Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 99-2112 SECTION "K"(4)
June 4, 2002
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is plaintiff Bethany Peterson's "Motion for New Trial and/or Amendment" of Judgment Pursuant to Rule 59 (rec. doc. 58). On January 31, 2001, the Court granted summary judgment in favor of defendant, Life Insurance of North America ("LINA"), dismissing all of plaintiff's claims against it (rec. doc. 57). Plaintiff filed her motion for new trial on February 11, 2002 and the motion was set for hearing originally of February 27, 2002 and reset for March 13, 2002. Having considered the pleading, memoranda and relevant law, the Court finds that the motion shall be denied for reasons that follow.
Although plaintiff's motion is denominated as a "Motion for Reconsideration and/or Re-Trial," the court must clarify which subsection of the rule controls. Rule 59(a) governs both jury and bench trials. However, the Court initially disposed of LINA's through a motion for summary judgment. Because summary judgment is not a trial, plaintiffs motion is most appropriately designated a motion to alter or amend a judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e). See St. Paul Mercury Insurance Company v. Fair Grounds Corp., et al., 123 F.3d 336, 339 (5th Cir. 1997) (motion to alter or amend under Rule 59(e) is proper motion to contest summary judgment); Patin v. Allied Signal Inc., 77 F.3d 782, 785 n. 1 (5th Cir. 1990) (motion to reconsider entry of summary judgment properly styled a Rule 59(e) motion); Lavespere v. Niagra Mach. Tool Works, Inc., 910 F.2d 167, 175 (5th Cir. 1990) (motion that challenges prior summary judgment filed within 10 days of judgment is brought under Rule 59(e)).
Reconsideration of a judgment is an extraordinary remedy which courts should use sparingly. Wright, Miller Kane, Federal Practice Procedure: Civil 2d § 2810.1, p. 124; Fields v. Pool Offshore, Inc., 1998 WL 43217 (E.D. La. 2/3/1998); Bardwell v. Sharp, 1995 WL 517120, *1 (E.D. La. 8/30/1995). The remedy is so extraordinary that the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has directed that the Rule 59(e) standard `favors denial of motions to alter or amend a judgment. . . ." Southern Contractors Group, Inc. v. Dynalectric Company, 2 F.3d 606, 611 (5th Cir. 1993) (citation omitted). As such, "the district court has considerable discretion in deciding whether to reopen a case in response to a motion for reconsideration arising under [Rule 59(e)]." Lavespere v. Niagra Mach. Tool Works, Inc., 910 F.2d 167, 174 (5th Cir. 1990); Edward H. Bohlin Co. v. Banning Co., 6 F.3d 350, 355 (5th Cir. 1993). Under the Rule 59(e) standard:
the court has considerable discretion in deciding whether to reopen a case . . . That discretion, of course, is not limitless . . . [t]wo important judicial imperatives clash: The need to bring litigation to an end and the need to render just decisions on the basis of all the facts. The task of the district court in such a case is to strike the proper balance between these competing interests.Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, 1996 WL 476879 (E.D. La. 1996)( citing Lavespere v. Niagra Mach. Tool Works, Inc., 910 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1990); In re Ingram Towing Co., 1994 WL 660484 (E.D. La. 1994).
Generally, there are four grounds upon which a Rule 59(e) motion can be granted:(1) to correct manifest errors of law or fact upon which judgment is based, (2) the availability of new evidence, (3) the need to prevent to prevent manifest injustice, or (4) an intervening change in controlling law. See e.g., Motiva Enterprises LLC v. Wegmann, 2001 WL 246414 (E.D. La. 3/12/2001); Clay v. Daichi Shipping, 2000 WL 6269 (E.D. La. 1/5/2000); Fields v. Pool Offshore, Inc., 1998 WL 43217 (E.D. La. 2/3/1998); Wright, Miller Kane, Federal Practice Procedure: Civil 2d § 2810.1, p. 125-27. Finally, a Rule 59(e) motion should not be used to relitigate prior matters that should have been urged earlier or that simply have been resolved to the movant's dissatisfaction. See Clay v. Daichi Shipping, 2000 WL 6269 (E.D. La. 1/5/2000); Campbell v. St. Tammany Parish School Bd., 1999 WL 777720 (E.D. La. 9/29/1999).
In the instant case, the Court has carefully considered the assertions in plaintiff's motion and finds that plaintiff has, for the most part, recited the same arguments that were presented in his initial opposition to summary judgment. Plaintiff does raise the argument in his motion for new trial that the Court should remand the case back to Tenet for a disability determination because the insurance policy at issue indicates that Tenet (not CIGNA or LINA) is to make that determination and Tenet has never made a decision on plaintiffs disability. Motion for Reconsideration and/or Re-Trial, p. 2. However, as noted in the Court's original opinion, while the Tenet Income Replacement Plan grants discretionary authority to Tenet to interpret plan terms, CIGNA is responsible for claims administration and deciding whether or not benefits are due. Because CIGNA's decision to deny plaintiff's benefits was based on the factual determination that it was not timely submitted and did not require any interpretation of plan terms, this Court employed an abuse of discretion standard in reviewing CIGNA's determination.
As this Court explained in its original opinion, the clear terms of the plan provide that written proof of loss must be submitted "within 90 days of the event giving rise to the disability, or as soon as is reasonably possible if the employee is unable to give notice within 90 days, but in no event can notice be given later than one year following the time notice was otherwise required" (Motion for Summary Judgement, p. 2). CIGNA did not receive written proof of plaintiff's loss until April 3, 1998 — when plaintiff's attorney wrote CIGNA a letter explaining that a claim for benefits had been made. (Administrative Record, Exhibit A, p. 15-16). Thereafter, a CIGNA representative sent plaintiff's attorney a letter dated January 21, 1999(1) acknowledging receipt of his letter and noting that it was the first notice the company had received regarding her claim and (2) requesting plaintiffs counsel to provide an explanation as to why plaintiff failed to comply with the notice requirements. (Administrative Record, Exhibit A. p. 12-13). Plaintiff's counsel replied on February 9, 1999 asserting that plaintiff had made a claim with the human resources department previously, but did not include any proof of the submission of her claim to that department.
A CIGNA representative then contacted Tenet on February 26, 1999 and learned that Tenet had no record of either a short or long term disability claim being filed by plaintiff (Administrative Record, Exhibit A, p. 6). Assured at that point that neither CIGNA nor Tenet had received written proof of loss in plaintiff's case within a year of the accident, CIGNA advised plaintiff's counsel that plaintiff's claim for long term disability was denied. (Administrative Record, Exhibit A, p. 1-3).
Further, plaintiff suggests that several exhibits, some of which were not a part of the administrative record, should cause this Court to grant its motion for reconsideration. For example, plaintiff posits that in Exhibit B, a letter drafted by CIGNA dated February 15, 1999, CIGNA "admits . . . that claimant did make a claim in August 1996." Specifically, that letter states, "It appears that this clmt filed for benefits in 8/96. We have no evidence of claim submission." The Court finds plaintiff's argument unpersuasive. While CIGNA concedes in the exhibit that plaintiff believed she made a claim for benefits, CIGNA clearly explained that it had not received any written submission of a claim on her behalf.
Plaintiff also submits that Exhibit F, an accident report presumably filed with plaintiff's employer, Northshore, establishes that plaintiff timely submitted her claim for benefits. While the exhibit indicates that it was received by a Northshore employee in October 1996, it is an accident report — not a claim for benefits. There has been no evidence to suggest that the filing of such an accident report is sufficient to constitute notice of a disability claim to the appropriate entity under the plan.
Finally, plaintiff submits that exhibits D and G, consisting of plaintiff's requests for coverage in 1998, are evidence of plaintiffs timely claim for benefits. As noted above, however, plaintiff's requests for benefits in 1998 was untimely as the accident occurred in 1996.
Therefore, the Court finds that plaintiff has failed to introduce any further evidence to persuade this Court that she filed or that Tenet received written proof of her loss within the time frame set by the insurance policy. Therefore, to the extent that plaintiff attempted to put forth new arguments, she has not persuaded the Court that it committed clear error of fact or law and mere disagreement with the Court's opinion is an insufficient ground to support relief. Plaintiff cannot simply relitigate his original motion or attempt to gain rehearing through Rule 59(e). The plaintiff has not convinced the Court that it made any errors of fact or law, let alone manifest errors, that merit reconsideration. Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that plaintiff's motion for reconsideration and or new trial is DENIED.