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Petty v. Keech

United States District Court, N.D. California
Jul 2, 2002
No. C 02-1088 CRB (PR) (N.D. Cal. Jul. 2, 2002)

Opinion

No. C 02-1088 CRB (PR)

July 2, 2002


ORDER OF DISMISSAL


Plaintiff, a prisoner at California State Prison, Solano, has filed a pro se civil rights complaint for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that while incarcerated at the Santa Clara County Jail, Elmwood Facility, he was injured when the legs of a steel tray cart he and Officer Keech were pushing "fishtailed" and the cart landed on top of him. Plaintiff claims the cart was defective and Officer Keech negligent.

Plaintiff also alleges that unnamed nurses and doctors at the jail committed medical malpractice and subjected him to unnecessary pain and suffering when they elected to take him to the infirmary (and keep him there for several days), rather than immediately take him to the hospital to check for internal injuries as he requested. Plaintiff further alleges that jail doctors denied his requests for an MRI of his back and feet, and instead only elected to x-ray his feet. Plaintiff notes that when the jail doctors finally approved an MRI of his back several months later, it showed a herniated disc. Plaintiff seeks to proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915.

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners seek redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The court must identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint "is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted," or "seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief" Id. § 191 5A(b). Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 69k, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

B. Legal Claims

It is well-established that neither negligence nor gross negligence is actionable under § 1983 in the prison context. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835-36 n. 4 (1994); Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1334 (9th Cir. 1990) (gross negligence insufficient to state claim for denial of medical needs to prisoner). The applicable standard is one of deliberate indifference to inmate health or safety under the Eighth Amendment, see Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 302 (1991), or, in the case of allegations of excessive force, the prisoner must show that officials applied force "maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm, " Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6 (1992). Even pretrial detainees, who are protected by the Due Process Clause and not the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, must show deliberate indifference or reckless indifference, i.e., conduct so reckless or wanton as to be tantamount to a desire to inflict harm and that therefore is equivalent to a deliberate choice. See Redman v. County of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1443 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc). Negligence is not actionable under § 1983 even outside of the prison context. See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 849 (1998). Plaintiffs allegations regarding the allegedly defective cart are DISMISSED because they amount to no more than negligence not actionable under § 1983.

Plaintiffs allegations regarding medical care will also be DISMISSED because they fail to state a claim fordeliberate indifference" to serious medical needs. A prison official is deliberately indifferent only if he knows that a prisoner faces a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable steps to abate it. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. A difference of opinion between a prisoner-patient and prison medical authorities regarding treatment does not give rise to a § 1983 deliberate indifference claim. Franklin v. Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337, 1344 (9th Cir. 1981). Nor, as previously noted, does a claim of negligence related to medical problems. See Wood, 900 F.2d at 1334; Franklin, 662 F.2d at 1344.

Although regrettable, plaintiffs medical care allegations must be dismissed because they do not amount to more than a claim for negligence or medical malpractice not cognizable under § 1983. See. e.g., Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1130 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding no merit in claims stemming from alleged delays in administering pain medication, treating broken nose and providing replacement crutch, because claims did not amount to more than negligence); O'Loughlin v. Doe, 920 F.2d 614, 617 (9th Cir. 1990) (finding that isolated occurrences of neglect may constitute grounds for medical malpractice but do not rise to level of unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain). After all, the complaint makes clear that plaintiff received medical care immediately after the cart fell on him and in the following months. That jail doctors elected not to immediately order a costly MRI in no way indicates that they were deliberately indifferent to plaintiffs medical needs.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs request to proceed in forma pauperis (doc #2) is DENIED and the complaint is DISMISSED.

The Clerk shall close the file and terminate all pending motions as moot.


Summaries of

Petty v. Keech

United States District Court, N.D. California
Jul 2, 2002
No. C 02-1088 CRB (PR) (N.D. Cal. Jul. 2, 2002)
Case details for

Petty v. Keech

Case Details

Full title:TIMOTHY J. PETTY, Plaintiff v. OFFICER KEECH, Defendant

Court:United States District Court, N.D. California

Date published: Jul 2, 2002

Citations

No. C 02-1088 CRB (PR) (N.D. Cal. Jul. 2, 2002)