Pete v. State

Full title: JOHN ANTWON PETE, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

Court: Court of Appeals of Texas, First District, Houston

Date published: Oct 1, 2009

No. 01-09-00114-CR (Tex. App. Oct. 1, 2009)

Opinion

No. 01-09-00114-CR

Opinion issued October 1, 2009. DO NOT PUBLISH. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

On Appeal from the 337th District Court, Harris County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 1193081.

Panel consists of Chief Justice RADACK and Justices BLAND and MASSENGALE.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

JANE BLAND, Justice.

A jury convicted John Antwon Pete of possession with the intent to deliver cocaine, a controlled substance, weighing more than one and less than four grams. See TEX. HEALTH SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 481.102(3)(D) (Vernon Supp. 2008), 481.112(c) (Vernon 2003). Pete pleaded true to two enhancements, and the trial court assessed punishment of twenty-five years' imprisonment. Pete appeals, claiming the trial court erred in refusing to give an article 38.23(a) instruction¹ because a factual issue exists as to whether the interior of the car in which Pete sat in constitutes a "public place." Pete, however, failed to present any evidence affirmatively disputing that the car was a public place. We therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court.

1 Article 38.23(a) reads:

No evidence obtained by an officer or other person in violation of any provisions of the Constitution or laws of the State of Texas, or of the Constitution or laws of the United States of America, shall be admitted in evidence against the accused on the trial of any criminal case.

In any case where the legal evidence raises an issue hereunder, the jury shall be instructed that if it believes, or has a reasonable doubt, that the evidence was obtained in violation of the provisions of this Article, then and in such event, the jury shall disregard any such evidence so obtained.

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.23(a) (Vernon 2005).

Background

On February 22, 2008 around 1:00 a.m., Officer M. Daniel was patrolling the Bristol apartment complex in a high crime area of South Houston when he saw a lone vehicle sitting in the parking lot. He observed two people inside the car either shaking hands or exchanging an object. He turned into the lot to investigate, followed by Officer J. Sanchez who was also patrolling the area. Officer Daniel and Officer Sanchez approached the car to make sure everything was all right. Officer Daniel spoke to Pete, who was in the passenger seat of the vehicle. Pete had bloodshot eyes, enlarged pupils, appeared disoriented, and did not respond to Officer Daniel's questions. Based on Pete's appearance and demeanor, Officer Daniel decided to arrest Pete for public intoxication. As Pete exited the car, he kept his hand in his pocket and refused to remove it. Pete resisted Officer Daniel's attempts to handcuff him, but Officer B. Ramirez arrived at the scene to help take Pete into custody. Officer Daniel then performed a search of Pete incident to the arrest and found a matchbox containing three grams of crack cocaine inside Pete's right front pocket. Officer Daniel and Officer Sanchez testified at Pete's trial regarding the incident. Both officers testified that Pete was arrested in a public place as required by the public intoxication statute.² See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 49.02(a) (Vernon Supp. 2008). During cross-examination, defense counsel asked Officer Sanchez hypothetical questions that Pete claims create a factual issue as to whether the inside of the car is a public place. First, counsel asked if the public would have access to his car if it was parked in a Target parking lot. In response, Officer Sanchez testified that the public would not have access to his car. Second, defense counsel presented a situation in which one person acts as a designated driver for an intoxicated person and stops at a Wal-Mart on the way home. Counsel then asked if the purpose of having a designated driver is defeated if this car is considered a public place. Officer Sanchez replied, "I guess so." At the close of evidence, defense counsel moved to suppress any controlled substance seized incident to Pete's arrest for public intoxication on the theory that the arrest was improper because the car was not a public place. Defense counsel then requested an article 38.23(a) jury question asking that the jury find whether the interior of the vehicle was a public place. See TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 38.23(a) (Vernon 2005). The trial court denied the request. The proposed jury issue stated:

A person commits an offense if the person appears in a public place while intoxicated to the degree that the person may endanger the person or another, then you must determine under the facts of this case if the interior of the vehicle in which the defendant was a passenger was a public place as defined as follows: Public place means anyplace to which the public or a substantial group of the public has access and includes but is not limited to streets, highways, and the common areas of schools, hospitals, apartment houses, office buildings, transport facilities, and shops.

If you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt or you have a reasonable doubt thereof that the interior of the vehicle in which the defendant was a passenger was not a public place as defined above, then you will disregard any evidence obtained as a result of the defendant's arrest for public intoxication.

The trial court denied the requested question, holding that the defense had not raised a fact issue as to whether the interior of the car was a public place.

Discussion

To determine whether the jury charge contains reversible error, we first decide whether error exists. Middleton v. State, 125 S.W.3d 450, 453 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). If we conclude that it does, we examine whether the error harmed the defendant. Id. Under article 38.23(a), a defendant must meet three requirements before he is entitled to a jury instruction: (1) The evidence heard by the jury must raise an issue of fact; (2) the evidence on that fact must be affirmatively contested; and (3) that contested fact must be material to the lawfulness of the challenged conduct in obtaining the evidence. Madden v. State, 242 S.W.3d 504, 510 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). If no factual dispute exists, the legality of the conduct is determined by the trial court alone, as a question of law. Id. at 510. Questions on cross-examination cannot create the required conflict; only a witness's answers, which are evidence, may create a dispute. Id. at 514. Pete cites Kirtley v. State for the proposition that the inside of a car is not per se a public place, and thus presents a question for the fact-finder. 585 S.W.2d 724, 726 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979). In Kirtley, the Court of Criminal Appeals addressed whether the "public" element of the public lewdness statute was met under circumstances in which the defendant, while driving his car on a public road, reached across the seat and touched his female passenger's breast. Id. at 725. In holding that the record did not support the assertion that the car was a public place, the court reasoned that the car was not a commercial establishment, and, while in motion, was not readily accessible to the public. Id. at 726. Since Kirtley was decided, both the United States Supreme Court and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals have weighed in on whether a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy inside a car when it is parked in a public place. See Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 740, 103 S. Ct. 1535, 1542 (1983) (holding that defendant had "no legitimate expectation of privacy shielding that portion of the interior of an automobile which may be viewed from outside the vehicle by inquisitive passersby or diligent police officers"); Longoria v. State, 624 S.W.2d 582, 584 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (holding that interior of car parked ten to twenty feet off the main paved road of a Houston public park after midnight was "readily accessible to the public . . . and therefore is a public place under the Penal Code"). The Penal Code defines as a "public place" as any place where a substantial group of the public has access, including, but not limited to, the common areas of apartment houses. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07(a)(40) (Vernon Supp. 2008). These include the parking lots and sidewalks. Evans v. State, 995 S.W.2d 284, 286 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. ref'd) (citing Bower v. State, 769 S.W.2d 887, 897-98 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989), overruled on other grounds by Heitman v. State, 815 S.W.2d 681 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991)); Cuero v. State, 845 S.W.2d 387, 391-92 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, pet. ref'd) (holding that defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy while in condominium complex parking lot surrounded by security fence). These authorities together demonstrate that the interior of a car in an apartment parking lot is a public place should it be viewed from the outside by diligent police officers. See Brown, 460 U.S. at 740, 103 S. Ct. at 1542. The officers' testimony, given in response to defense counsel's hypothetical questions, do not create a fact issue because it is undisputed that Pete was in a parked car in a public place in view of the patrolling officers. Consequently, the trial court correctly rejected the requested jury question.

Conclusion

Pete failed to raise a factual issue as to whether the interior of the car constituted a public place under these circumstances, and thus the trial court did not err in refusing the requested jury question. We therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court.