Nor can Plaintiffs seek punitive damages from Officer Gaeta. While it is true that a plaintiff can demand punitive damages from a public official sued in her personal capacity, Atwell v. Schweiker, 274 Fed.Appx. 116, 118 (3d Cir. 2007); Strickland v. Mahoning Twp., 647 F.Supp.2d 422, 428-29 (M.D. Pa. 2009); King v. Twp. of East Lampeter, 17 F.Supp.2d 394, 426 (E.D. Pa. 1998); Pica v. Sarno, 907 F.Supp. 795, 805 (D.N.J. 1995), the Court has no basis here to permit Plaintiffs to pursue punitive damages from Officer Gaeta based on the deficient allegations of the First Amended Complaint. The availability of an award of punitive damages in an individual-capacity suit depends on proving that a defendant's conduct was “motivated by evil motive or intent” or “involve[d] reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others.”

Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271, 101 S.Ct. 2748, 69 L.Ed.2d 616 (1981), "that immunity does not extend to a municipal official sued in his individual capacity," New Windsor Volunteer Ambulance Corps, Inc. v. Meyers, 442 F.3d 101, 122 (2d Cir. 2006) (citing Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 55-56, 103 S.Ct. 1625, 75 L.Ed.2d 632 (1983)). See also S. Lyme Prop. Owners Ass'n v. Town of Old Lyme, 539 F. Supp. 2d 524, 544 (D. Conn. 2008); Pica v. Sarno, 907 F. Supp. 795, 805 (D.N.J. 1995); Jannuzzi v. Borough of Edwardsville, No. CIV. A. 3:09-CV-970, 2009 WL 3818427, at *9 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 13, 2009). Accordingly, Plaintiffs cannot recover punitive damages against the Town, but they seek punitive damages against Maturo and Soto.

It follows that a plaintiff cannot recover punitive damages against an individual who is sued in his official capacity because liability is imposed against the public entity, of which the public official is an agent. Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 471-72 (1985); Pica v. Sarno, 907 F. Supp. 795, 805 (D.N.J. 1995). However, punitive damages are available against the individual Defendants in their personal capacity so long as the Defendant's conduct was motivated by an evil motive or intent or a reckless or callous indifference to the federal rights of others.

A § 1983 "plaintiff may recover not only out-of-pocket expenses, but also compensation for emotional and mental distress caused by a constitutional violation." Pica v. Sarno, 907 F. Supp. 795, 803 (D.N.J. 1995). (citing Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 255-56 (1978)) (emphasis added).

Plaintiffs can present their own testimony and the testimony of family members. Id. at 33; Pica v. Sarno, 907 F. Supp. 795, 804 (D.N.J. 1995). Even the testimony of the plaintiff alone can be sufficient to support recovery for emotional distress.

Plaintiffs can present their own testimony and the testimony of family members. Id. at 33; Pica v. Sarno, 907 F. Supp. 795, 804 (D.N.J. 1995). Even the testimony of the plaintiff alone can be sufficient to support recovery for emotional distress.

, damages may be awarded for harm suffered as a result of the deprivation of a constitutional right. See Pica v. Sarno, 907 F. Supp. 795, 803 (D.N.J. 1995) (citing Stachura, 477 U.S. at 307;Spence v. Bd. of Educ., 806 F.2d 1198, 1200-01 (3d Cir. 1986)).2. Motion to Preclude Identification of President George W. Bush (Doc. No. 33) and Motion to Preclude Reference to the Content of Dr. Lischner's Sign and Political Affiliation/Anti-war Beliefs (Doc. No. 38)

Although plaintiff alleges that "defendants knowingly and maliciously violated plaintiff's clearly-established civil rights," (Supp.Complt. ¶ 25), the record is devoid of any facts demonstrating that Grifo acted with malice toward plaintiff when enforcing the Mamakating sign ordinance. See Pica v. Sarno, 907 F. Supp. 795, 804 (D.N.J. 1995) (the fact that official was enforcing a municipal ordinance creates strong presumption that official did not believe he was violating the plaintiff's rights). No reasonable trier of fact could find that Grifo acted objectively unreasonably, and Grifo is entitled to qualified immunity.