Opinion
14493N, 104778/11
03-12-2015
Anna PEZHMAN, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. CHANEL, INC., Defendant–Respondent, Debbie Dayton, et al., Defendants.
Anna Pezhman, appellant pro se. Proskauer Rose LLP, New York (Robert S. Schwartz of counsel), for respondent.
Anna Pezhman, appellant pro se.
Proskauer Rose LLP, New York (Robert S. Schwartz of counsel), for respondent.
Opinion
Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Shlomo S. Hagler, J.), entered May 7, 2014, which, to the extent appealed from as limited by the briefs, granted plaintiff's motion to reargue and, upon reargument, adhered to a prior order, same court and Justice, entered April 8, 2013, which granted defendant Chanel, Inc.'s motion to dismiss the claim for tortious interference with prospective employment, unanimously affirmed, without costs.
Plaintiff's motion, which was denominated as one for renewal and reargument, was solely one for reargument and was treated as such by the motion court (see Williams v. City of New York, 19 A.D.3d 251, 797 N.Y.S.2d 468 [1st Dept.2005] ). Although the court's order “denied” the motion to reargue, it addressed the merits, and in so doing, effectively granted reargument. Accordingly, the order is appealable (see Jackson v. Leung, 99 A.D.3d 489, 952 N.Y.S.2d 130 [1st Dept.2012] ; Premier Capital v. Damon Realty Corp., 299 A.D.2d 158, 753 N.Y.S.2d 43 [1st Dept.2002] ).
Plaintiff failed to demonstrate that there are “matters of fact or law allegedly overlooked or misapprehended by the court in determining the prior motion” (CPLR 2221[d][2] ). In any event, dismissal of the claim was warranted pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), since plaintiff, a seasonal at-will employee at Lord & Taylor, failed to allege the existence of a firm offer of employment (see Mattesich v. Hayground Cove Asset Mgt., LLC, 61 A.D.3d 487, 487–88, 876 N.Y.S.2d 405 [1st Dept.2009] ; Murphy v. City of New York, 59 A.D.3d 301, 874 N.Y.S.2d 407 [1st Dept.2009] ). Even if she had, there can be no tortious interference with prospective at-will employment (see Sullivan v. Harnisch, 81 A.D.3d 117, 125, 915 N.Y.S.2d 514 [1st Dept.2010], affd. 19 N.Y.3d 259, 946 N.Y.S.2d 540, 969 N.E.2d 758 [2012] ). Moreover, there are no allegations in the complaint that defendant Chanel engaged in any conduct “for the sole purpose of inflicting intentional harm on plaintiff[ ]” (Carvel Corp. v. Noonan, 3 N.Y.3d 182, 785 N.Y.S.2d 359, 818 N.E.2d 1100 [2004] ).
We have considered plaintiff's remaining contentions and find them unavailing.
MAZZARELLI, J.P., ANDRIAS, SAXE, FEINMAN, CLARK, JJ., concur.