“We review an order granting or denying a motion for new trial based on juror nondisclosure for abuse of discretion.” Pereda v. Parajon, 957 So.2d 1194, 1197 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) (citing Palm Beach Cnty. Health Dep't v. Wilson, 944 So.2d 428, 430 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006)). Entitlement to a new trial on the basis of a juror's non-disclosure requires the complaining party to demonstrate that: “(1) the information is relevant and material to jury service in the case; (2) the juror concealed the information during questioning; and (3) the failure to disclose the information was not attributable to the complaining party's lack of diligence.”

"We review an order granting or denying a motion for new trial based on juror nondisclosure for abuse of discretion." Pereda v. Parajon, 957 So. 2d 1194, 1197 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) (citing Palm Beach Cnty. Health Dep't v. Wilson, 944 So. 2d 428, 430 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006)). Entitlement to a new trial on the basis of a juror's non-disclosure requires the complaining party to demonstrate that: "(1) the information is relevant and material to jury service in the case; (2) the juror concealed the information during questioning; and (3) the failure to disclose the information was not attributable to the complaining party's lack of diligence."

The trial court's determination of whether to remove a juror for non-disclosure is subject to a three-prong analysis. Tricam Indus. Inc. v. Coba, 100 So.3d 105, 112 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012) (citing Pereda v. Parajon, 957 So.2d 1194, 1197 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007)). Thus, the party seeking a new trial based on allegations that a juror failed to disclose information must demonstrate that: “(1) the information is relevant and material to jury service in the case; (2) the juror concealed the information during questioning; and (3) the failure to disclose the information was not attributable to the complaining party's lack of diligence.”

The trial court's determination of whether to remove a juror for non-disclosure is subject to a three-prong analysis. Tricam Indus., Inc. v. Coba, 100 So. 3d 105, 112 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012) (citing Pereda v. Parajon, 957 So. 2d 1194, 1197 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007)). Thus, the party seeking a new trial based on allegations that a juror failed to disclose information must demonstrate that: "(1) the information is relevant and material to jury service in the case; (2) the juror concealed the information during questioning; and (3) the failure to disclose the information was not attributable to the complaining party's lack of diligence."

Such a further inquiry is typically accomplished by way of a posttrial juror interview. See, e.g., Simon v. Maldonado, 65 So.3d 8 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011) ; Pereda v. Parajon, 957 So.2d 1194 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) ; Bernal v. Lipp, 580 So.2d 315 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991) ; Bolling v. State, 61 So.3d 419 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) ; Sterling v. Feldbaum, 980 So.2d 596 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) ; Forbes v. State, 753 So.2d 709 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000). In the instant case, such a further inquiry could have been conducted with relative ease, and without the countervailing privacy implications normally associated with such a procedure, since the juror and discharged alternate juror were still present before the court and the trial proceedings were still ongoing.

Roberts, 814 So.2d at 343. Thus, this is not a “credibility determination because whether or not [the juror's] concealment was intentional is of no import....” Pereda v. Parajon, 957 So.2d 1194, 1197 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007). In order to establish this element, the party seeking a juror interview must “ ‘demonstrate (among other things) that the voir dire question was straightforward and not reasonably susceptible to misinterpretation.’ ”

The appellee's defensive contentions to the contrary are without merit. See Roberts v. Tejada, 814 So.2d 334 (Fla.2002); Pereda v. Parajon, 957 So.2d 1194 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007); Taylor v. Magana, 911 So.2d 1263 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005). The plaintiff was a trumpet player in the defendant's cruise ship orchestra.

See De La Rosa v. Zequeira, 659 So.2d 239, 241 (Fla.1995) (delineating three-part test to determine whether a juror's nondisclosure of information during voir dire warrants a new trial); Simon v. Maldonado, 65 So.3d 8, 10 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011) (“[T]he mere possibility that a juror was involved in prior claims does not show in and of itself that his point of view was affected so as to deprive the defendant of a fair and impartial trial.”); Pereda v. Parajon, 957 So.2d 1194, 1197 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) (stating appellate court reviews an order granting a motion for new trial based on juror nondisclosure for an abuse of discretion); Tripp v. State, 874 So.2d 732, 734 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) (holding denial of new trial based on juror's failure to disclose relationship with the defendant and his family was error absent a jury interview). Affirmed.

But Mr. Boiling never even alleged that he would have used a peremptory challenge to strike Mr. Maxwell. See, e.g., Pub. Health Trust of Miami-Dade Cnty. v. Metellus, 948 So.2d 4, 5 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) (reversing order granting new trial because a juror did not reveal she had been in a divorce and was the target of collection efforts, in part because there was no showing that counsel would have exercised a peremptory challenge against the juror, had he known the information); Freedman v. De La Cuesta, 929 So.2d 25, 26 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) (no abuse of discretion in denying motion for new trial based on juror nondisclosure when there was no showing that the undisclosed information was substantial and important or that plaintiffs would have exercised a peremptory challenge); Murphy v. Hurst, 881 So.2d 1157, 1162-63 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004) (finding that information juror withheld was not material merely because appellant objected to juror's presence on jury). But see Pereda v. Pamjon, 957 So.2d 1194, 1196-97 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) (reversing trial court's determination that there was no basis to believe plaintiff's counsel would have used a peremptory challenge to strike the juror had he known the information later disclosed, and finding that juror's failure to disclose the facts of the juror's personal injury litigation was material because it was not too remote in time and might have affected her point of view). At the hearing on the motion before the trial court, the defense contended that Mr. Maxwell had a duty to notify the court once he recognized Ms. Randall "so that the [c]ourt could then give [Mr. Boiling] an option of whether to question him, and then whether it [had] influenced his ability to be fair and impartial.

There was apparently no litigation, even in the worker's compensation case, and neither juror's involvement in the process was extensive. See Pereda v. Parajon, 957 So.2d 1194, 1197 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007). In discussing the factors to be considered in the context of nondisclosure of a juror's exposure to the legal system, the Roberts court said: