Opinion
No. 106,961.
2012-09-28
Stephen A. PFEIFER, Appellant, v. KANSAS DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, Appellee.
Appeal from Russell District Court; Mike Keeley, Judge. Michael S. Holland II, of Holland and Holland, of Russell, for appellant. James G. Keller, of Legal Services Bureau, Kansas Department of Revenue, of Topeka, for appellee.
Appeal from Russell District Court; Mike Keeley, Judge.
Michael S. Holland II, of Holland and Holland, of Russell, for appellant. James G. Keller, of Legal Services Bureau, Kansas Department of Revenue, of Topeka, for appellee.
Before MARQUARDT, P.J., McANANY and BUSER, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
After Stephen A. Pfeifer was involved in a single-vehicle accident on his motorcycle, he was transported to the hospital where he agreed to have a sample of his blood taken. Because his blood-alcohol content (BAC) was .15, his driver's license was suspended. Pfeifer appeals the district court's order affirming his driver's license suspension. We affirm.
Shortly after 11 p.m. on July 15, 2009, Deputy Graham Collins of the Russell County Sherriffs Department was called to the scene of a single-vehicle motorcycle accident outside of Paradise, Kansas. When Deputy Collins arrived, firemen and first responders were already at the accident scene. Pfeifer, the driver of the motorcycle, was lying in the ditch next to his wrecked motorcycle. Pfeifer insisted that his wife was riding on the back of his motorcycle at the time of the accident; however, after Deputy Collins searched for Pfeifer's wife, he determined that Pfeifer was alone on the motorcycle.
Deputy Collins noticed an odor of alcohol coming from Pfeifer. He asked Pfeifer whether he had been drinking, and Pfeifer replied in the affirmative. When Deputy Collins asked how much, Pfeifer replied, “[E]nough.” Deputy Collins believed Pfeifer was injured; however, he was uncertain as to the extent of the injuries. EMS transported Pfeifer to the hospital. Collins testified that Pfeifer was conscious, appeared to be coherent, and was talking with his family. Deputy Collins provided Pfeifer with the implied consent advisories and asked Pfeifer to submit to a blood test. Pfeifer agreed. Pfeifer's BAC was .15 grams per 1000 milliliters of blood.
Pfeifer received a notice of driver's license suspension stating that his BAC was greater than .08 and that Deputy Collins had the following reasonable grounds for believing Pfeifer was under the influence of alcohol at the time of the accident: odor of alcohol; slurred speech; bloodshot eyes; difficulty communicating; and Pfeifer's statement that he had consumed “enough” alcohol. On August 20, 2009, Pfeifer requested an administrative hearing. After the hearing, the administrative officer affirmed the suspension.
Pfeifer appealed his driver's license suspension to the district court. Following a hearing, the district court affirmed the suspension, holding that Deputy Collins had reasonable grounds to believe Pfeifer was driving under the influence of alcohol. Pfeifer timely appealed.
On appeal, Pfeifer contends that Deputy Collins lacked reasonable grounds to request a breath test under the Kansas Implied Consent Law, K.S.A. 8–1001 et seq. The determination of whether an officer has reasonable grounds for a particular action involves a mixed question of law and fact. In such cases, we review the ultimate legal conclusion—whether reasonable grounds existed—independently, even though we must defer to the district court's factual findings. Poteet v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 43 Kan.App.2d 412, 416, 233 P.3d 286 (2010).
Pfeifer's sole argument on appeal is that Deputy Collins did not have reasonable grounds to believe Pfeifer was intoxicated prior to the blood test. K.S.A.2009 Supp. 8–1001(a) provides that by driving a vehicle in this state, a person has given implied consent “to submit to one or more tests of the person's blood, breath, urine or other bodily substance to determine the presence of alcohol or drugs .” An officer shall request a person to submit to one of these tests if the officer has reasonable grounds to believe the person was operating or attempting to operate a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or drugs and the person was involved in a vehicle accident resulting in property damage or personal injury. K .S.A.2009 Supp. 8–1001(b)(1)(A), (B). The Kansas Implied Consent Law is to be “liberally construed to promote public health, safety and welfare.” K.S.A.2009 Supp. 8–1001(v).
“This court has equated ‘reasonable grounds' with ‘probable cause.” ’ Sullivan v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 15 Kan.App.2d 705, 707, 815 P.2d 566 (1991). Probable cause is the quantum of evidence that would lead a reasonably prudent police officer to believe that guilt is more than a mere possibility. Campbell v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 25 Kan.App.2d 430, 431, 962 P.2d 1150, rev. denied 266 Kan. 1107 (1998). That standard was met here.
Accordingly, a law enforcement officer has reasonable grounds to believe that a person is operating or attempting to operate a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or drugs if, under the totality of the circumstances, a reasonably prudent police officer would believe that the person's guilt is more than a mere possibility. Poteet, 43 Kan.App.2d at 416.
Pfeifer argues that the district court's ruling would give officers reasonable grounds “when an individual is involved in a motor vehicle accident as long as there was any indication of alcohol consumption whatsoever.” Here, the district court stated:
“The facts in this case establish the officer upon arrival at the scene noticed there had been a severe injury accident, the driver was somewhat disoriented in that he was requesting the officer to look for a passenger who had not been on the vehicle. The officer then followed the driver to the hospital where he smelled an odor of alcohol coming from the driver. The officer, when questioning the driver, was told by the driver he had been drinking and he further testified that he had been drinking ‘enough.” ’
Pfeifer has failed to suggest any facts or authority to show Deputy Collins did not have sufficient information to establish reasonable grounds that Pfeifer was driving under the influence of alcohol prior to requesting a blood test. Here, Pfeifer was involved in a single-vehicle motorcycle accident. Deputy Collins noticed the odor of alcohol and Pfeifer admitted to consuming alcohol. Pfeifer persistently alleged that his wife was riding on the motorcycle with him, which she was not.
In Poteet, a panel of this court determined that there was sufficient evidence to support reasonable grounds for a blood test with only the facts of a single-vehicle accident and the “odor of alcohol.” 43 Kan.App.2d at 415–16. Here, there was far greater evidence to support the reasonable grounds necessary for the blood testing. The district court did not err in affirming Pfeifer's driver's license suspension.
Affirmed.