Nos. 05-06-01523-CR, 05-06-01524-CR, 05-06-01525-CR
Opinion issued November 21, 2007. DO NOT PUBLISH TEX. R. APP. P. 47
On Appeal from the 282nd Judicial District Court Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause Nos. F96-02641-S, F96-02642-S, F96-19402-TS.
Before Justices WHITTINGTON, BRIDGES, and FRANCIS.
MARK WHITTINGTON, Justice.
Stephen Ray Phillips appeals his convictions for unlawful possession with intent to deliver cocaine, unlawful possession with intent to deliver methamphetamine, and felony escape. In two points of error, appellant contends the trial court never pronounced a sentence after adjudicating his guilt in the cocaine case and the trial court lacked jurisdiction to revoke his community supervision in the methamphetamine and escape cases. We affirm the trial court's judgments.
Procedural History
In cause no. 05-06-01523-CR, appellant waived a jury and pleaded guilty to unlawful possession with intent to deliver cocaine in an amount of four grams or more, but less than 200 grams. See Tex. Health Safety Code Ann. § 481.112(a), (d) (Vernon 2003). The trial judge deferred adjudicating appellant's guilt, placed him on ten years' deferred community supervision, and assessed a $2000 fine. Five months later, after finding appellant had violated the terms of his community supervision, the trial judge adjudicated appellant guilty, sentenced him to ten years in prison, then placed appellant on regular community supervision for ten years. The State later moved to revoke appellant's community supervision, alleging several violations. The trial judge found the allegations true, revoked appellant's community supervision, and assessed punishment at ten years' imprisonment. In cause nos. 05-06-01524-CR and 05-06-01525-CR, appellant waived a jury and pleaded guilty to unlawful possession with intent to deliver methamphetamine in an amount of four grams or more, but less than 200 grams and felony escape. See Tex. Health Safety Code Ann. § 481.112(a), (d) (Vernon 2003); Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 38.06(a) (Vernon 2003). The trial judge placed appellant on ten years' community supervision in each case, and assessed fines of $2000 and $1000, respectively. The State later moved to revoke appellant's community supervision, alleging several violations. The trial judge found the allegations true, revoked appellant's community supervision, and assessed punishment at ten years' imprisonment in each case. Lack of Oral Pronouncement
In his first point of error, appellant argues that because the trial judge did not orally pronounce any sentence after adjudicating appellant's guilt in the cocaine case, he was never placed on probation, and the trial judge had no jurisdiction to revoke any probation in this case. The State responds that this court does not have jurisdiction to address appellant's complaint. Appellant was adjudicated guilty, sentenced to ten years in prison, and placed on ten years' regular community supervision on January 22, 1997. Appellant's community supervision was revoked on October 26, 2006. Appellant did not raise any issues concerning the lack of an oral pronouncement of sentence at the time he was adjudicated guilty and community supervision was imposed. Thus, the time period for appellant to bring this complaint has expired, and we have no jurisdiction to consider this issue. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.12, § 23(b) (Vernon 2006); Tex. R. App. P. 26.2(a)(1); Heiskell v. State, 522 S.W.2d 477, 478 (Tex.Crim.App. 1975). We overrule appellant's first point of error. Trial Court Jurisdiction
In his second point of error, appellant argues the trial court lacked jurisdiction to revoke his community supervision in the methamphetamine and felony escape cases. Appellant asserts that because he was never served with the January 1999 motion to revoke, and there was no capias issued upon the July 2006 amended motion to revoke, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to revoke his community supervision on October 26, 2006, after the probation term had expired. The State responds that the trial court had jurisdiction over both cases when it revoked appellant's community supervision. When a motion to revoke is filed and a capias is issued before the expiration of a probationary period, the court acquires limited jurisdiction to hear the motion after the probation period expires. See Coleman v. State, 632 S.W.2d 616, 618 (Tex.Crim.App. 1982); see also Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.12, § 21(e) (Vernon 2006). This jurisdiction extends to allegations contained in an amended motion to revoke that is filed during the probation period. See Zillender v. State, 557 S.W.2d 515, 519 (Tex.Crim.App. 1977). Here, appellant was placed on community supervision in each case on August 22, 1996. The motions to revoke were filed and the capiases were issued on January 26, 1999. Amended motions to revoke were filed within the ten-year probation period on July 10, 2006. Although the revocation hearing was held on October 26, 2006, which was after the probation period had expired, the trial court retained jurisdiction over the motions to revoke because they were filed before expiration of the probation period. See Zillender, 557 S.W.2d at 519. Moreover, during the revocation hearing, appellant testified he received the motions to revoke and understood the allegations in the motions. We overrule appellant's second point of error. We affirm the trial court's judgment in each case.