Peterson v. Grissom

3 Citing cases

  1. Hart v. City of Johnson City

    801 S.W.2d 512 (Tenn. 1990)   Cited 14 times
    Invalidating an amendment to the quo warranto statute which only applied in 14 counties

    We have also upheld legislation which has rendered general statutes applicable in only one county, where we found a rational basis for the classification. See, e.g., Shelby County Civil Service Merit Bd. v. Lively, 692 S.W.2d 15 (Tenn. 1985) (upholding an act eliminating authority of county officials to terminate deputies, applicable solely in Shelby County); Harwell v. Leech, 672 S.W.2d 761 (Tenn. 1984) (upholding a statute prohibiting the sale of fireworks, applicable only in Knox County); Peterson v. Grissom, 194 Tenn. 26, 250 S.W.2d 3 (1952) (upholding a "road law," applicable to only one county by virtue of population classification); Elliott v. Fuqua, 185 Tenn. 200, 204 S.W.2d 1016 (1947) (upholding a statute prohibiting the sale of pyrotechnics, applicable only in Davidson County); Knox County v. State ex rel. Nighbert, 177 Tenn. 171, 147 S.W.2d 100 (1940) (upholding the Teacher Tenure Act, applicable to Knox County alone); cf. Canale v. Steveson, 224 Tenn. 578, 458 S.W.2d 797 (1970) (invalidating for absence of rational basis, a statute forbidding "fortune telling," applicable only in Shelby County). In each of the foregoing cases, the relevant statutes were challenged as violative of Article XI, Section 8 of the Tennessee Constitution, which provides that the legislature has no power to suspend any general law for the benefit of a particular individual inconsistent with the general laws of the land.

  2. Williams v. Cothron

    199 Tenn. 618 (Tenn. 1956)   Cited 9 times

    "The legislative intent will prevail over strict letter or literal sense of language used in statute, and to carry such intent into effect, general terms will be limited and narrow terms expanded." To the same effect is Peterson v. Grissom, 194 Tenn. 26, 250 S.W.2d 3, opinion by Mr. Justice Burnett. We think, as did the Chancellor, that the instant case is controlled by Loring v. McGinness, 163 Tenn. 543, 44 S.W.2d 314, and cases cited therein.

  3. Gunter v. U.C.H.R.A.

    No. M1999-01591-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Jun. 27, 2002)   Cited 2 times
    In Gunter, section 16-1-116 could not be applied retroactively because it impaired the defendant employer's vested right in its defense.

    We have also upheld legislation which has rendered general statutes applicable in only one county, where we found a rational basis for the classification. See e.g., Shelby County Civil Service Merit Bd. v. Lively, 692 S.W.2d 15 (Tenn. 1985) (upholding an act eliminating authority of county officials to terminate deputies, applicable solely in Shelby County); Harwell v. Leach, 672 S.W.2d 761 (Tenn. 1984) (upholding a statue prohibiting the sale of fireworks, applicable only in Knox County); Peterson v. Grissom, 194 Tenn. 26, 250 S.W.2d 3 (1952) (upholding a "road law," applicable to only one county by virtue of population classification); Elliott v. Fuqua, 185 Tenn. 200, 204 S.W.2d 1016 (1947) (upholding a statute prohibiting the sale of pyrotechnics, applicable only in Davidson County); Knox County v. State ex rel. Nighbert, 177 Tenn. 171, 147 S.W.2d 100 (1940) (upholding the Teacher Tenure Act, applicable to Knox County alone); cf. Canale v. Stevenson, 224 Tenn. 578, 458 S.W.2d 797 (1970) (invalidating for absence of rational basis, a statute forbidding "fortune telling," applicable only in Shelby County). Hart, 801 S.W.2d at 514-15.