Opinion
2:22-cv-00254-JD-MGB
02-07-2022
Maria Peter; Michael Peter; Julika Berger; and Jarolin Berger, Plaintiffs, v. Susan Diane Wojcicki; William Henry Gates; Stephane Bancel; and, Albert Bourla, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
MARY GORDON BAKER, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Maria Peter (43 years old); Michael Peter (14 years old); Julika Berger (50 years old); and Jarolin Berger (15 years old) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”), proceeding pro se, bring this civil action against Susan Diane Wojcicki, CEO of YouTube; William Henry Gates, Co-Chair of the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation (“BMGF”); Stephane Bancel, CEO of Moderna Therapeutics, Inc. (“Moderna”); and Albert Bourla, CEO of Pfizer, Inc. (“Pfizer”) (collectively, “Defendants”), alleging negligence in relation to the COVID-19 pandemic. Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.), the assigned United States Magistrate Judge is authorized to review the Complaint and submit a recommendation to the United States District Judge. For the following reasons, the undersigned recommends that this action be summarily dismissed.
BACKGROUND
The undersigned notes at the outset that the incoherent, nonsensical nature of Plaintiffs' Complaint makes it difficult to discern the true causes of action underlying this case. Plaintiffs state that in March and April 2020, Defendants negligently “failed to keep the risk of synthetic bioweapon-attacks at the 10%-low, but rose it to a 70%-high.” (Dkt. No. 1 at 4.) Plaintiffs seem to suggest that Defendants did this by exaggerating the impact of COVID-19 to the general public, despite knowing “that a corona-virus in the year 2020 is not a killer-virus, merely for people aged 85+. . . .” (Id.) Defendants apparently “said in mass media ‘18 months lockdown' as this ‘is a pandemic, a deadly virus,' thus making aggressive states/terrorists happy and worrying nation's military; thus making security and vaccine business happy; thus producing new anxiety disease Akva.” (Id.) The Complaint further states that Defendants “let damage-knowhow fall- uncensored-into wrong hands, because on [December 30, 2020] NATO/Brussel announced nuclear (!) retaliatory strikes against aggressive states/terrorists using synthetic bioweapons.” (Id.)
As a result of Defendants' actions, Plaintiffs claim that they, and other citizens, are now “handicapped” by the “new anxiety disease Akva, ” which requires two years of “medication and psychotherapy.” (Id.) Thus, Plaintiffs each seek approximately $25,000 in compensatory damages, and $16 trillion in punitive damages to be distributed to “countries, communities, [and] nation's military affected most from [Defendants'] negligence rising in 2020 the risk of killer-virus-attacks to continuous 70%.” (Id.) This is the extent of the Complaint.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Plaintiffs filed this Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in federal court without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit. To protect against possible abuses, the court must dismiss any complaints, or portions of complaints, that are frivolous or malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see also Ross v. Baron, 493 Fed.Appx. 405, 406 (4th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (noting that frivolous complaints are also subject to dismissal pursuant to the inherent authority of the court); Hamilton v. United States, No. 2:20-cv-1666-RMG-MHC, 2020 WL 7001153, at *1 (D.S.C. Aug. 26, 2020), adopted, 2020 WL 5939235 (D.S.C. Oct. 7, 2020) (“It is well established that a court has broad inherent power sua sponte to dismiss an action, or part of an action, which is frivolous, vexatious, or brought in bad faith.”) (internal citations omitted).
A complaint is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). Thus, a claim based on a “meritless legal theory” or a “fantastic or delusional” factual scenario may be dismissed sua sponte at any time under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25, 327-28 (1989); see also McLean v. United States, 566 F.3d 391, 399 (4th Cir. 2009) (noting that examples of frivolous claims include those whose factual allegations are so “wholly fanciful” as to be simply “unbelievable”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The United States Supreme Court has explained that the statute “is designed largely to discourage the filing of, and waste of judicial and private resources upon, baseless lawsuits.” Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 326.
As to failure to state a claim, a complaint filed in federal court must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). In order to satisfy this standard, a plaintiff must do more than make conclusory statements. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (explaining that the court need not accept as true a complaint's legal conclusions). Rather, the complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” See Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). When “it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations, ” Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984), the complaint fails to state a claim.
Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). A federal court is therefore charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Nonetheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure to allege facts that set forth a cognizable claim in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 390-91 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009) (outlining pleading requirements under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for all civil actions).
DISCUSSION
Even considering Plaintiffs' claims under the more liberal pro se pleading standard, the instant action is subject to summary dismissal for several reasons. As a threshold matter, the undersigned clarifies that Plaintiffs do not have standing to bring a lawsuit on behalf of other countries, communities, and/or nations' militaries. See Career Counseling, Inc. v. Amerifactors Fin. Grp., LLC, 509 F.Supp.3d 547, 553 (D.S.C. 2020) (citing Covenant Media of N.C., LLC v. City of Monroe, N.C. , 285 Fed.Appx. 30, 34 (4th Cir. 2008)) (noting that “[s]tanding implicates the court's subject matter jurisdiction” and is “a threshold jurisdictional issue. . . .”) Rather, Plaintiffs must show “a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy” in order to establish standing. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962); see also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992) (noting that the plaintiff must have suffered a “particularized” injury, which means that “the injury must affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual way”). Accordingly, the Court's review here is limited to Plaintiffs' personal claims and injuries. See, e.g., Murray v. Singhi, No. 0:09-cv-451-PMD-PJG, 2009 WL 2447987, at *5 (D.S.C. Aug. 7, 2009) (finding complaint subject to partial summary dismissal with respect to plaintiff's allegations about matters applicable to “all mankind” and not directly related to plaintiff's own, individual constitutional rights or injuries).
With this clarification in mind, this Court is plainly the wrong venue for Plaintiffs' Complaint. A civil action may be brought in one of the following: (1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the state in which the district is located; (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated; or (3) if there is no district in which an action may otherwise be brought, any judicial district in which any defendant is subject to the court's personal jurisdiction with respect to such action. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). Here, Plaintiffs' claims against Defendants do not meet any of the criteria under 28 U.S.C. § 1391. Indeed, none of the Defendants in this action are citizens of or reside in South Carolina, nor did any of the events giving rise to Plaintiffs' claims occur in this district. (Dkt. No. 1 at 2.) To the contrary, Plaintiffs live in Austria and Germany (id. at 1), and there is no indication in the Complaint that they developed the purported “new anxiety disease” anywhere other than Europe.
If an action is filed in the improper venue, the court may dismiss the case, or transfer such case to any district or division in which it could have been brought for the convenience of the parties and in the interests of justice. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404(a), 1406(a); see also United States v. Espinoza, 641 F.2d 153, 162 (4th Cir. 1981) (noting that the decision of whether to transfer or dismiss a case is committed to the sound discretion of the district court); Rouse v. Nessel, No. 8:20-cv-00954-DCC-JDA, 2020 WL 6279198, at *8 (D.S.C. July 6, 2020), adopted, 2020 WL 4435189 (D.S.C. Aug. 3, 2020) (“A court may raise the issue of defective venue sua sponte.”). In the instant case, the undersigned finds that transferring Plaintiffs' Complaint to another district court would be futile, as the claims are completely frivolous and nonsensical.
As noted above, it is impossible to distill an actionable claim from Plaintiffs' rambling, convoluted allegations. See, e.g., Green v. Sumter Court, No. 3:07-cv-1570-JFA-BM, 2007 WL 2022199, at *2-3 (D.S.C. July 9, 2007) (dismissing pro se complaint where the allegations were “so incomprehensible and filled with what could only be considered by a reasonable person as unconnected, conclusory, unsupported statements or ‘gibberish' that they [did] not state a cause of action.”); Bell v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. 1:13-cv-00478-RDB, 2013 WL 6528966, at *1 (D. Md. Dec. 11, 2013) (“Although a pro se plaintiff is general[ly] given more leeway than a party represented by counsel . . . a district court is not obligated to ferret through a [c]omplaint . . . that is so confused, ambiguous, vague or otherwise unintelligible that its true substance, if any, is well disguised.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Moreover, when a plaintiff proceeds in forma pauperis, 28 U.S.C. § 1915 “gives courts the authority to pierce the veil of the complaint's factual allegations” and dismiss the case “when the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1992) (internal quotation marks and citations and omitted). Examples of such claims are those “describing fantastic or delusional scenarios or claims which are otherwise manifestly ‘fanciful' or so wholly irrational as to lack any basis in fact.” See Kraim v. Virginia, No. 3:21-cv-00326, 2021 WL 3612305, at *2 (S.D. W.Va. July 26, 2021) (referencing Denton, 504 U.S. at 32-33), adopted, 2021 WL 3610509 (S.D. W.Va. Aug. 13, 2021). Here, Plaintiffs' rambling, convoluted allegations of “synthetic bioweapon-attacks” and a “new anxiety disease Akva” plainly fall within the statute's definition of frivolity.
Accordingly, the undersigned finds that Plaintiffs' allegations should be summarily dismissed as frivolous and for failure to state a plausible claim upon which relief may be granted. See, e.g., Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72 (4th Cir. 1994) (affirming dismissal of plaintiffs suit as frivolous where allegations were nonsensical and conclusory on their face); Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536-37 (1974) (noting that federal courts lack the power to entertain claims that are “so attenuated and unsubstantial as to be absolutely devoid of merit”).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the Court summarily dismiss this action without prejudice and without issuance and service of process.
The undersigned finds that Plaintiffs' allegations are “so detached from reality that there is no conceivable way for [them] to cure the complaint's deficiencies through amendment.” See Kraim v. Virginia, No. 3:21-cv-00326, 2021 WL 3612305, at *2 (S.D. W.Va. July 26, 2021), adopted, 2021 WL 3610509 (S.D. W.Va. Aug. 13, 2021); see also Boyd v. United States Cent. Intel. Agency, No. 7:21-cv-1133-BHH-JDA, 2021 WL 2482415, at *5 (D.S.C. May 26, 2021) (finding that it would be futile to allow plaintiff an opportunity to amend complaint “given the preposterous and frivolous nature” of the allegations), adopted, 2021 WL 2477170 (D.S.C. June 17, 2021). This is especially true given that this Court is not the appropriate venue to entertain Plaintiffs' claims.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Plaintiffs' attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 835
Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).