Opinion
Civil Action No. 04-6255 (FLW).
July 1, 2005
VICTORIA PERRY, PLAINTIFF PRO SE, ATRIUM EXECUTIVE SUITES, MT. LAUREL, NJ, for Plaintiff.
CARL D. POPLAR, CHERRY HILL, NJ, for Defendants.
ORDER
This matter having been opened to the Court by Victoria Perry, plaintiff pro se, by the filing of a motion for reconsideration of this Court's May 25, 2005 Opinion and Order in which the Court dismissed Plaintiff's Complaint; the Court having reviewed Plaintiff's brief and Defendants' letter, pursuant toFed.R.Civ.P. 78, and it further appearing that:
1. In the District of New Jersey, Local Civil Rule 7.1(g) allows a party to seek reconsideration of a court's decision if there are "matters or controlling decisions which counsel believes the Judge . . . has overlooked." L. Civ. R. 7.1(g) (quoted in Interfaith Community Organization v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc., 215 F. Supp. 2d 482, 507 n. 12 (D.N.J. 2002). A motion for reconsideration may only be granted if: "(1) an intervening change in the controlling law has occurred; (2) evidence not previously available has become available; or (3) it is necessary to correct a clear error of law or prevent manifest injustice." Interfaith Community, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 507 (citations omitted). It has been described as a "limited procedural vehicle." Resorts Int'l v. Greate Bay Hotel and Casino, 830 F. Supp. 826, 831 (D.N.J. 1992). Hence, a "party seeking reconsideration must show more than a disagreement with the court's decision," Panna v. Firstrust Sav. Bank, 760 F. Supp. 431, 435 (D.N.J. 1991), and will fail to meet its burden if it merely presents "a recapitulation of the cases and arguments considered by [the] Court before rendering its original decision." Carteret Sav. Bank, F.A. v. Shushan, 721 F. Supp. 705, 706 (D.N.J. 1989), appeal dismissed and mandamus granted, 919 F.2d 225 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 817 (1992). The rule permits a reconsideration only when "dispositive factual matters or controlling decisions of law" were presented to the court but were overlooked. See Resorts Int'l v. Great Bay Hotel and Casino, 830 F.Supp. 826, 831 (D.N.J. 1992); Khair v. Campbell Soup Co., 893 F.Supp. 316, 337 (D.N.J. 1995). Thus, the court will only grant such a motion if the matters overlooked might reasonably have resulted in a different conclusion. Bowers v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, Act, Inc., NCAA, 130 F. Supp. 2d 610, 613 (D.N.J. 2001). In sum, it is improper on a motion for reconsideration to "ask the Court to rethink what it had already thought through — rightly or wrongly." Oritani Sav. Loan Ass'n v. Fidelity Deposit Co., 744 F.Supp. 1311, 1314 (D.N.J. 1990).
2. The facts of this case are set out in detail in the aforementioned Opinion of May 25, 2005, which is incorporated by reference.
3. In her moving papers, Plaintiff lists twenty-three of her allegations and argues that the Court should grant her motion because it "did not address" these allegations in its Opinion. She admits that her discussion of "specific items not addressed in [the] Opinion . . . refers primarily to Judges [sic] John A. Fratto, Judge John McFeely [sic], Judge Francis J. Orlando, Jr. and Judge Daniel Bernardin." Pl.'s Mot. at 3. As she has done in previous submissions, Plaintiff has confused this case with her other case before this Court, Civil Action No. 04-6102 (FLW). In Civil Action No. 04-6102 (FLW), Plaintiff sued the four above mentioned judges because of prior court rulings adverse to her in connection with certain of her allegations in this case. However, none of these judges are defendants in this case.
4. Assuming, arguendo, that Plaintiff's allegations having to do with the judges have any bearing upon this case, those allegations, along with her statements regarding the allegedly conspirational, illegal and unconstitutional conduct of the defendants in this case merely present a recapitulation of the arguments considered by the Court before rendering its original decision. See Carteret Sav. Bank, F.A. 721 F. Supp. at 706. The Court is also confident that it did not overlook anything that might reasonably have caused it to reach a different conclusion. See Bowers, 130 F. Supp. 2d at 613. Therefore, Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration is denied. Accordingly,
Plaintiff also seeks an evidentiary hearing. No evidentiary hearing is required because the Court finds her arguments unpersuasive and lacking a legal basis. The record is already complete for purposes of any judicial review.
IT IS on this 1st day of July, 2005, hereby
ORDERED that Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration is DENIED.