Opinion
Case No. 7:20CV00496
11-12-2020
JERRY LEE PHILLIPS, Plaintiff, v. ROANOKE CITY JAIL, Defendant.
Jerry Lee Phillips, Pro Se Plaintiff.
OPINION
Jerry Lee Phillips, Pro Se Plaintiff.
The plaintiff, Jerry Lee Phillips, a Virginia inmate proceeding pro se, filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Phillips's Complaint alleges that "[w]hile handcuffed from behind [he] was gropped [sic] by a deputy thus being sexually assaulted which should be on the jail camera footage." Compl. 2, ECF No. 1. As relief in this lawsuit, Phillips seeks "[f]or the deputy to be held accountable for his actions." Id. After review of the Complaint, I conclude that this action must be summarily dismissed.
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1), the court may dismiss any § 1983 action "with respect to prison conditions . . . if the court is satisfied that the action is frivolous, malicious, [or] fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Section 1983 permits an aggrieved party to file a civil action against a person for actions taken under color of state law that violated his constitutional rights. Cooper v. Sheehan, 735 F.3d 153, 158 (4th Cir. 2013). A complaint must be dismissed if it does not allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
Phillips names only one defendant in this case: the "Roanoke City Jail." Compl. 1, ECF No. 1. A local jail or office building, however, cannot qualify as a person subject to being sued under § 1983. See, e.g., Vinnedge v. Gibbs, 550 F.2d 926, 928 (4th Cir. 1977) (finding that under § 1983, "liability will only lie where it is affirmatively shown that the official charged acted personally in the deprivation of the plaintiff['s] rights") (internal quotation marks, alterations, and citation omitted); McCoy v. Chesapeake Corr. Ctr., 788 F. Supp. 890, 894 (E.D. Va. 1992) ("[T]he jail is not a person under § 1983" and thus "lacks the capacity to be sued as a jail."
Because Phillips's § 1983 claims cannot proceed against the only defendant he has named, I will summarily dismiss the action without prejudice under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1) for failure to state a claim.
An appropriate order will enter this day. Such a dismissal leaves Phillips free to refile his claims in a new and separate civil action if he can correct the deficiencies described in this opinion.
The possibility of amending and resubmitting the claims in a new and separate civil action should not be taken as a finding that Phillips's allegations might state a viable § 1983 claim against some person employed at the jail. The Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment "protects inmates from inhumane treatment and conditions while imprisoned." Williams v. Benjamin, 77 F.3d 756, 761 (4th Cir. 1996). However, not every allegation of sexual abuse is objectively, sufficiently serious for Eighth Amendment purposes. See Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37 (2010) ("[N]ot 'every malevolent touch by a prison guard gives rise to a federal cause of action.'") (quoting Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992)); Boddie v. Schnieder, 105 F.3d 857, 861 (2nd Cir. 1997) (holding that "small number of incidents in which [inmate] allegedly was verbally harassed, touched, and pressed against without his consent" were "despicable," if true, but did "not involve a harm of federal constitutional proportions as defined by the Supreme Court.") (citations omitted). Phillips is also advised that he cannot use a § 1983 action to compel law enforcement authorities to pursue any criminal charge against the deputy for his alleged actions, as he apparently requests. See Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 64-65 (1986) (holding private citizen has no constitutional right to, or any judicially cognizable interest in, the prosecution or non-prosecution of another person and applying other cases).
DATED: November 12, 2020
/s/ JAMES P. JONES
United States District Judge