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Perri Unempl. Compensation Case

Superior Court of Pennsylvania
Mar 24, 1960
159 A.2d 67 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1960)

Opinion

December 16, 1959.

March 24, 1960.

Appeals — Timeliness — Decision of bureau — Jurisdiction of referee to consider claim on merits — Hearing — Procedural due process.

1. The time limits prescribed by the Unemployment Compensation Law for the taking of an appeal are mandatory, and, in the absence of fraud or its equivalent, courts and administrative bodies are without power to extend the appeal period.

2. A decision of the bureau with notice, properly addressed to the residence of claimant and not returned by the postal authorities, is presumed to have been received.

3. In this case, in which it appeared that a copy of the bureau's decision, declaring claimant ineligible, was mailed to her at her given post office address; that claimant, who asserted that she had never received the notice, failed to take an appeal within the period prescribed; and that the referee, after a hearing, ruled that he was without jurisdiction to hear the appeal since it was filed beyond the period prescribed, and the board adopted his findings and conclusions and affirmed his decision; it was Held that (a) under the circumstances, the referee was without jurisdiction to consider the claim on the merits; and (b) claimant, who was afforded a full hearing before the referee on appeal from the bureau, was not denied procedural due process.

Before RHODES, P.J., HIRT, GUNTHER, WRIGHT, WOODSIDE, ERVIN, and WATKINS, JJ.

Appeal, No. 423, Oct. T., 1959, by claimant, from decision of Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, No. B-52491, in re claim of Mary Ann S. Perri. Decision affirmed.

Lena Fusco Hurlong, for appellant.

Sydney Reuben, Assistant Attorney General, with him Anne X. Alpern, Attorney General, for appellee.


Argued December 16, 1959.


This is an appeal by claimant from a decision of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review affirming the referee's findings and conclusions, and denying claimant benefits. Claimant was last employed as a supervisor at Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company, 436 Walnut Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. She left her employment on February 27, 1959, being in her seventh month of pregnancy, and filed an application for benefits on February 28, 1959. On April 22, 1959, the bureau issued a decision declaring claimant ineligible under section 402(b) of the Unemployment Compensation Law, 43 P. S. § 802(b), she having voluntarily left her work. A copy of the decision was mailed to claimant at her given post office address, 1217 South Broad Street, Philadelphia 47, Pennsylvania, on April 22, 1959.

Claimant failed to take an appeal within the ten-day period prescribed in section 501(e) of the Law, 43 478 P. S. § 821(e), which period expired on May 2, 1959. On May 21, 1959, claimant appeared at the bureau in person and filed an appeal. On June 12, 1959, the referee held a hearing at which claimant admitted that her address at the time of the bureau's decision was 1217 South Broad Street, Philadelphia 47, Pennsylvania. Claimant had entered a hospital on April 20, 1959, and her child was delivered on April 21, 1959. She returned home on April 24, 1959. Claimant asserts she never received the bureau's notice of April 22, 1959, denying compensation, although claimant's mother and husband were at her home and received other mail at her home address.

On June 19, 1959, the referee ruled that he was without jurisdiction to hear the appeal since it was filed beyond the ten-day period prescribed by section 501(e) of the Law, 43 P. S. § 821 (e). Claimant appealed to the board from the referee's decision of June 19, 1959. The board, on July 16, 1959, adopted the referee's findings and conclusions, and affirmed his decision which dismissed the claim on the ground claimant's appeal to him was filed too late under section 501(e) of the Law.

The time limits prescribed by the Unemployment Compensation Law for the taking of an appeal are mandatory, and, in the absence of fraud or its equivalent courts and administrative bodies are without power to extend the appeal period. Pisani Unemployment Compensation Case, 184 Pa. Super. 35, 37, 132 A.2d 760. The bureau's decision with notice, properly addressed and not returned by the postal authorities, is presumed to have been received. Cf. Bee Unemployment Compensation Case, 180 Pa. Super. 231, 233, 119 A.2d 558.

Claimant, through her counsel, argues that she did not have a hearing before the referee or the board, and thus was prevented from presenting her side of the case. The record establishes that claimant was afforded a hearing and a full opportunity to testify before the referee. There was no evidence submitted that she was misled by any administrative official or otherwise prevented from filing a timely appeal. There was no contradiction of the fact that claimant's appeal from the bureau was not filed within the limitation of ten days set up in section 501(e) of the Law. Under the circumstances, the referee was without jurisdiction to consider the claim on the merits. Cf. Pisani Unemployment Compensation Case, supra, 184 Pa. Super. 35, 38, 132 A.2d 760. Here, as in Davidson Unemployment Compensation Case, 189 Pa. Super. 543, 548, 549, 151 A.2d 870, claimant was afforded a full hearing before the referee on appeal from the bureau, and claimant's assertion of lack of procedural due process is entirely unfounded.

Decision is affirmed.


Summaries of

Perri Unempl. Compensation Case

Superior Court of Pennsylvania
Mar 24, 1960
159 A.2d 67 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1960)
Case details for

Perri Unempl. Compensation Case

Case Details

Full title:Perri Unemployment Compensation Case

Court:Superior Court of Pennsylvania

Date published: Mar 24, 1960

Citations

159 A.2d 67 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1960)
159 A.2d 67

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