Opinion
No. 12–P–1696.
2013-10-17
Luis PEREZ v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION & others.
By the Court (KANTROWITZ, SIKORA & HINES, JJ.).
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
The plaintiff, Luis Perez, was found guilty after a prison disciplinary hearing on charges of extortion and attempting to commit extortion. The charges were brought under Department of Correction regulations, 103 Code Mass. Regs. § 430.24 (2006), defining offenses within the prison setting. Perez appeals from a Superior Court judgment dismissing his complaint in the nature of certiorari in which he challenged the guilty finding. He argued that the evidence was insufficient and that he was denied due process of law. He now argues that the Superior Court judge erred in dismissing the complaint on both grounds. We affirm.
1. Background. The disciplinary offenses at issue here stemmed from a letter Perez sent an attorney who mistakenly named Perez as defendant in a motor vehicle tort action based on a collision that occurred while Perez was incarcerated. In the letter, Perez stated his intent to file a complaint with the Board of Bar Overseers and a lawsuit against the attorney unless the attorney paid him $1,000. Prison officials learned of the letter and Perez was notified that he would receive a disciplinary report. Perez requested a hearing before a hearing officer. The hearing officer entered a guilty finding and sanctioned Perez with a thirty-day loss of canteen and telephone privileges. Perez appealed to the Superior Court by way of his complaint in the nature of certiorari. On cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings, a Superior Court judge denied Perez's motion and allowed the defendants' motion, thus affirming the disciplinary decision. In so doing, the judge rejected Perez's substantive contention that the hearing officer's decision was not supported by the administrative record, because the letter he sent to the attorney was nothing more than a typical prelitigation demand letter. The judge also rejected Perez's argument that the disciplinary hearing violated his due process rights.
2. Discussion. Prison inmates are entitled to review of disciplinary actions, whether or not their liberty interest is at stake, through the certiorari procedure. See Drayton v. Commissioner of Correction, 52 Mass.App.Ct. 135, 140 (2001). An action in the nature of certiorari permits the inmate to challenge the validity of the disciplinary proceeding. The question for the judge reviewing the complaint is whether there is “substantial evidence” in the record to support the disciplinary action imposed on the prisoner. See Cepulonis v. Commissioner of Correction, 15 Mass.App.Ct. 292, 295 (1983). A court may “correct only a substantial error of law, evidenced by the record, which adversely affects a material right of the plaintiff.” Sheriff of Plymouth County v. Plymouth County Personnel Bd., 440 Mass. 708, 710 (2004), quoting from Massachusetts Bay Transp. Authy. v. Auditor of the Commonwealth, 430 Mass. 783, 790 (2000). In addition, prison inmates are entitled to procedural due process protections under the United States and Massachusetts Constitutions if sanctions create an “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). See Torres v. Commissioner of Correction, 427 Mass. 611, 617–618 (1998). Perez was not entitled to relief under either theory.
First, the judge properly concluded that the guilty finding was supported by substantial evidence. The hearing officer had before him Perez's letter to the attorney, which went beyond merely notifying the attorney that Perez was sued in error. Instead, Perez took that opportunity to seize advantage from the attorney's misstep, threatening to file a Board of Bar Overseers complaint which, though ultimately without merit, would entangle the attorney in a process that would leave a permanent record of the complaint. The record also established that Perez wrote this letter to the attorney at the same time he wrote to the court requesting dismissal on his own behalf. Perez's letter to the attorney demanded a response barely a week after it was sent, further evidencing his intent was to seek money rather than a timely dismissal.
Second, we discern no error in the judge's ruling that Perez received the full measure of the required due process protections in the disciplinary hearing. Perez argued that prison officials denied him due process by failing to provide documents referenced in the disciplinary report in accordance with 103 Code Mass. Regs. § 430.11(1)(b), (c) (2006). The judge cited administrative record evidence that Perez did in fact receive the required documents. Perez signed forms indicating that he did in fact receive the documents.
Even if Perez had not received the documents, he was not prejudiced, because the requested documents were letters written by Perez. “[T]here must be some showing of prejudice before an agency's disregard of its own rules may constitute reversible error.” Benevolent & Protective Order of Elks, Lodge No. 65 v. Planning Bd. of Lawrence, 403 Mass. 531, 550 (1988), quoting from Martorano v. Department of Pub. Utils., 401 Mass. 257, 262–263 (1987).
The first document is Perez's letter to the attorney, requesting the $1,000 in exchange for not filing suit or a complaint. The second is a letter to Superintendent Corsini and Deputy Superintendent Soares written by Perez after he learned of the disciplinary report filed against him.
Perez's other claims also lack merit and need not be addressed. For these reasons as well as for substantially those argued in the defendants' brief, we affirm.
Judgment affirmed.