Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:08-CV-1191-M.
November 7, 2008
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is Defendant Dallas Independent School District's Motion to Dismiss [Docket Entry #7]. For the reasons set forth in detail below, the Court GRANTS Defendant's Motion.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs Anthony and Sharon Peterson, individually and as next friends to Essance Peterson, Essance Peterson, Tomika Davis, individually and as next friend to Cedric Laderro Davis, Cedric Laderro Davis, Zakaya Payne, individually and as next friend to both Marquabious Bernard Hall and Mai-Tiara Sonjae Hall, Marquabious Bernard Hall, Mai-Tiara Sonjae Hall, John Williams, and The Coalition to Maximize Education (collectively, "Plaintiffs") filed suit against the Dallas Independent School District and John Does 1-10 (collectively, "the DISD"), alleging that the DISD unlawfully provides lower-quality academic programs, equipment, facilities, and materials to schools located in what are principally African-American communities. The focus of much of the Complaint is the allegation that an insufficient amount of public bond money is being allocated to certain schools, and that the allocation is unlawful. Plaintiffs bring claims under 20 U.S.C. § 1706 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Texas Open Meetings Act, and for common-law nuisance. The nuisance claim arises out of an incident in which students at Maynard Jackson Junior High School were allegedly exposed to poisonous sewage gas, allegedly caused by insufficient bond money being allocated to maintain the school's facilities.
Plaintiffs also assert that on several occasions, Plaintiff John Williams made complaints to DISD management about the program funds that were appropriated for and approved for use in predominantly African-American schools, but were later reallocated and diverted to other schools in the DISD. According to Plaintiffs' Complaint, Mr. Williams was terminated from his position as a bond manager in the DISD because of his objections to the inequities of the program. However, Plaintiffs do not assert causes of action due to wrongful termination; rather, they focus on the circumstances surrounding the funding issues.
The DISD moved to dismiss the nuisance claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The DISD also seeks to dismiss several Plaintiffs pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1).
II. RULE 12(b)(6) MOTION
Defendant DISD first asserts that Plaintiffs' nuisance claim should be dismissed because Texas public school districts may not be held liable for any claims in the absence of a constitutional or statutory provision waiving sovereign immunity, and no such waiver has been made.
A. Legal Standard
B. Governmental Immunity
City of Dallas v. Jennings Jennings 11.151
Campbell v. City of San Antonio, 43 F.3d 973, 975 (5th Cir. 1995).
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964-65 (2007).
Id. at 1965.
Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, 517 F.3d 738, 742 (5th Cir. 2008).
United States ex rel. Riley v. St. Luke's Episcopal Hosp., 355 F.3d 370, 376 (5th Cir. 2004).
Dallas County Mental Health Retardation v. Bossley, 968 S.W.2d 339, 341 (Tex. 1998).
Barr v. Bernhard, 562 S.W.2d 844, 846 (Tex. 1978).
TEX. CIV. PRAC. REM. CODE § 101.001(3)(B) (Vernon 2008).
City of Dallas v. Jennings, 142 S.W.3d 310, 316 (Tex. 2004).
See Jennings, 142 S.W.3d at 316.
Id.
Barr, 562 S.W.2d at 846.
The trustees of an independent school district constitute a body corporate and in the name of the district may acquire and hold real and personal property, sue and be sued, and receive bequests and donations or other moneys or funds coming legally into their hands.
TEX. EDUC. CODE § 11.151(a) (Vernon 2008).
In 2006, the Texas Supreme Court held that the phrase "sue and be sued" does not serve to waive governmental immunity across the board, reversing its prior holding. The Texas Supreme Court has since held that Section 11.151(a) is "not a clear and unambiguous waiver of immunity." The other statutes Plaintiffs cite for support are equally unavailing. In sum, the only situation for which the Legislature has waived governmental immunity for school districts facing nuisance claims is when the complained-of injuries involve the operation or use of a motor vehicle. None of the Plaintiffs' claims involve a motor vehicle, and thus the DISD is entitled to dismissal of the nuisance claim based on the immunity grounds.
Tooke v. City of Mexia, 197 S.W.3d 325, 342 (Tex. 2006).
Fort Worth Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Serv. Employment Redev., 243 S.W.3d 609, 610 (Tex. 2008) (per curiam).
TEX. EDUC. CODE § 130.084 only applies to junior college districts. Section 101.021 of the TTCA expressly states that it does not apply to a school district. Plaintiff cites no support for the proposition that sovereign immunity has been waived for gross negligence claims.
TEX. CIV. PRAC. REM. CODE § 101.051 (Vernon 2008); LeLeauax v. Hamshire Fannet Indep. Sch. Dist., 835 S.W.2d 49, 51 (Tex. 1992).
III. RULE 12(b)(1) MOTION
Defendant next moves to dismiss several of Plaintiffs' claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1). Defendant seeks to dismiss Plaintiffs Essance Peterson, Cedric Laderro Davis, Marquabious Bernard Hall, and Mai-Tiara Sonjae Hall's claims because these four Plaintiffs are minors and therefore lack the legal capacity to sue. Defendant also asserts that Plaintiff John Williams lacks standing to sue because "he has suffered no injury in fact based on the cause[s] of action asserted."
Defendant's Brief at 8.
A. Legal Standard
B. The Standing Requirement
Home Builders Assoc., Inc. v. City of Madison, 143 F.3d 1006, 1010 (5th Cir. 1998).
Id.
See Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541-42 (1986).
See Chair King, Inc. v. Houston Cellular Corp., 131 F.3d 507, 509 (5th Cir. 1997).
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
Id., quoting Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734-35 (1972).
Id. at 561.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 17.
Sax v. Votteler, 648 S.W.2d 661, 666 (Tex. 1983).
TEX. CIV. PRAC. REM. CODE § 129.001 (Vernon 2008).
Plaintiffs' answer and response to Defendant's pre-answer motion, at 12.
412 F. Supp. 1192 (N.D. Tex. 1976) (Taylor, J.).
The caption in the Tasby case — Eddie Mitchell Tasby et. al. v. Dr. Nolan Estes — appears at first glance to support Plaintiffs' proposition. The original filing in Tasby v. Estes was October 6, 1970, when Eddie Tasby was 16 years old. However, the district court's first judgment was successfully appealed to the Fifth Circuit, and by the time the case was again before the district court, it was 1975, and Eddie Tasby had reached the age of majority in Texas. If no party moved to dismiss based on Tasby's initial minor status before the appeal, the issue would have been waived. The case certainly does not establish precedent for allowing a minor to sue over an objection.
Complaint at 1, Tasby v. Estes, 342 F. Supp. 945 (N.D. Tex. 1971) (Taylor, J.), reversed on other grounds by Tasby v. Estes, 517 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1975).
Plaintiffs also assert that "[o]ther cases have also allowed minors to be a party to lawsuits of school districts," citing the Fifth Circuit cases of Castaneda v. Pickard and Sherling v. Townley. However, in both cases, the minor parties were represented by their parents and next friends, and did not appear in their individual capacities, and thus the cases do not support Plaintiffs' contentions. Plaintiffs Essance Peterson, Cedric Laderro Davis, Marquabious Bernard Hall, and Mai-Tiara Sonjae Hall, as minors, do not have the capacity to bring suit in this case as individuals and must be dismissed. The Court notes that others purport to act for them as next friends.
648 F.2d 989 (5th Cir. 1981); 464 F.2d 587 (5th Cir. 1972).
2. Plaintiff John Williams' Standing
Plaintiffs assert that one of the Plaintiffs, John Williams, was wrongfully terminated as a result of retaliation for Mr. Williams's whistle blowing activity. However, Plaintiffs do not assert a cause of action relating to Mr. Williams' termination, which is the only injury to Mr. Williams alleged in Plaintiffs' Complaint. Even if this Court were to return a favorable decision on all four claims brought by Plaintiffs, it would do nothing to address any concrete injury suffered by Mr. Williams. If Mr. Williams desires to assert causes of action related to his termination, may certainly do so — but Plaintiffs' complaint does not, and so he must be dismissed.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS Defendant's motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' nuisance claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The Court also GRANTS Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Essance Peterson, Cedric Laderro Davis, Marquabious Bernard Hall, Mai-Tiara Sonjae Hall and John Williams from the suit for lack of standing, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1).
SO ORDERED.