Perez v. United States

3 Citing cases

  1. Wilson v. United States

    315 F. Supp. 1197 (E.D. Pa. 1970)   Cited 9 times
    Discussing Cesare, 210 A.2d at 493-495

    The Court rejects this argument; to do otherwise would be tantamount to imposing liability on the Government every time a serviceman committed a negligent act which resulted in an injury. This would, of course, greatly expand the Government's liability under the Federal Tort Claims Act in spite of the long-established proposition that the Act was designed to impose liability only under circumstances where a private person would be liable. E.g. Perez v. United States, 253 F. Supp. 619 (D. Mass.), aff'd 368 F.2d 320 (1st Cir. 1966); United States v. Eleazer, 177 F.2d 914 (4th Cir. 1949). This the Court will not do. Moreover, we find support for our position in case law.

  2. Bowling v. U.S.

    740 F. Supp. 2d 1240 (D. Kan. 2010)   Cited 21 times
    Finding that plaintiff's civil conspiracy claim was not actionable under the FTCA because if acting within the scope of employment, an employee's actions are those of the corporation, and a corporation cannot be guilty of conspiracy with itself

    United States v. Olson, 546 U.S. 43, 46 (2005).Louie v. United States, 776 F.2d 819, 824 (9th Cir. 1985); United States v. Inmon, 205 F.2d 681, 684 (5th Cir. 1953); Costley v. United States, 181 F.2d 723, 725 (5th Cir. 1950); United States v. South Carolina State Highway Dep't, 171 F.2d 893, 900 (4th Cir. 1949); Perez v. United States, 253 F. Supp. 619, 620 (D. Mass. 1966); Carroll v. United States, 87 F. Supp. 721, 726 (W.D.S.C. 1949). Moreover, under Kansas law, the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine holds that "officers and directors of a corporation cannot conspire with themselves when [1] acting on behalf of the corporation and [2] within the scope of their authority" because a "corporate defendant could not be guilty of conspiracy with itself."

  3. Pruden v. United States

    399 F. Supp. 22 (E.D.N.C. 1974)   Cited 4 times

    He was allowed to choose his own mode of transportation, and he was not required to report for duty for several more hours. In this regard, see Perez v. United States, 253 F. Supp. 619 (D.Mass. 1966), aff. 368 F.2d 320 (1 Cir. 1966), where an enlisted man reporting for duty four hours early did not subject the United States to liability when he was involved in an automobile-pedestrian accident. The decision in James with relation to the instant case is further strengthened by Strohkorb v. United States, 268 F. Supp. 526 (E.D.Va. 1967), aff. 393 F.2d 137 (4th Cir. 1968), which held a