Harrington elucidates adverse employment action as "discharges, demotions, refusals to hire, refusals to promote, and reprimands." Id. (citing Pierce v. Texas Dep't of Criminal Justice, 37 F.3d 1146, 1149 (5th Cir. 1994)). The city failed to make a motion for j.m.l. on this basis.

Fifth Circuit caselaw, some of which post-dates the trial in this case, is inconsistent with Breaux's and Ambrogio's contention that they suffered actionable adverse employment actions. "Adverse employment actions are discharges, demotions, refusals to hire, refusals to promote, and reprimands." Pierce v. Texas Dep't of Criminal Justice, Institutional Div., 37 F.3d 1146, 1149 (5th Cir. 1994). Transfers can constitute adverse employment actions if they are sufficiently punitive, see id. at 1150, or if the new job is markedly less prestigious and less interesting than the old one, see Click v. Copeland, 970 F.2d 106, 110 (5th Cir. 1992).

(3) a causal connection exists between the protected activity and the adverse action.See Goff v. Continental Oil Co., 678 F.2d 593, 599 (5th Cir. 1982) (citing Dickerson v. Metropolitan Dade County, 659 F.2d 574, 580-81 (5th Cir. 1981)); accord Mayberry v. Vought Aircraft Co., 55 F.3d 1086, 1092 (5th Cir. 1995); Pierce v. Texas Dept. of Criminal Justice, 37 F.3d 1146, 1151 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S.Ct. 1957, 131 L.Ed.2d 849 (1995); Barrow v. New Orleans S.S. Assn., 10 F.3d 292, 297 (5th Cir. 1994); Shirley v. Chrysler First, Inc., 970 F.2d 39, 42 (5th Cir. 1992). In order to maintain an action for retaliation, an employee need only establish that she had a reasonable belief that discriminatory practices existed.

"Adverse employment actions are discharges, demotions, refusals to hire, refusals to promote, and reprimands." Pierce v. Texas Department of Crim. Justice, Inst. Div., 37 F.3d 1146, 1149 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing McCabe v. Sharrett, 12 F.3d 1558, 1563 (11th Cir. 1994)). See also Harrington v. Harris, 118 F.3d 359, 365 (5th Cir. 1997).

Included in the list of recognized adverse employment actions are "discharges, demotions, refusals to hire, refusals to promote, and reprimands." Id. (citing Pierce v. Tex. Dep't of Criminal Justice, Institutional Div., 37 F.3d 1146, 1149 (5th Cir. 1994)). The court has also recognized that, in some circumstances, transfers can constitute adverse employment actions. See Sharp v. City of Houston, 164 F.3d 923, 933 (5th Cir. 1999) ("[F]or the purposes of a § 1983 retaliation claim, an adverse employment action can include a transfer, because it may serve as a demotion.

To that end, the Fifth Circuit has held that "investigating alleged violations of departmental policies and making purportedly false accusations are not adverse employment actions." Breaux, 205 F.3d at 158 (citing Pierce v. Tex. Dep't of Criminal Justice, 37 F.3d 1146, 1150 (5th Cir. 1994); Colson v. Grohman, 174 F.3d 498, 511 (5th Cir. 1999)). Although Breaux, Pierce, and Colson were decided primarily in the context of § 1983 claims, they apply with equal force to § 1981 and Title VII claims because, if anything, the definition of an adverse employment action may be broader under § 1983 than under § 1981 and Title VII.

Id. ¶ 29. A First Amendment retaliation claim requires allegations that, if proven, would show that the plaintiff's exercise of protected rights, not some other reason, was a substantial or motivating factor for the adverse employment action. See Pierce v. Texas Dep't of Crim. Justice, 37 F.3d 1146, 1149 (5th Cir. 1994). After many opportunities to amend the complaint, the allegations in the live complaint do not support a connection between the adverse employment action against Joshua Balderas and any retaliatory motive on Bandy and Iglehart-Hammons's part and in fact, undermine any inference of a connection.

See, e.g., Brady v. Fort Bend County, 145 F.3d 691, 703 (5th Cir.1998) ( “While Rutan addressed only political patronage, we have applied it [regarding an employer's decision to transfer, recall and hire] to cases involving public employer retaliation for employees' exercise of their right to free speech.”), citing Pierce v. Texas Dep't of Criminal Justice, Institutional Div., 37 F.3d 1146, 1149–50 (5th Cir.1994); Click v. Copeland, 970 F.2d 106, 110–11 (5th Cir.1992) (“transfers to jail could be considered demotions even though they suffered no reduction in salary”). Another example is Dorsett, 940 F.2d 121.

To prove his claim of retaliation, Plaintiff must demonstrate, "(1) Defendants were acting under color of state law; (2) Plaintiffs speech activities were protected under the First Amendment; and (3) Plaintiffs exercise of [his] protected right was a substantial or motivating factor in Defendants' action." Harrington, 118 F.3d at 365 (citing Pierce v. Texas Dept. of Criminal Justice Inst. Div., 37 F.3d 1146, 1149 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1107, 115 S.Ct. 1957, 131 L.Ed.2d 849 (1995); Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287, 97 S.Ct. 568, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977)). In the instant case, the parties do not dispute that Defendants, as a public, state supported school system, were acting under color of state law.

Dahm, 60 F.3d at 257. Further, the DeGuiseppe court cited Pierce v. Texas Department of Criminal Justice, 37 F.3d 1146, 1149 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1107, 115 S.Ct. 1957 (1995), a decision that expressly included a refusal to promote as an adverse employment action. See DeGuiseppe, 68 F.3d at 191.