Opinion
CIVIL ACTION 03-0902
March 2, 2004
Before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment (Document 18) filed on behalf of Defendants Danny Blackburn ("Blackburn") and Brian Harris Autoplex ("Brian Harris") and a Motion for Summary Judgment (Document 19) filed on behalf of Defendant, Clayton Stonecypher ("Stonecypher"). The parties waived oral argument and the matter was taken under submission on February' 11, 2004. The Court, having considered the arguments of the parties, the Court record, the law and applicable jurisprudence, is fully advised in the premises and ready to rule.
ORDER AND REASONS
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, Awilda Perez ("Perez") was formerly employed by Brian Harris as an automobile salesperson hired on January 25, 2001. Danny Blackburn was the General Manager at Brian Harris, and Clayton Stonecypher was the assistant manager. In the months of February and March of 2002, Perez's production had declined and she was drawing more advances than she was earning in commissions. Perez called in sick to work on March 29, 2002. On March 30, 2002, Perez did not show up for work. The defendants claim that she did not notify anyone at Brian Harris that she would not be coming in. However, Perez claims she called in to work and Mr. Stonecypher did not pick up the line and accept her call.
According the defendants, on April 1, 2002, Perez was told she was terminated for not calling in to inform her employer she was ill on March 30 and for her insufficient sales performances, including not covering her quotas for the past months. Perez alleges that after Mr. Stonecypher handed her the check she requested and told her she was fired, he stated, "You should have f-ked me and this wouldn't have happened."
On March 31, 2003, Perez filed this suit alleging sexual harassment on the part of her co-employee at the dealership, Clayton Stonecypher. She alleges that Blackburn was given notice of Stonecypher's behavior and took no action to protect the employees under their supervision and control, but instead allowed and condoned the actions of Stonecypher.
In her original Complaint, Perez asserts claims under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. (also known as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964) and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. She also asserts Louisiana state law claims for negligence, sexual harassment and/or intentional infliction of emotional distress against Stonecypher, Blackburn, and Brian Harris Autoplex.
II. LAW AND ANALYSIS OF THE COURT
A. LAW ON RULE 56 SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that summary judgment should be granted only "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the record which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Stults v. Conoco, Inc., 76 F.3d 651, 655-56 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing Skotak v. Tenneco Resins, Inc., 953 F.2d 909, 912-13 (5th Cir.) (quoting Celotex Corp. v, Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 832 (1992)). When the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. The nonmoving party must come forward with "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (emphasis supplied); Tubacex, Inc. v. M/V RISAN, 45 F.3d 951, 954 (5th Cir. 1995).
Thus, where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no "genuine issue for trial." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 588. Finally, the Court notes that substantive law determines the materiality of facts and only "facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
B. TITLE VII
In a Title VII race discrimination case, plaintiff has the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). In order to meet this initial burden, plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that he was a member of a protected class; (2) that he was qualified for the position in question; (3) that he was discharged from that position; and, (4) that he was either replaced by someone outside the protected class or otherwise discharged because of the protected trait. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973); Bodenheimer v. PPG Industries, Inc. 5 F.3d 955, 957 (5th Cir. 1993).
Once plaintiff has set forth a prima facie case of discrimination, the burden shifts to the employer to produce a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its employment action. Davis v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 14 F.3d 1082, 1087 (5th Cir. 1994). "This burden is one of production, not persuasion; it 'can involve no credibility assessment.'" Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 2106, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) (citation omitted)). The presumption of unlawful discrimination disappears once the employer offers admissible evidence that is sufficient for the trier of fact to conclude that there was a legitimate reason for the discharge. See id.
Title VII affords a private right of action to individuals aggrieved by unlawful discrimination but, in order to preserve their statutory rights, employees must file their charges of discrimination "within one hundred and eighty days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred." 42 U.S.C. A § 2000e-5(e). Timely filing is a prerequisite to the maintenance of a Title VII action and the failure to file within the statutory period will ordinarily operate as a bar to suit. Abrams v. Baylor College of Medicine, 805 F.2d 528, 533 (5th Cir. 1986).
In the instant case, plaintiff has named Danny Blackburn and Clayton Stonecypher, both employees of Brian Harris, as defendants. Title VII, however, only prohibits discrimination by an "employer." See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. The Fifth Circuit has consistently rejected the argument that a supervisor, as an "agent" of an employer, can be sued in his individual capacity under Title VII. Indest v. Freeman Decorating, Inc., 164 F.3d 258, 262 (5th Cir. 1999). Therefore, as the plaintiff may not sue Mr. Blackburn or Mr. Stonecypher under Title VII, claims against both should be dismissed because no genuine issue of material fact exists.
Plaintiff has no opposition to defendant's argument that defendants Stoncypher and Blackburn cannot be sued in their individual capacity, as they are not "employers" as defined by Title VII.
Accordingly, the only claims to be further discussed are those against Brian Harris. The defendant contends that plaintiffs Title VII claims are time barred, as plaintiff failed to file a charge or complaint with the EEOC prior to filing suit. The defendant cites numerous cases which deal with jurisdiction of the court to hear this matter. In this case, the defendants have made no argument that the Title VII requirements deprive this court of jurisdiction, only that the filing requirements of Title VII are prerequisite to maintaining an action and failure to file within the statutory period operates to bar this suit. Plaintiff admits she did not file a charge with any administrative agency, including the EEOC. In addition to failing to exhaust administrative remedies, her claims as to employment actions for which no EEOC charge was filed within 300 days after their occurrence have prescribed. Plaintiff failed to file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC, well over three hundred days from her last day of work have passed and any subsequent charge would be considered late. Therefore, plaintiff's failure to file her charge within Title VII's statutory period operates to bar her Title VII claims in this suit.
C. STATE LAW CLAIMS
In Louisiana, discrimination based on sex is prohibited. La.Rev.Stat. § 23:1006(A)(1), 51:2231. The prescriptive period for claims brought under Louisiana anti-discrimination statutes is one year. La. Civ. Code art. 3492; Williams v. Conoco, Inc., 860 F.2d 1306, 1307 (5th Cir. 1988), Harris v. Home Savs. Loan Ass'n, No. W95-223, 1995 WL 442229 (La.App. 3d Cir. 1995).
Plaintiff filed this suit alleging sexual harassment on March 31, 2003. Plaintiff's last day of work at Brian Harris was March 28, 2002. The deposition testimony of the plaintiff establishes that no harassing behavior took place on March 29th, 30th, or 31st. The point of contention is whether sexual harassment took place on the day the plaintiff was fired, April 1, 2002. Plaintiff, in deposition testimony, stated that on the morning of April 1, 2002, she arrived at work, went to a meeting and when she came back, she was fired, packed her things, and left. Perez stated, "1 went to the meeting that morning and when I came back, Mr. Clayton gave me my shaking down and pink slip. He said, 'If you would have done something with me, you would have never gotten fired."
The defendant contends that the "shaking down" referenced by plaintiff in no way insinuates sexually harassing behavior. Defendant submits that even if Mr. Stoncypher's statement could be viewed as a sexually harassing comment, which they do not contend it does, it was made after plaintiffs employment with Brian Harris was terminated and therefore, no liability for sexual harassment can be imputed to Brian Harris. The plaintiff, however, argues that plaintiff's statement shows that there is a material fact at issue, including, but not limited to, what happened on April 1, 2002.
The Court notes that plaintiff, in both her deposition testimony and the Original Complaint, admits that on the morning of April 1, 2002, Mr. Stonecypher made a comment she found offensive after she requested her check from him, was handed her check, and was told she was fired. Therefore, any comment made by Mr. Stonecypher was made after plaintiffs employment with Brian Harris was terminated. As plaintiff admits that no sexual harassing behavior took place on either March 29th, 30th, or 31st, and plaintiff did not file this suit until March 31, 2003, plaintiffs state law claims have prescribed.
D. § 1981 CLAIMS
Title 42 U.S.C. § 1981 provides in pertinent part, "All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens . . ." In the instant case, plaintiff has failed to allege any facts to state a cause of action for discrimination "on the basis of race" as required by Section 1981. Therefore, there are no genuine issues of material fact and defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law with respect to claims made under § 1981.
Plaintiff has no opposition to defendant's argument that 28 U.S.C. § 1981 does not apply in the instant case.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that the Motion for Summary Judgment filed on behalf of the Defendant be and the same is hereby GRANTED.