Permanent Ins. v. Cox

3 Citing cases

  1. In re Verhoff

    Case No. 98-31972 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Nov. 29, 2000)

    Bogan v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 36 Ohio St.3d 22, 31, 521 N.E.2d 447, 455-456 (1988), modified in partin McDonald v. Republic-Franklin Ins. Co., 45 Ohio St.3d 27, 543 N.E.2d 456 (1989). Further, it has also been held that under Ohio law an insured retains an interest in litigation even after an insurer has paid on a claim unless the insurer has fully compensated the insured for his or her loss; thus denoting that until an insured has been fully compensated for his or her loss, both the insurer and the insured have a substantive interest in any claim against an alleged tortfeasor. 59 OHIO JUR.3d Insurance ยงยง 1226 1227; see also Permanent Insurance Company v. Cox, 99 Ohio App. 389, 392,133 N.E.2d 627, 630 (Ohio Ct.App. 1955) (holding that where the amount of damages in an automobile collision case exceeds the amount due on an existing policy, the insured is the real party in interest, and the insurer, who has paid a part of the damages, is a proper but not a necessary party to the action); Hoosier Condensed Milk Co. v. Doner, 96 Ohio.App. 84, 121 N.E.2d 100, 101 (Ohio Ct.App. 1951) (when actual losses exceeded the amount an insurer is required to pay under a policy, the insured is the real party in interest); Shealy v. Campbell, 20 Ohio St.3d 23, 25, 485 N.E.2d 701, 703 (1985) (when an insurer fully pays for the loss occasioned by the insured and the insurer becomes subrogated to the insured's claim against the tortfeasor, the insurer is the real party in interest as the insured no longer has a right of action against the tortfeasor). It follows then that unless an insured has been fully compensated for a loss, an insured retains at least a residual interest in a cause

  2. Zurback Steel Corp. v. Edgcomb

    411 A.2d 153 (N.H. 1980)   Cited 12 times
    In Zurback Steel Co., the New Hampshire Supreme Court emphasized that recoupment may only be used to "reduce or eliminate the plaintiff's demand either because the plaintiff has not complied with some cross obligation of the contract... or because he has violated some duty... in the making or performance of the contract."

    51 AM. JUR. 2d Limitation of Actions 78 (1970); Annot., 127 A.L.R. 909 (1940); see, e.g., Rollins v. Horn, 44 N.H. 591 (1863). See also Permanent Ins. Co. v. Cox, 99 Ohio App. 389, 133 N.E.2d 627 (1955); Jones v. Mortimer, 28 Cal.2d 627, 170 P.2d 893 (1946); Tom Reed Gold Mines Co. v. Brady, 55 Ariz. 133, 99 P.2d 97 (1940). Plaintiff's suit was instituted with regard to the agreement on August 21, 1972, well within the six-year statute of limitations.

  3. Masters v. Alessandro

    229 N.E.2d 110 (Ohio Ct. App. 1965)   Cited 1 times

    Under the authority of Section 2505.22, Revised Code, the plaintiff-appellee has also set forth an assignment of error. See Permanent Ins. Co. v. Cox, 99 Ohio App. 389. Such assignment of error, as stated by the plaintiff-appellee, is that "the judgment is contrary to law as it was awarded to defendant-appellant on the first and third causes of action, without any evidence thereon."