Opinion
A148557
07-28-2017
INDER PHULL, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE CO., Defendant and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Alameda County Super. Ct. No. HG15788611)
Inder Phull (appellant) purports to appeal, in propria persona, from the trial court's order denying his petition to vacate an arbitration award made in favor of his automobile insurer, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (respondent). The dispute arose after respondent denied appellant's claim for uninsured motorist benefits, following a traffic accident. We conclude the order denying the petition to vacate the arbitration is not an appealable order, and shall therefore dismiss the appeal.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The arbitrator's statement of decision sets forth the facts underlying this matter: "This case arises out of a collision on April 13, 2013 on Interstate 880 near Fremont. . . . [¶] Not in dispute is that the front end of [appellant's] vehicle collided with the rear of Dustin Krueger's vehicle stopped or almost stopped in fron[t] of [appellant's] vehicle. [Appellant's] position is that he was hit from behind and pushed into Krueger's vehicle by a vehicle that left the scene immediately after it hit [appellant's] vehicle. [Appellant] testified that he was hit from behind and pushed into the Krueger vehicle. Respondent's position is that there is no evidence to support [appellant's] position that he was pushed into the Krueger vehicle. [¶] . . . [¶]
"[Appellant's] vehicle was examined for repairs by [r]espondent on April 23, 201[3]. The repair estimate totaled $7,429.57. All of the damage on the repair estimate was to the front of the vehicle. There is no damage listed to the rear bumper, rear quarter panels or trunk. Pictures of [appellant's] vehicle support the front end estimate and show no damage to the rear of the vehicle. Mr. Krueger testified at his deposition that at the scene of the collision [appellant] made no mention of being hit from behind."
On August 3, 2015, the arbitrator found as follows: "California's long standing law requires physical contact in support of an uninsured motorist claim involving a phantom vehicle. Based on the evidence presented at the arbitration [appellant] did not meet his burden of proof in establishing contact by the phantom vehicle." The arbitrator therefore awarded no damages to appellant.
On October 7, 2015, appellant filed a petition to vacate the contractual arbitration award.
On April 22, 2106, the trial court denied appellant's petition to vacate, finding that appellant "has provided no evidence of corruption, fraud or undue means in procuring the arbitration award in this matter."
On June 9, 2016, appellant filed a notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
Respondent has asserted, as a preliminary matter, that we do not have jurisdiction to consider an appeal from the denial of appellant's petition to vacate the arbitration award.
"An aggrieved party may appeal from an order dismissing a petition to confirm, correct, or vacate an award. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1294, subd. (b).) No appeal, however, will lie from an order denying vacation or correction of an arbitration award. [Citations.] Such an order may be reviewed upon an appeal from the judgment of confirmation. [Citations.]" (Mid-Wilshire Associates v. O'Leary (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1450, 1454 (Mid-Wilshire Associates).)
As the court in Mid-Wilshire Associates explained, an order dismissing a petition to vacate on the ground that the respondent is not bound by the arbitration agreement results is a final disposition of the proceeding as to that party, while an order denying a petition to vacate on substantive grounds is not a final disposition. (Mid-Wilshire Associates, supra, 7 Cal.App.4th at p. 1454.)
In this case, because the order appealed from is one denying appellant's petition to vacate the arbitration award, we have no jurisdiction to consider the appeal. (See Mid-Wilshire Associates, supra, 7 Cal.App.4th at p. 1454.) Furthermore, because the record does not include a copy of a judgment and appellant had not stated that any such judgment has been entered, we may not treat the notice of appeal as premature and address the appeal on the merits. (Compare, e.g., Cooper v. Lavely & Singer Professional Corp. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 1, 10, fn. 3 [treating notice of appeal as premature under Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.104(d)(2) where judgment was entered after notice of appeal was filed].)
We also decline to assume jurisdiction by treating the appeal as a petition for writ of mandate. (See Mid-Wilshire Associates, supra, 7 Cal.App.4th at p. 1455.) First, appellant has neither requested that we do so nor explained why he lacks an adequate remedy through the direct appeal of a judgment confirming the arbitration award. (See ibid.) Second, our Supreme Court has mandated that the exercise of our discretionary power of writ review be reserved "for cases involving compelling evidence of 'unusual circumstances.' [Citation.]" (Ibid., quoting Olson v. Cory (1983) 35 Cal.3d 390, 401.) Here, appellant has demonstrated no extraordinary circumstances warranting review of the denial of his petition to vacate the arbitration award prior to the entry of a final judgment.
DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed. Each party shall bear its own costs on appeal.
/s/_________
Kline, P.J. We concur: /s/_________
Richman, J. /s/_________
Miller, J.