Opinion
1:22-cv-571
07-12-2022
PETER ALFRED PEREZ, Plaintiff, v. UNKNOWN BRAMAN et al., Defendants.
OPINION
Honorable Paul L. Maloney Judge
This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff previously sought and was granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF No. 4.) Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (PLRA), the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff's pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff's allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these standards, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a claim.
Discussion
T. Factual Allegations
Plaintiff is presently incarcerated with the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) at the Richard A. Handlon Correctional Facility (MTU) in Ionia, Ionia County, Michigan. The events about which he complains occurred at that facility. Plaintiff sues Warden Unknown Braman and Unknown Parties, referred to as the “Lansing COVID Team.” Plaintiff sues Defendant Braman in her official capacity. (ECF No. 1, PageID.2.)
Plaintiff alleges that at some unknown time, he was assigned to cell 16 in C Unit and was informed that his cellmate would be moving out and that he would be getting a new cellmate, an inmate named Colling. (Id., PageID.3.) Inmate Colling told other inmates that he did not want to move. (Id.) Inmate Colling stood in the hall waiting for Plaintiff's old cellmate to move and stated that he was “going to tell them I have COVID.” (Id.) When Plaintiff's new cellmate came into the cell, Plaintiff asked him if he had his key, and inmate Colling responded that he did not. (Id.) Plaintiff stated that he would ask about it because he did not want his old cellmate to have it. (Id.) Plaintiff went to the officers' desk to ask about the key. (Id.) He was told that his new cellmate would be moving to A Unit. (Id.)
On June 7, 2022, officers came to Plaintiff's cell and told him he had been in contact with the COVID-19 virus. (Id.) They took Plaintiff and placed him “in the hole.” (Id.) Plaintiff contends that the was punished for a lie. (Id.) Plaintiff told numerous people, including the officers, nurses, Resident Unit Manager Bandt, the Assistant Deputy Warden of housing, and social worker Fritsch (all of whom are not parties), about the lie, but no one believed him. (Id.) Plaintiff avers that he was placed in the hole because “Colling did not want to move and told a lie.” (Id.) He indicates that they were tested and “it was negative.” (Id.)
On June 7, 2022, Plaintiff did not receive a drink with dinner. (Id.) The next day, he did not get his fruit for dessert with lunch. (Id.) Plaintiff asked about it but was told that he “just got here [and would] have to wait.” (Id.) At lunch time on June 9, 2022, Plaintiff “had to beat on the door to get [his] food.” (Id.) He again did not receive his fruit for dessert. (Id.)
Plaintiff was then moved to cell 32, which was “the [nastiest] cell [he has ever] been in.” (Id.) He was unable to clean the cell until six hours after he was placed there. (Id.) Plaintiff states that he missed a nurse call-out scheduled for June 7, 2022, for broken ribs and a bad headache. (Id.) Plaintiff was not allowed “basic things like exercise and the[y] did not wash [his] laundry.” (Id.) Plaintiff avers that they were tested each day for COVID-19 and that the tests were negative for all four days that he was in the hole. (Id.)
Based on the foregoing, the Court construes Plaintiff's complaint to assert violations of his Eighth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment rights. As relief, Plaintiff asks to “be [paid] so the MDOC will stop just doing whatever they want to us.” (Id., PageID.4.) He also seeks $1,000.00 per day for the four days he was “in the hole . . . for no reason.” (Id.)
II. Failure To State a Claim
A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “to give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's allegations must include more than labels and conclusions. Id.; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). The court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,' . . . it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not ‘show[n]'-that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Id. at 679 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard applies to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)).
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994).
A. Conclusory Allegations and Respondeat Superior
As noted supra, Plaintiff sues Warden Unknown Braman and the Lansing COVID Team. His complaint, however, is completely devoid of any allegations concerning these individuals. Rather, Plaintiff makes vague references to “they” throughout his complaint. It is a basic pleading essential that a plaintiff attribute factual allegations to particular defendants. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 544 (holding that, in order to state a claim, a plaintiff must make sufficient allegations to give a defendant fair notice of the claim). Where a person is named as a defendant without an allegation of specific conduct, the complaint is subject to dismissal, even under the liberal construction afforded to pro se complaints. See Gilmore v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 92 Fed.Appx. 188, 190 (6th Cir. 2004) (dismissing complaint where plaintiff failed to allege how any named defendant was involved in the violation of his rights); Frazier v. Michigan, 41 Fed.Appx. 762, 764 (6th Cir. 2002) (dismissing plaintiff's claims where the complaint did not allege with any degree of specificity which of the named defendants were personally involved in or responsible for each alleged violation of rights); Griffin v. Montgomery, No. 00-3402, 2000 WL 1800569, at *2 (6th Cir. Nov. 30, 2000) (requiring allegations of personal involvement against each defendant); Rodriguez v. Jabe, No. 90-1010, 1990 WL 82722, at *1 (6th Cir. June 19, 1990) (“Plaintiff's claims against those individuals are without a basis in law as the complaint is totally devoid of allegations as to them which would suggest their involvement in the events leading to his injuries.”).
Moreover, “[s]ummary reference to a single, five-headed ‘Defendants' does not support a reasonable inference that each Defendant is liable for” the incidents Plaintiff describes in his complaint. Boxill v. O'Grady, 935 F.3d 510, 518 (6th Cir. 2019) (citing Heyne v. Metro. Nashville Pub. Sch., 655 F.3d 556, 564 (6th Cir. 2011) (“This Court has consistently held that damage claims against government officials arising from alleged violations of constitutional rights must allege, with particularity, facts that demonstrate what each defendant did to violate the asserted constitutional right.”) (quoting Lanman v. Hinson, 529 F.3d 673, 684 (6th Cir. 2008))). Plaintiff's claims fall far short of the minimal pleading standards under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” For that reason alone, Plaintiff's complaint is subject to dismissal.
Further, it appears that Plaintiff may have named Defendants because of their respective supervisory capacities. Government officials, however, may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676; Monell v. New York City Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691(1978); Everson v. Leis, 556 F.3d 484, 495 (6th Cir. 2009). A claimed constitutional violation must be based upon active unconstitutional behavior. Grinter v. Knight, 532 F.3d 567, 575-76 (6th Cir. 2008); Greene v. Barber, 310 F.3d 889, 899 (6th Cir. 2002). The acts of one's subordinates are not enough, nor can supervisory liability be based upon the mere failure to act. Grinter, 532 F.3d at 576; Greene, 310 F.3d at 899; Summers v. Leis, 368 F.3d 881, 888 (6th Cir. 2004). Moreover, § 1983 liability may not be imposed simply because a supervisor denied an administrative grievance or failed to act based upon information contained in a grievance. See Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir. 1999). “[A] plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit repeatedly has summarized the minimum required to constitute active conduct by a supervisory official:
“[A] supervisory official's failure to supervise, control or train the offending individual is not actionable unless the supervisor either encouraged the specific incident of misconduct or in some other way directly participated in it.” Shehee, 199 F.3d at 300 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). We have interpreted this standard to mean that “at a minimum,” the plaintiff must show that the defendant “at least implicitly authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct of the offending officers.”Peatross v. City of Memphis, 818 F.3d 233, 242 (6th Cir. 2016) (quoting Shehee, 199 F.3d at 300, and citing Phillips v. Roane Cnty., 534 F.3d 531, 543 (6th Cir. 2008)); see also Copeland v. Machulis, 57 F.3d 476, 481 (6th Cir. 1995) (citing Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 375-76 (1976), and Bellamy v. Bradley, 729 F.2d 416, 421 (6th Cir. 1984)); Walton v. City of Southfield, 995 F.2d 1331, 1340 (6th Cir. 1993); Leach v. Shelby Cnty. Sheriff, 891 F.2d 1241, 1246 (6th Cir. 1989).
Plaintiff fails to allege any facts showing that Defendants encouraged or condoned the conduct of their subordinates, or authorized, approved or knowingly acquiesced in the conduct. Indeed, he fails to allege any facts at all about their conduct. His vague and conclusory allegations of supervisory responsibility are insufficient to demonstrate that Defendants were personally involved in the events surrounding Plaintiff's placement in the “hole” and the conditions he experienced therein. Conclusory allegations of unconstitutional conduct without specific factual allegations fail to state a claim under § 1983. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Because Plaintiff's § 1983 action is premised on nothing more than respondeat superior liability, his action fails to state a claim.
B. Official Capacity
Even if Plaintiff had included allegations concerning Defendant Braman's personal involvement, he sues her in her official capacity only. A suit against an individual in his or her official capacity is equivalent to a suit against the governmental entity; in this case, the MDOC. See Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989); Matthews v. Jones, 35 F.3d 1046, 1049 (6th Cir. 1994). The states and their departments are immune under the Eleventh Amendment from suit in the federal courts, unless the state has waived immunity or Congress has expressly abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity by statute. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98-101 (1984); Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978); O'Hara v. Wigginton, 24 F.3d 823, 826 (6th Cir. 1994). Congress has not expressly abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity by statute, Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 341 (1979), and the State of Michigan has not consented to civil rights suits in federal court. Abick v. Michigan, 803 F.2d 874, 877 (6th Cir. 1986). In numerous opinions, the Sixth Circuit has specifically held that the MDOC is absolutely immune from a § 1983 suit under the Eleventh Amendment. See, e.g., Harrison v. Michigan, 722 F.3d 768, 771 (6th Cir. 2013); Diaz v. Mich. Dep't of Corr., 703 F.3d 956, 962 (6th Cir. 2013); McCoy v. Michigan, 369 Fed.Appx. 646, 653-54 (6th Cir. 2010). Plaintiff only seeks damages, but official capacity defendants are absolutely immune from monetary damages. See Will, 491 U.S. at 71; Turker v. Ohio Dep't of Rehab. & Corr., 157 F.3d 453, 456 (6th Cir. 1998). For this reason, Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Braman are also subject to dismissal. Moreover, as explained below, even setting aside the above-discussed issues, Plaintiff fails to state any claim upon which relief may be granted.
C. Eighth Amendment Claims
Plaintiff complains about the conditions he experienced during his four days in the “hole.” Plaintiff contends that he did not receive a drink with his dinner on June 7, 2022, and that he did not receive fruit for dessert on two occasions. (ECF No. 1, PageID.3.) He was placed in “the [nastiest] cell” and was unable to clean it for six hours. (Id.) Plaintiff also vaguely asserts that he was not allowed exercise and laundry, and that he missed a medical call-out for broken ribs and a bad headache. (Id.) Liberally construed, Plaintiff's complaint asserts Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement and denial of medical care claims.
1. Conditions of Confinement
The Eighth Amendment imposes a constitutional limitation on the power of the states to punish those convicted of crimes. Punishment may not be “barbarous,” nor may it contravene society's “evolving standards of decency.” Rhodesv. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 345-46 (1981). The Amendment, therefore, prohibits conduct by prison officials that involves the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Ivey v. Wilson, 832 F.2d 950, 954 (6th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 346). The deprivation alleged must result in the denial of the “minimal civilized measure of life's necessities.” Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347; see also Wilson v. Yaklich, 148 F.3d 596, 600-01 (6th Cir. 1998). The Eighth Amendment is only concerned with “deprivations of essential food, medical care, or sanitation” or “other conditions intolerable for prison confinement.” Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 348 (citation omitted). Moreover, “[n]ot every unpleasant experience a prisoner might endure while incarcerated constitutes cruel and unusual punishment within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment.” Ivey, 832 F.2d at 954. “Routine discomfort is ‘part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society.'” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992) (quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347). As a consequence, “extreme deprivations are required to make out a conditions-of-confinement claim.” Id.
In order for a prisoner to prevail on an Eighth Amendment claim, he must show that he faced a sufficiently serious risk to his health or safety and that the defendant official acted with “‘deliberate indifference' to [his] health or safety.” Mingus v. Butler, 591 F.3d 474, 479-80 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (applying deliberate indifference standard to medical claims)); see also Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35 (1993) (applying deliberate indifference standard to conditions of confinement claims)). The deliberate-indifference standard includes both objective and subjective components. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; Helling, 509 U.S. at 35-37. To satisfy the objective prong, an inmate must show “that he is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Under the subjective prong, an official must “know[] of and disregard[] an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Id. at 837. “[I]t is enough that the official acted or failed to act despite his knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm.” Id. at 842. “It is, indeed, fair to say that acting or failing to act with deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm to a prisoner is the equivalent of recklessly disregarding that risk.” Id. at 836. “[P]rison officials who actually knew of a substantial risk to inmate health or safety may be found free from liability if they responded reasonably to the risk, even if the harm ultimately was not averted.” Id. at 844.
a. Cleanliness of Cell
Plaintiff alleges that he was placed in “the [nastiest] cell” and was unable to clean it for six hours. (ECF No. 1, PageID.3.) Plaintiff, however, fails to allege facts detailing why the cell was the “nastiest.” Plaintiff's complaint, therefore, fails to plausibly assert that he was forced to live in inhumane conditions. See Logan v. Mich. Dep't of Corr., No. 1:21-cv-791, 2022 WL 325404, at *10 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 3, 2022) (concluding the same regarding inmate's Eighth Amendment claim concerning cleanliness of his cell in the segregation unit at the Ionia Correctional Facility); cf. Taylor v. Riojas, 141 S.Ct. 52, 53 (2020) (concluding that a prisoner who alleged that he was placed in “shockingly unsanitary” cells for six days, one of which was covered in “massive amounts” of feces and the other of which was equipped with only a clogged drain to dispose of bodily waste, stated a violation of the Eighth Amendment); Taylor v. Larson, 505 Fed.Appx. 475, 477 (6th Cir. 2012) (concluding that a prisoner who alleged that he was forced to remain in a cell covered in fecal matter for three days stated a claim under the Eighth Amendment). Plaintiff, therefore, cannot maintain an Eighth Amendment claim based upon his vague, conclusory statement regarding the cleanliness of his cell.
b. Denial of Exercise
Plaintiff contends that he was unable to exercise during his four days in the hole. It is well established that “total or near-total deprivation of exercise or recreational opportunity, without penological justification violates Eighth Amendment guarantees.” Rodgers v. Jabe, 43 F.3d 1082, 1086 (6th Cir. 1995) (quoting Patterson v. Mintzes, 717 F.2d 284, 289 (6th Cir. 1983)). As an initial matter, nothing in Plaintiff's complaint suggest that Defendants were personally involved in the alleged deprivation of exercise time. In any event, the denial of out-of-cell exercise for such a short period of time does not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation. See May v. Baldwin, 109 F.3d 557, 565-66 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that denial of out-of-cell exercise for 21 days did not rise to Eighth Amendment violation); Knight v. Armontrout, 878 F.2d 1093, 1096 (8th Cir. 1989) (“Denial of recreation for a short period, per se, is not a constitutional violation.”); Davenport v. DeRobertis, 844 F.2d 1310 (8th Cir. 1988) (upholding a 90-day segregation threshold before five hours of weekly out-of-cell exercise is required), cited with approval in Pearson v. Ramos, 237 F.3d 881, 884-85 (7th Cir. 2001); Harris v. Fleming, 839 F.2d 1232, 1236 (7th Cir. 1988) (holding that there was no Eighth Amendment violation when the plaintiff was held in segregation without outdoor exercise for 28 days). Plaintiff, therefore, fails to allege a plausible Eighth Amendment claim regarding the denial of exercise during his time in the “hole.”
c. Denial of Laundry
Plaintiff also vaguely asserts that he was denied laundry service while in the “hole.” (ECF No. 1, PageID.3.) However, within the Sixth Circuit, “a prisoner's claim of denial of clean clothes for a brief time fails to state an Eighth Amendment violation.” Bostic v. Mehr, No. 20-1031-SHM-cgc, 2021 WL 5999305, at *5 (W.D. Tenn, Dec. 20, 2021) (citing Walker v. State Dept. of Corr., No. 98-6586, 2000 WL 32057, *1-2 (6th Cir. Jan. 7, 2000)); see also Wright v. Gregory, No. 1:21-cv-P79-GNS, 2021 WL 4037594, at *4 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 3, 2021) (“[T]he temporary inconvenience of . . . not having clean clothes . . . during Plaintiff's nine-day placement in segregation fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.”); Jackson v. Powell, No. 1:18-cv-466, 2018 WL 3722158, at *8 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 6, 2018) (“Plaintiff's alleged temporary deprivations of hygiene items, exercise yard, and laundry service amount to minor inconveniences that do not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation.”) Certainly, if a lack of clean clothing results in some actual harm, it might rise to the level of an extreme deprivation. Brown v. Timmerman-Cooper, No. 2:10-cv-283, 2013 WL 430262, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 4, 2013) (The denial of laundry facilities or clean clothes may also constitute an Eighth Amendment violation, but only when the inmate claims to have ‘suffered a physical injury or a disease as a result of these conditions.'”); Hill v. Matthews, No. 1:19-cv-853, 2020 WL 502607, at *10 (W.D. Mich. Jan. 31, 2020) (same); Presley v. LMPD, No. 3:16CV-118-TBR, 2017 WL 581325, at *4 (W.D. Ky. Feb. 13, 2017) (same); Morris v. George, No. 1:13-cv-00029, 2013 WL 2384330, at *3 (M.D. Tenn. May 30, 2013) (same). Here, however, Plaintiff has failed to allege facts suggesting that he suffered a physical injury or disease from the temporary denial of laundry service. Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to set forth a plausible Eighth Amendment claim regarding the denial of laundry service while he was in the “hole.”
d. Issues with Food Trays
Plaintiff alleges further that he did not receive a drink with dinner on June 7, 2022, and that he did not receive his fruit for dessert on two occasions. (ECF No. 1, PageID.3.) “The Eighth Amendment imposes a duty on officials to provide ‘humane conditions of confinement,' including insuring, among other things, that prisoners receive adequate . . . food.” Young ex rel. Estate of Young v. Martin, 51 Fed.Appx. 509, 513 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832). The Constitution “does not mandate comfortable prisons,” however. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 349. Thus, the deprivation of a few meals for a limited time generally does not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation. See Davis v. Miron, 502 Fed.Appx. 569, 570 (6th Cir. 2012) (denial of seven meals over six days is not an Eighth Amendment violation); Richmond v. Settles, 450 Fed.Appx. 448, 456 (6th Cir. 2011) (denial of five meals over three consecutive days, and a total of seven meals over six consecutive days, does not rise to Eighth Amendment violation, where the prisoner fails to allege that his health suffered); Cunningham v. Jones, 667 F.2d 565, 566 (6th Cir. 1982) (per curiam) (providing a prisoner only one meal per day for fifteen days did not violate the Eighth Amendment, because the meals provided contained sufficient nutrition to sustain normal health); see also Staten v. Terhune, 67 Fed.Appx. 462, 462-63 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding the deprivation of two meals is not sufficiently serious to form the basis of an Eighth Amendment claim); Berry v. Brady, 192 F.3d 504, 507-08 (5th Cir. 1999) (finding the denial of a few meals over several months does not state a claim); Cagle v. Perry, No. 9:04-CV-1151, 2007 WL 3124806, at *14 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 2007) (finding the deprivation of two meals is “not sufficiently numerous, prolonged or severe” to give rise to an Eighth Amendment claim).
Here, Plaintiff does not allege that he was denied an entire meal; instead, he alleges that his trays were missing certain items on three separate occasions. If the deprivation of a few meals for a limited period of time fails to state an Eighth Amendment claim, it stands to reason that Plaintiff's allegations concerning items missing from his food trays fall far short of the serious deprivations protected by the Eighth Amendment. See Turner v. Gilbertson, No. 2:17-cv-65, 2017 WL 1457051, at *5 (W.D. Mich. Apr. 25, 2017) (concluding that an inmate failed to state an Eighth Amendment claim when he “missed two packets of crackers-far less than even one meal-and was forced to use a broken spoon to eat the same meal”). Plaintiff's claims about his food trays, therefore, must be dismissed.
In sum, Plaintiff has failed to allege facts suggesting that he suffered from extreme deprivations and that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to such deprivations. Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claims concerning the conditions of confinement in the “hole” will, therefore, be dismissed.
2. Denial of Medical Care
Plaintiff contends that he missed a nurse call-out on June 7, 2022, for broken ribs and a bad headache, because of his placement in the “hole.” (ECF No. 1, PageID.3.)
The Eighth Amendment obligates prison authorities to provide medical care, including medically necessary mental health care, to incarcerated individuals, as a failure to provide such care would be inconsistent with contemporary standards of decency. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1976). The Eighth Amendment is violated when a prison official is deliberately indifferent to the serious medical needs of a prisoner. Id. at 104-05; Comstock v. McCrary, 273 F.3d 693, 702 (6th Cir. 2001). Deliberate indifference may be manifested by a doctor's failure to respond to the medical needs of a prisoner, or by “prison guards in intentionally denying or delaying access to medical care or intentionally interfering with the treatment once prescribed. Regardless of how evidenced, deliberate indifference to a prisoner's serious illness or injury states a cause of action under § 1983.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05.
A claim for the deprivation of adequate medical care has an objective and a subjective component. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. To satisfy the objective component, the plaintiff must allege that the medical need at issue is sufficiently serious. Id. In other words, the inmate must show that he is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm. Id. The objective component of the adequate medical care test is satisfied “[w]here the seriousness of a prisoner's need[] for medical care is obvious even to a lay person.” Blackmore v. Kalamazoo Cnty., 390 F.3d 890, 899 (6th Cir. 2004); see also Phillips v. Roane Cnty., 534 F.3d 531, 539-40 (6th Cir. 2008). Obviousness, however, is not strictly limited to what is detectable to the eye. Even if the layman cannot see the medical need, a condition may be obviously medically serious where a layman, if informed of the true medical situation, would deem the need for medical attention clear. See, e.g., Rouster v. Saginaw Cnty., 749 F.3d 437, 446-51 (6th Cir. 2014) (holding that a prisoner who died from a perforated duodenum exhibited an “objectively serious need for medical treatment,” even though his symptoms appeared to the medical staff at the time to be consistent with alcohol withdrawal); Johnson v. Karnes, 398 F.3d 868, 874 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that prisoner's severed tendon was a “quite obvious” medical need, since “any lay person would realize to be serious,” even though the condition was not visually obvious). If the plaintiff's claim, however, is based on “the prison's failure to treat a condition adequately, or where the prisoner's affliction is seemingly minor or non-obvious,” Blackmore, 390 F.3d at 898, the plaintiff must “place verifying medical evidence in the record to establish the detrimental effect of the delay in medical treatment,” Napier v. Madison Cnty., 238 F.3d 739, 742 (6th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The subjective component requires an inmate to show that prison officials have “a sufficiently culpable state of mind” in denying medical care. Brown v. Bargery, 207 F.3d 863, 867 (6th Cir. 2000). Deliberate indifference “entails something more than mere negligence,” but can be “satisfied by something less than acts or omissions for the very purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that harm will result.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835. “[T]he official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id. at 837. To prove a defendant's subjective knowledge, “[a] plaintiff may rely on circumstantial evidence . . .: A jury is entitled to ‘conclude that a prison official knew of a substantial risk from the very fact that the risk was obvious.'” Rhinehart v. Scutt, 894 F.3d 721, 738 (6th Cir. 2018) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842)).
As an initial matter, nothing in Plaintiff's complaint can lead the Court to a reasonable inference that Defendants were personally involved in the denial of medical care to Plaintiff. Administrative or custody officials who have no training or authority to supervise healthcare officials cannot be held liable for those officials' inadequate care. See Winkler v. Madison Cnty., 893 F.3d 877, 895 (6th Cir. 2018) (concluding that custody officer was entitled to rely on medical provider's judgment); Smith v. Cnty. of Lenawee, 505 Fed.Appx. 526, 532 (6th Cir. 2012) (“[I]f a prisoner is under the care of medical experts . . . a non-medical prison official will generally be justified in believing that the prisoner is in capable hands.” (quoting Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 236 (3d Cir. 2004))); see also Newberry v. Melton, 726 Fed.Appx. 290, 296-97 (6th Cir. 2018) (same); Cuco v. Fed. Med. Ctr.-Lexington, No. 05-CV-232-KSF, 2006 WL 1635668, at *21-22 (E.D. Ky. June 9, 2006) (holding that prison administrative officials were not liable for overseeing and second-guessing care given by medical officials) (citing Birrell v. Brown, 867 F.2d 956, 959 (6th Cir. 1989)).
Moreover, Plaintiff's complaint is devoid of facts suggesting that he suffered anything more than minor discomfort from his bad headache and broken ribs. In sum, nothing in Plaintiff's complaint would permit the Court to infer that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to a serious medical need. Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claim premised upon the lack of medical care will, therefore, be dismissed.
D. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
Plaintiff's four-day placement in the “hole” fails to state a due process claim. The Supreme Court long has held that the Due Process Clause does not protect every change in the conditions of confinement having an impact on a prisoner. See Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225 (1976). In Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995), the Court set forth the standard for determining when a prisoner's loss of liberty implicates a federally cognizable liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause. According to the Sandin Court, a prisoner is entitled to the protections of due process only when a deprivation “will inevitably affect the duration of his sentence” or imposes an “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486-87; see also Jones v. Baker, 155 F.3d 810, 812 (6th Cir. 1998); Rimmer-Bey v. Brown, 62 F.3d 789, 790-91 (6th Cir. 1995).
Confinement in administrative segregation “is the sort of confinement that inmates should reasonably anticipate receiving at some point in their incarceration.” Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 468 (1983). Thus, it is considered atypical and significant only in “extreme circumstances.” Joseph v. Curtin, 410 Fed.Appx. 865, 868 (6th Cir. 2010). Generally, courts will consider the nature and duration of a stay in segregation to determine whether it imposes an “atypical and significant hardship.” Harden-Bey v. Rutter, 524 F.3d 789, 794 (6th. Cir. 2008).
In Sandin, the Supreme Court concluded that the segregation at issue in that case (disciplinary segregation for 30 days) did not impose an atypical and significant hardship. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484. Similarly, the Sixth Circuit has held that mere placement in administrative segregation, and placement for a relatively short period of time, do not require the protections of due process. Rimmer-Bey, 62 F.3d at 790-91; see Joseph v. Curtin, 410 Fed.Appx. 865, 868 (6th Cir. 2010) (61 days in segregation is not atypical and significant). The Sixth Circuit has also held, in specific circumstances, that confinement in segregation for a relatively long period of time does not implicate a liberty interest. See, e.g., Baker, 155 F.3d at 812-23 (two years of segregation while the inmate was investigated for the murder of a prison guard in a riot); Mackey v. Dyke, 111 F.3d 460 (6th Cir. 1997) (one year of segregation following convictions for possession of illegal contraband and assault, including a 117-day delay in reclassification due to prison crowding). But cf. Selby v. Caruso, 734 F.3d 554, 559 (6th Cir. 2013) (13 years of segregation implicates a liberty interest); Harden-Bey, 524 F.3d at 795 (remanding to the district court to consider whether the plaintiff's allegedly “indefinite” period of segregation, i.e., three years without an explanation from prison officials, implicates a liberty interest); Harris v. Caruso, 465 Fed.Appx. 481, 484 (6th Cir. 2012) (eight years of segregation implicates a liberty interest).
Clearly, Plaintiff's four-day placement in the “hole” falls well short of the 30-day placement at issue in Sandin and the 61-day placement at issue in Joseph. While the Court does not condone needless placement of prisoners in segregation, Plaintiff's allegations suggest that staff at MTU acted reasonably by segregating Plaintiff after being told (albeit erroneously) that he had been exposed to the COVID-19 virus. While Plaintiff believes there was no reason for him to be placed in the “hole” because his cellmate had not tested positive for COVID-19, it was reasonable for staff to segregate Plaintiff from other inmates pending the outcome of a few days' worth of testing results. For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff's allegations fail to state a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim.
Conclusion
Having conducted the review required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the Court determines that Plaintiff's complaint will be dismissed for failure to state a claim, under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must next decide whether an appeal of this action would be in good faith within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 611 (6th Cir. 1997). Although the Court concludes that Plaintiff's claims are properly dismissed, the Court does not conclude that any issue Plaintiff might raise on appeal would be frivolous. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962). Accordingly, the Court does not certify that an appeal would not be taken in good faith. Should Plaintiff appeal this decision, the Court will assess the $505.00 appellate filing fee pursuant to § 1915(b)(1), see McGore, 114 F.3d at 610-11, unless Plaintiff is barred from proceeding in forma pauperis, e.g., by the “three-strikes” rule of § 1915(g). If he is barred, he will be required to pay the $505.00 appellate filing fee in one lump sum.
This is a dismissal as described by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
A judgment consistent with this opinion will be entered.