Opinion
No. 05-05-00103-CV
Opinion issued November 10, 2005.
On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 3, Collin County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 003-1389-04.
Affirmed.
Before Justices WHITTINGTON, FRANCIS, and LANG.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
David Wayne Peters appeals the suspension of his driver's license following an arrest for driving while intoxicated (DWI). In three issues, appellant claims the trial judge erred in affirming the administrative law judge's ruling because the police lacked probable cause to arrest appellant and the decision to suspend his driver's license is not supported by substantial evidence. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
Background
On February 19, 2004, Fairview Police Officer Lovren found appellant asleep in the driver's seat of a car parked in a field near a highway frontage road. Officer Lovren succeeded in rousing appellant after several attempts. The officer asked appellant to step out of the vehicle. According to Officer Lovren, appellant's eyes were bloodshot, he smelled of alcohol, and his speech was slurred. Appellant was "somewhat incoherent." Officer Lovren also reported that the front end of the car was damaged. When asked about the damage, appellant replied he was not aware of any damage. The officer then asked appellant "where he was headed," and appellant responded that he was going to his house in Allen, Texas. Appellant admitted he had been drinking all night. Appellant refused to submit to breath and blood alcohol concentration tests even though Officer Lovren warned appellant that his license would be suspended if he refused. Officer Lovren subsequently arrested appellant for DWI.
On August 27, 2004, the Texas Department of Public Safety (DPS) sought the suspension of appellant's driver's license at a hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ). After the ALJ suspended appellant's driver's license, appellant appealed to the county court at law. The county court at law judge upheld the suspension. This appeal followed.
Standard of Review
We review the decision of an ALJ to suspend a party's driver's license under the substantial evidence standard. See Mireles v. Tex. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 9 S.W.3d 128, 131 (Tex. 1999); Tex. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Fisher, 56 S.W.3d 159, 162 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2001, no pet.). We may not substitute our judgment for that of the ALJ. Mireles, 9 S.W.3d at 131; Fisher, 56 S.W.3d at 162. Under the substantial evidence rule, the issue for the reviewing court is not whether the ALJ's decision was correct, but only whether the record demonstrates some reasonable basis for the ALJ's decision. Mireles, 9 S.W.3d at 131; Fisher, 56 S.W.3d at 162. Appellate courts must affirm administrative findings in contested cases if there is more than a scintilla of evidence to support them, even if the findings are against the preponderance of the evidence. Mireles, 9 S.W.3d at 131 (citing R.R. Comm'n of Tex. v. Torch Operating Co., 912 S.W.2d 790, 792-93 (Tex. 1995)); Fisher, 56 S.W.3d at 162. The issues to be determined by the ALJ at the suspension hearing were whether (i) reasonable suspicion or probable cause existed to stop or arrest appellant; (ii) probable cause existed to believe that appellant was operating a motor vehicle in a public place while intoxicated; (iii) appellant was placed under arrest by Officer Lovren and was requested to submit to the taking of a specimen; and (iv) appellant refused to submit to the taking of a specimen on Officer Lovren's request. See Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 724.042 (Vernon Supp. 2005).
Probable Cause
In his first issue, appellant claims the police did not have probable cause to arrest him for DWI. Under this issue, appellant claims Officer Lovren did not observe appellant operate the vehicle or make it function and, therefore, the arrest was improper. We disagree.
"Probable cause exists where the police have reasonably trustworthy information sufficient to warrant a reasonable person to believe a particular person has committed or is committing an offense." Fisher, 56 S.W.3d at 163 (citing Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 87 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997)). A police officer may arrest, without a warrant, a person found in a suspicious place and under circumstances that reasonably show the person had been guilty of some felony or breach of the peace. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 14.03(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 2005). DWI is a breach of the peace. Gallups v. State, 151 S.W.3d 196, 201 (Tex.Crim.App. 2004) (citing Romo v. State, 577 S.W.2d 251, 253 (Tex.Crim.App. 1979)). Whether a place is suspicious depends on the totality of the circumstances. See Dyar v. State, 125 S.W.3d 460, 464 (Tex.Crim.App. 2003). We examine "all the circumstances observed by the officers and the facts known by them" to determine "whether they had probable cause and the . . . arrest was authorized under the Code of Criminal Procedure Article 14.03(a)(1)." Dyar, 125 S.W.3d at 464. Suspicious places have included the scene of an accident, the hospital, or even the home of the suspect. See Dyar, 125 S.W.3d at 468 (combination of appellant's slurred speech, red glassy eyes, strong smell of alcohol and unintelligible responses soon after single car accident made hospital "suspicious place" to satisfy probable cause for DWI); Layland v. State, 144 S.W.3d 647, 650 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 2004, no pet.) (scene of accident considered "suspicious place" when suspect returned to accident and exhibited signs of intoxication); Sandoval v. State, 35 S.W.3d 763, 768 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2000, pet. ref'd) (backyard where intoxicated suspect was located following accident deemed "suspicious place"). Thus, signs of a suspect's intoxication and his location may combine to create a "suspicious place" for the purposes of establishing probable cause in DWI cases.
In this case, Officer Lovren discovered appellant asleep in the driver's seat of a car in an empty field near the intersection of U.S. Highway 75 and State Highway 121. The car had sustained damage to the front. Officer Lovren tried several times to awaken appellant before being successful. Appellant smelled of alcohol, his eyes were bloodshot, his speech was slurred, and he was "somewhat incoherent." When asked, appellant said "he had been drinking all night." A second officer had arrived at the scene. While Officer Lovren consulted with the second officer, appellant urinated, explaining that "he could not hold it any longer." Although the officers attempted to administer field sobriety tests, appellant refused to perform the tests. Officer Lovren then arrested appellant for DWI. After examining the circumstances observed by Officer Lovren and the facts known by him, we conclude Officer Lovren had probable cause to arrest appellant for DWI and, therefore, the arrest was authorized under article 14.03 of the code of criminal procedure. See Dyer, 125 S.W.3d at 464. Furthermore, we conclude the evidence supporting a finding of probable cause of DWI amounts to more than a mere scintilla. Accordingly, the record contains substantial evidence to support the ALJ's finding the Officer Lovren had probable cause to arrest appellant. We overrule appellant's first issue.
Sufficiency of the Evidence
In his second and third issues, appellant contends there is insufficient evidence to support the decision to suspend his driver's license. Under these issues, appellant claims the ALJ erred in suspending appellant's license because the arresting officer's "belief consisted of merely a hunch" that appellant had been operating a vehicle while intoxicated.
We have determined the record supports a finding of probable cause to arrest appellant for DWI. See Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 724.042 (Vernon Supp. 2005). The record also establishes that when Officer Lovren asked, appellant refused to provide a breath or blood specimen. See Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 724.042 (Vernon Supp. 2005). Thus, the evidence in the record supports the ALJ's findings that (i) Officer Lovren had probable cause existed to arrest appellant and probable cause existed to believe that appellant was operating a motor vehicle in a public place while intoxicated; and (ii) following appellant's arrest by Officer Lovren, appellant was requested to submit to the taking of a breath and blood specimen, and he refused. Because there is substantial evidence to support the ALJ's findings, we conclude appellant's second and third issues lack merit. See Beeman v. State, 86 S.W.3d 613, 617 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002) ("Failure to provide a specimen results in suspension of the person's driving privileges for a specific period of time as provided by section 724.035 of the Transportation Code."). Because there is substantial evidence to support the ALJ's findings and conclusions, it follows that the county court at law judge did not err in affirming the ALJ's judgment. We overrule appellant's final two issues.
We affirm the trial court's judgment.