuntary confession claim and affirmed the district court's ruling. At his post-conviction relief hearing, Pierson for the first time argued that his attorney was ineffective for failing to obtain a convenience store surveillance video that showed him at the store at an important time. On March 29, 2001, Pierson filed for habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. On September 5, 2002, this court ruled that Pierson's ineffective assistance of counsel claims based on failure to obtain the Handimart videotape were procedurally defaulted. Pierson now pursues relief arguing that his due process rights were violated by the admission of an involuntary statement at trial.
Conclusions of Law Standard of Review
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) provides:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim —
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.
Thus, "[ 28 U.S.C. §] 2254(d) distinguishes between two types of erroneous decisions — those of law and those of fact — and treats each in separate paragraphs." Weaver v. Bowersox, 241 F.3d 1024, 1029 (8th Cir. 2001).
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), a state prisoner may obtain federal habeas corpus relief with respect to a claim adjudicated on the merits in state court only through a showing that the state court's decision was either contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court's recent opinion in Williams v. Taylor explains the meaning of those statutory concepts and the degree of deference that must be afforded to state court determinations on the merits in federal habeas corpus proceedings concerning state prisoners under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). Newman v. Hopkins, 247 F.3d 848, 850-51 (8th Cir. 2001); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000). Pierson only seeks relief under the second part of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) arguing the Iowa courts' decision admitting his signed statement at trial involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.
An "unreasonable application" of Supreme Court precedent may arise in one of two ways, as the Supreme Court has explained:
First, a state-court decision involves an unreasonable application of this Court's precedent if the state court identifies the correct governing legal rule from this Court's cases but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular state prisoner's case. Second, a state-court decision also involves an unreasonable application of this Court's precedent if the state court either unreasonably extends a legal principle from our precedent to a new context where it should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new context where it should apply.
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. at 407 (citing Green v. French, 143 F.3d 865, 869-70 (4th Cir. 1998)). Thus, where a state court "correctly identifies the governing legal rule but applies it unreasonably to the facts of a particular prisoner's case," that decision "certainly would qualify as a decision `involv[ing] an unreasonable application of . . . clearly established Federal law.'" Id. at 407-08. However, [u]nder [28 U.S.C.] § 2254(d)(1)'s `unreasonable application' clause, . . . a federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.Id. at 411.
Applying these standards to the present case, this court's inquiry must be whether the Iowa courts correctly identified the applicable principles of federal law but then unreasonably applied that law to the facts of Pierson's case by admitting his statement at trial. Pierson argues his statement to police should not have been admitted at trial because it was obtained in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. In support of his argument, he asserts that Officer Hamblin actually coerced him to sign the statement after over eight hours of interrogation.
Voluntariness of Statement
"The admissibility of a defendant's confession is a mixed question of law and fact and as such merits independent consideration by a federal court in a habeas proceeding." Hill v. Lockhart, 927 F.2d 340, 346 (8th Cir. 1991) (citing Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 112 (1985)). For in-custody statements to be admissible, they must have been voluntary within the meaning of the Due Process Clause. See Haynes v. State of Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 513 (1963). "The use in a state criminal trial of a defendant's confession obtained by coercion — whether physical or mental — is forbidden by the Fourteenth Amendment." Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556, 558 (1954) (citations omitted).
In determining whether a statement is voluntary, the court must consider the totality of the circumstances. United States v. Bordeaux, 980 F.2d 534, 538 (8th Cir. 1992); United States v. Casal, 915 F.2d 1225, 1228 (8th Cir. 1990). 18 U.S.C. § 3501(b) provides:
The trial judge in determining the issues of voluntariness shall take into consideration all the circumstances surrounding the giving of the confession, including (1) the time elapsing between arrest and arraignment of the defendant making the confession, if it was made after arrest and before arraignment, (2) whether such defendant knew the nature of the offense with which he was charged or of which he was suspected at the time of making the confession, (3) whether or not such defendant was advised or knew that he was not required to make any statement and that any such statement could be used against him, (4) whether or not such defendant had been advised prior to questioning of his right to the assistance of counsel; and (5) whether or not such defendant was within the assistance of counsel when questioned and when giving such confession.
In light of the totality of the circumstances, a statement is not voluntary if "`pressures exerted upon the suspect have overborne his will.'" United States v. Meirovitz, 918 F.2d 1376, 1379 (8th Cir. 1990) (quoting United States v. Jorgensen, 871 F.2d 725, 729 (8th Cir. 1989)). "The two factors that must be considered in applying the `overborne will' doctrine are `the conduct of the law enforcement officials and the capacity of the suspect to resist pressure to confess.'" Id. (citingUnited States v. Jorgensen, 871 F.2d at 729; Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986)). "A statement is not constitutionally involuntary unless `the police extorted it from the accused by means of coercive activity.'" Jenner v. Smith, 982 F.2d 329, 333 (8th Cir. 1993) (quotingUnited States v. Rohrbach, 813 F.2d 142, 144 (8th Cir. 1987)).
Pierson argues that the Iowa courts' decision to admit his statement at trial was an unreasonable application of federal law. "An `unreasonable application' is one that, `evaluated objectively and on the merits, resulted in an outcome that cannot reasonably be justified under existing Supreme Court precedent.'" James v. Bowersox, 187 F.3d 866, 869 (8th Cir. 1999) (quoting Long v. Humphrey, 184 F.3d 758, 760 (8th Cir. 1999)). The reviewing court's "mere disagreement with the [state courts'] conclusions is not enough to warrant habeas relief." Atley v. Ault, 191 F.3d 865, 871 (8th Cir. 1999) (citing Matteo v. Superintendent, SCI Albion, 171 F.3d 877, 890 (3d Cir. 1999) (en banc)).
Pierson argues that his statement to police was involuntary because he was coerced to sign it by Detective Hamblin and therefore, it should not have been admitted at his trial. He supports this assertion by pointing to the fact that he was subjected to an eight-hour interrogation. Pierson also argues that because his friend Deputy Brandt was called after Pierson had been questioned for a few hours and was present for the latter part of the interrogation, this made Pierson more susceptible to signing the prepared statement. Further, Pierson points out that Deputy Brandt testified at trial that he did now know if Pierson read the statement before signing it. The respondent argues that nothing in the record indicates that Pierson was coerced into signing the statement or that the interrogation was grueling and that it was Pierson who requested that his friend Deputy Brandt be present during the interrogation.
When Pierson was first questioned, he was not under arrest. He was free to leave if he wanted to. Detective Hamblin stated Pierson never asked to leave. Pierson was not in custody until approximately 8:30 p.m. Upon learning that Pierson was implicated as a suspect, Detective Hamblin read him his Miranda rights and Pierson waived them both orally and in writing. At that point, Pierson was interrogated as a suspect and three hours into that, he admitted hitting the victim in the face. A few hours following that, he signed the statement.
The Iowa courts found Pierson's statement to be voluntary and therefore admissible at his trial. In making this finding, the Iowa Court of Appeals reviewed the facts surrounding the signing of the statement. The court stated that although eight and one-half hours of questioning is unduly long, this factor in isolation does not render the statement involuntary. The Iowa Court of Appeals concluded:
We come to our conclusion regarding the voluntariness of the incriminating statements through an examination of the totality of the circumstances. At the time of the interview, Detective Hamblin knew Pierson was an alcoholic, but he did not feel Pierson was impaired by alcohol at the time. Pierson was twenty-four years old at the time and had attended junior college. His behavior during the interview suggest he had an understanding of the criminal justice system and the situation he was in. During the interrogation, Pierson was given frequent breaks and refreshments. There are no allegations of physical punishment, nor are there allegations of deceit or improper promises. We are unable to find any evidence of intimidation on the part of Detective Hamblin. We find Pierson made an essentially free and unconstrained choice at a time when his free will was not overborne nor his capacity for self-determination critically impaired. While we do not approve of the length of the interrogation under the circumstances of this case, we nevertheless find, after examining the totality of the circumstances, the incriminating statements were voluntary. Consequently, the district court did not err in denying the motion to suppress.State v. Pierson, 554 N.W.2d 555, 561-62 (Iowa Ct.App. 1996). It is clear the Iowa Court of Appeals considered the total time Pierson was questioned and indicated that it was unduly long, however, the court found this single factor was not enough to render his statement involuntary under federal law. The Iowa court undertook a detailed analysis of the totality of the circumstances in determining that Pierson's statement was voluntary. The analysis by the Iowa Court of Appeals, evaluated objectively on its merits, was not an unreasonable application of existing Supreme Court precedent.
Certificate of Appealability
Pierson also asks this court to issue a certificate of appealability on the ineffective assistance of counsel claims this court held were procedurally defaulted. A district court possesses the authority to issue certificates of appealability under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c) and Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 22(b). See Tiedman v. Benson, 122 F.3d 518, 522 (8th Cir. 1997). A certificate of appealability may only issue if a defendant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). When a federal habeas petition is dismissed on procedural grounds, rather than on the merits, a certificate of appealability "`should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurist of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.'" Adams v. Ault, 2001 WL 34008477, at *28 (N.D.Iowa Oct. 3, 2001) (unpublished opinion) (citing Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)). Where the underlying claims are defaulted, as the claims Pierson asserts have constitutional significance have been, the question for purposes of an application for a certificate of appealability is whether or not the petitioner has made a substantial showing of "cause and prejudice" to overcome the default. See United States v. Bailey, 235 F.3d 1069, 1071 (8th Cir. 2000).
Pierson has made no such substantial showing that he could overcome his procedural default on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel, where he has neither presented the ineffective assistance claims based on failure to obtain the Handimart videotape to the state courts nor attempted to demonstrate in these proceedings that his claims of ineffective assistance, asserted as "cause and prejudice" for default of this claim, satisfy the prongs of the Strickland analysis. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). For the reasons stated in this court's September 5, 2002 order, Pierson fails to meet the standards set forth for the issuance of a certificate of appealability. Having thoroughly reviewed the record in this case, the court finds Pierson failed to make the requisite "substantial showing" with respect to his ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to obtain the Handimart videotape claims. Pierson's request for a certificate of appealability is denied.
Upon the foregoing,
IT IS ORDERED that Pierson's petition for a writ for habeas corpus and request for a certificate of appealability (docket numbers 5 and 37) are denied.