Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County No. 37-2008-00093582- CU-PN-CTL, William R. Nevitt, Jr., Judge.
HUFFMAN, J.
Plaintiff Serafin Perez appeals a judgment entered after the trial court granted summary judgment (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c) in favor of defendants Yong Lie Lee, Cheryl Thompson, and Scripps Health (together Scripps) in his medical negligence action. Perez seeks to reverse the summary judgment ruling, arguing (1) Scripps's motion for summary judgment was procedurally defective because a motion for summary adjudication (§ 437c, subd. (f)) was the proper procedural device; and (2) he satisfied his burden to oppose the motion by raising a triable issue as to whether section 340.5, a statute of limitation, barred his claim. We affirm the judgment.
All statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise specified.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In August 2006, Perez sought medical treatment at Scripps after he had difficulties speaking for several weeks. Scripps's medical personnel, including defendants Lee and Thompson, evaluated his condition, conducted a computed tomography (CT) scan and an echocardiogram, diagnosed him with a transient ischemic attack, and prescribed medication for him. Scripps treated Perez at its facility for about 17 hours before discharging him.
Two days later, Perez suffered a stroke after experiencing the same symptoms for which he had received medical care. He sought treatment for his symptoms at a Sharp Hospital rehabilitation facility. In October 2006, as he recovered from his stroke, Perez talked to nurses at Sharp who suggested his treatment at Scripps must have been deficient.
In December 2007, Perez filed a complaint against Scripps, asserting a cause of action for medical negligence. Scripps then filed a motion for summary judgment on the ground that Perez's claim had no merit. Specifically, Scripps asserted (1) it met the requisite standard of professional care; (2) it did not cause Perez's injuries; and (3) section 340.5, the applicable statute of limitation, barred the action because Perez did not file his complaint within one year after he discovered his injuries. In its moving papers, Scripps included the declaration of Gregory Seymann, M.D., an expert specialist in hospital medicine, who stated in relevant part:
"[T]here was nothing that the nursing staff or physicians (including Yong Lie Lee, and Dr. Cheryl Thompson) did or failed to do that was [a] breach in the standard of care with regard to the care and treatment of [Perez] during his hospitalization from August 2, 2006 to August 3, 2006."
Dr. Seymann also gave his expert opinion that "keeping [Perez] hospitalized... would not have prevented this stroke."
Perez filed an opposition to the motion, but he did not present any evidence, expert or otherwise, to rebut Dr. Seymann's opinion. Instead, Perez contended Scripps should have filed a motion for summary adjudication because, he argued, the motion sought to resolve three "distinct" issues: breach, causation, and an affirmative defense that the statute of limitations barred his claim. Perez further argued the statute of limitations did not bar his action because the one-year filing limitation did not begin to run until nurses at Sharp informed him of the nature of his injuries.
The court granted Scripps's motion for summary judgment. The court ruled that Scripps met its burden of proof as to breach and causation by producing expert medical evidence to that effect. It also stated Perez's opposition failed to raise triable issues of material fact as to those two elements of the malpractice cause of action. Perez appeals the court's ruling.
DISCUSSION
I
APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS
We review the court's summary judgment ruling on a de novo basis, "considering all of the evidence the parties offered in connection with the motion... and the uncontradicted inferences the evidence reasonably supports." (Merrill v. Navegar, Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 465, 476.) We also review the evidence in the light most favorable to the losing party. (Ambriz v. Kelegian (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1519, 1523, fn. 1.)
Summary judgment is appropriate where no triable issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (§ 437c, subd. (c).) A defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law where the plaintiff's cause of action has no merit. (§ 437c, subd. (a).) A defendant may show the cause of action has no merit by proving (1) the plaintiff cannot establish one or more elements of the claim; or (2) the defendant has a complete defense to the entire action. (§ 437c, subd. (o)(1)-(2).) If the defendant meets this initial burden, the burden then shifts to the plaintiff to establish triable issues of material fact as to the disputed elements and defense. (§ 437c, subd. (p)(2).)
Plaintiffs in a negligence action must establish, inter alia, the defendant breached a legal duty owed to the plaintiffs, and the breach caused their injuries. (Sharon P. v. Arman, Ltd. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1181, 1188; disapproved on another point in Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 853, fn. 19.) In the context of medical negligence, a plaintiff must present expert medical evidence showing the defendant breached a duty to the plaintiff and caused the plaintiff's injuries. (Powell v. Kleinman (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 112, 123 (Powell).)
As to the issue of breach, expert evidence defines the standard of care against which a court measures the defendant's conduct in a medical negligence action. (Jambazian v. Borden (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 836, 844.) "When a defendant moves for summary judgment and supports his motion with expert declarations that his conduct fell within the community standard of care, he is entitled to summary judgment unless the plaintiff comes forward with conflicting expert evidence." (Munro v. Regents of the University of California (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 977, 984-985.)
Expert evidence is also necessary to determine whether the defendant caused the plaintiff's injuries in a medical negligence action. (Powell, supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at p. 123.) When a defendant moves for summary judgment and presents expert evidence to show he did not cause the plaintiff's injuries, the defendant is entitled to summary judgment unless the plaintiff comes forward with conflicting expert evidence. (Ibid.;see Hanson v. Grode (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 601.)
II
ANALYSIS
Perez contends the court erroneously granted Scripps's motion for summary judgment. Under section 437c, subdivision (p)(2), Scripps initially had to show Perez could not establish one or more elements of his cause of action. Scripps supported its motion by including the expert declaration of Dr. Seymann, who expressly stated Scripps's medical personnel met the standard of care in treating Perez during his hospitalization. Dr. Seymann also asserted Scripps could not have prevented Perez's stroke, thereby indicating that Scripps did not cause Perez's injuries. Accordingly, Scripps satisfied its initial burden because it showed Perez could not establish two essential elements of his cause of action, breach and causation.
Under section 437c, subdivision (p)(2), the burden then shifted to Perez to raise triable issues as to whether Scripps deviated from the standard of care and caused his injuries. Perez did not meet this burden. He did not introduce any conflicting expert evidence to rebut Dr. Seymann's opinions. By failing to produce any expert evidence, Perez did not raise triable issues as to the elements of breach and causation. (See Powell, supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at p. 123.)
Perez does not argue he raised triable issues of material fact as to the elements of breach and causation. Instead, Perez asserts Scripps improperly filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming that a motion for summary adjudication was the proper procedural device to dispose of identified issues within a cause of action. However, Perez misconstrues Scripps's notice of summary judgment. In the notice, Scripps does not ask the court to adjudicate three independent "issues" within Perez's cause of action. Instead, Scripps identified three grounds upon which it was entitled to summary judgment, all directed toward the single legal issue of whether Perez's cause of action had any merit under section 437c, subdivision (o). Summary judgment, not adjudication, is appropriate where an entire cause of action has no merit. (§ 437c, subd. (a).)
The trial court correctly identified the key issues of fact presented by the evidence. It properly focused on the contested elements of Perez's claim, breach and causation, and correctly found Perez did not in any way rebut Scripps's showing as to those elements. In ruling, the court did not need to address whether the statute of limitations barred the action, because that issue was not a part of Perez's required showing in opposition to Scripps's motion, as framed.
Scripps established it met the standard of care and did not cause Perez's injuries as matters of law, and Perez did not introduce any rebutting evidence. Because Perez failed to establish triable issues of fact as to essential elements of his claim, Perez's cause of action had no merit under section 437c, subdivision (o). Accordingly, the court properly granted summary judgment.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: BENKE, Acting P. J. NARES, J.