Generally, the mere evidence of a party's consumption of alcohol or controlled substance is inadmissible to prove recklessness or carelessness of the party, unless it is established that the party was intoxicated and physically impaired at the time of the accident. Whyte v. Robinson, 421 Pa. Super. 33, 617 A.2d 380 (1992); Hawthorne v. Dravo Corp., Keystone Division, 508 A.2d 298 (1986), appeal denied, 514 Pa. 617, 521 A.2d 932 (1987). Thus, any evidence tending to establish intoxication of a pedestrian is inadmissible, unless it is also proven that the pedestrian was unfit to cross the street due to physical impairment resulting from intoxication; the intoxication and physical impairment may be established by circumstantial evidence, such as "evidence that the injured party was staggering or had liquor on his breath."

See Smith v. Bell Telephone Co., 397 Pa. 134, 153 A.2d 477 (1959) (underground telephone line conduit crushed and blocked sewage pipe); Lewey v. H.C. Frick Coke Co., 166 Pa. 536, 31 A. 261 (1895) (mining of coal under plaintiff's land from access located on defendant's land). The rule's application was then expanded to include cases involving medical malpractice where the injury was not immediately apparent, see Ayers v. Morgan, 397 Pa. 282, 154 A.2d 788 (1959) (surgical sponge left in abdomen during operation performed nine years earlier); cases of "creeping diseases" where the plaintiff has been exposed to hazardous substances but is asymptomatic beyond the limitations period, see Trieschock v. Owens Corning Fiberglas Co., 354 Pa. Super. 263, 511 A.2d 863 (1986), alloc. denied, 514 Pa. 617, 521 A.2d 932 (1987) (asbestosis from exposure to asbestos); Cathcart, 324 Pa. Super. 123, 471 A.2d 493 (same); and breach of contract cases involving latent defects in construction, see A.J. Aberman, Inc. v. Funk Building Corp., 278 Pa. Super. 385, 420 A.2d 594 (1980) (defective roof installed in construction of shopping center). It is the "`inherently unknowable'" character of the injury that is the critical factor that governs the applicability of the discovery rule.

Stauffer v. Ebersole, 385 Pa. Super. 306, 309, 560 A.2d 816, 817, alloc. denied, 524 Pa. 622, 571 A.2d 384 (1989). The discovery rule has thus been applied in cases involving medical malpractice where the injury was not immediately apparent, see Ayers v. Morgan, 397 Pa. 282, 154 A.2d 788 (1959) (surgical sponge left in abdomen during operation performed nine years earlier), DeMartino v. Albert Einstein Medical Center, 313 Pa. Super. 492, 460 A.2d 295 (1983) (negligent root canal); in cases of "creeping diseases" where the plaintiff has been exposed to hazardous substances but the symptoms of the injury do not develop for some time, see Trieschock v. Owens Corning Fiberglas Co., 354 Pa.Super 263, 511 A.2d 863 (1986), alloc. denied, 514 Pa. 617, 521 A.2d 932 (1987) (asbestosis from exposure to asbestos), Cathcart v. Keene Industrial Insulation, 324 Pa. Super. 123, 471 A.2d 493 (1984) (same); in cases involving latent defects in construction, see Northampton County Area Community College v. Dow Chemical, 389 Pa. Super. 11, 566 A.2d 591 (1989), alloc. granted, 525 Pa. 647, 581 A.2d 573 (1990) (defective masonry panels used in construction of building); and in cases of subsurface injury where the defendant damaged the land of the plaintiff via access originating on the defendant's land, see Smith v. Bell Telephone Co. of Pa., 397 Pa. 134, 153 A.2d 477 (1959) (underground telephone line conduit crushed and blocked sewage pipe); Lewey v. H.C. Fricke Coke Co., 166 Pa. 536, 31 A. 261 (1895) (removal of coal from plaintiff's land via access from defendant's land).

Pennsylvania law precludes the admission of evidence that the injured party drank alcohol to show contributory negligence, unless there is corroborative evidence which "reasonably establishes" that the injured party was intoxicated or unfit to drive at the time of the accident. Hawthorne v. Dravo Corp., Keystone Division, 352 Pa. Super. 359, 508 A.2d 298, 303-04 (1986), alloc. denied, 514 Pa. 617, 521 A.2d 932 (1987) and Ackerman v. Delcomico, 336 Pa. Super. 569, 486 A.2d 410 (1984). Corroborative evidence can take several forms.

See supra at 574, n. 4. Second, plaintiffs' reliance on Trieschock v. Owens Corning Fiberglas Company, Inc., 354 Pa. Super. 263, 511 A.2d 863 (1986), alloc. denied, 514 Pa. 617, 521 A.2d 932 (1987) to support their argument is also misplaced. In that case, as part of a routine medical check-up conducted by his employer in March, 1982, Trieschock was told by the company doctor that he was suspected of having asbestosis.

They argue that if the medical personnel who saw Lisa could not come to a definitive conclusion about her illness until November, 1983, it would be unfair to presume that the Mazurs, who are not experienced in the medical field, knew or should have known that she had SSPE before October 31, 1983. This argument finds support in the Pennsylvania case of Trieschock v. Owens Corning Fiberglas Company, 354 Pa. Super. 263, 511 A.2d 863 (1986), alloc. denied, 514 Pa. 617, 521 A.2d 932 (1987). In that case, as part of a routine medical check-up conducted by his employer in March, 1982, Trieschock was told by the company doctor that he was suspected of having asbestosis.

" 'Generally, the mere evidence of a party's consumption of alcohol or controlled substance is inadmissible to prove recklessness or carelessness of the party, unless it is established that the party was intoxicated and physically impaired at the time of the accident. Whyte v. Robinson, 421 Pa. Super. 33, 617 A.2d 380 (1992); Hawthorne v. Dravo Corp., Keystone Division, 352 Pa. Super. 359, 508 A.2d 298 (1986), appeal denied, 514 Pa. 617, 521 A.2d 932 (1987). Thus, any evidence tending to establish intoxication of a pedestrian is inadmissible, unless it is also proven that the pedestrian was unfit to cross the street due to physical impairment resulting

For examples of cases where Pennsylvania courts did apply the discovery rule: Ayers v. Morgan, 397 Pa. 282, 154 A.2d 788 (1959) (surgical sponge left in abdomen during operation performed nine years earlier); Trieschock v. Owens Corning Fiberglas Co., 354 Pa. Super. 263, 511 A.2d 863 (1986), alloc. denied 514 Pa. 617, 521 A.2d 932 (1987) (asbestosis, creeping disease, caused by exposure to asbestos); Smith v. Bell Telephone Co. of Pa., 397 Pa. 134, 153 A.2d 477 (1959) (subsurface injury, underground telephone line crushed and blocked sewage pipe).

The point of sentence enhancement is to punish more severely offenders who have persevered in criminal activity despite the theoretically beneficial effects of penal discipline. Commonwealth v. Wolfe, 349 Pa. Super. 415, 419, 503 A.2d 435, 437 (1986), allocatur granted, 514 Pa. 617, 521 A.2d 932 (1986), appeal dismissed, 517 Pa. 406, 537 A.2d 1370 (1988). In numerous cases, the court has unwaveringly applied the same rule.

"Generally, the mere evidence of a party's consumption of alcohol or controlled substance is inadmissible to prove recklessness or carelessness of the party, unless it is established that the party was intoxicated and physically impaired at the time of the accident. Whyte v. Robinson, 421 Pa. Super. 33, 617 A.2d 380 (1992) ; Hawthorne v. Dravo Corp., Keystone Division, 352 Pa. Super. 359, 508 A.2d 298 (1986), appeal denied, 514 Pa. 617, 521 A.2d 932 (1987). Thus, any evidence tending to establish intoxication of a pedestrian is inadmissible, unless it is also proven that the pedestrian was unfit to cross the street due to physical impairment resulting from intoxication; the intoxication and physical impairment may be established by circumstantial evidence, such as ‘evidence that the injured party was staggering or had liquor on his breath.’