Opinion
No. 3D18-2160
02-19-2020
PEOPLE'S TRUST INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant, v. Rosa N. BRAVO, Appellee.
Brett Frankel and Jonathan Sabghir (Deerfield Beach); Cole Scott & Kissane, P.A., and Kathryn L. Ender, David C. Borucke, and Mark D. Tinker (Tampa), for appellant. Mintz Truppman, P.A., and Timothy H. Crutchfield, Miami and Adrian N. Arkin, North Miami, for appellee.
Brett Frankel and Jonathan Sabghir (Deerfield Beach); Cole Scott & Kissane, P.A., and Kathryn L. Ender, David C. Borucke, and Mark D. Tinker (Tampa), for appellant.
Mintz Truppman, P.A., and Timothy H. Crutchfield, Miami and Adrian N. Arkin, North Miami, for appellee.
Before EMAS, C.J., and LOGUE and SCALES, JJ.
LOGUE, J.
People's Trust Insurance Company (the "Insurer") seeks review of an order directing its agent Rapid Response Team, LLC, to repair the property of Rosa N. Bravo (the "Insured"). We treat this matter as an appeal of an interlocutory order granting a temporary injunction, and reverse because the required formalities were not followed.
The Insured made a claim for hurricane damage under its policy. The policy at issue included a preferred contractor endorsement which gave the Insurer the right to repair damage to the Insured's dwelling in lieu of making a cash payment. The Insurer advised it planned to exercise the option to repair, and requested the Insured to submit a sworn proof of loss and sign a work authorization. After the Insured declined to submit a sworn proof of loss containing the amount of its final claim (indicating that determination of this amount was "pending") and declined to sign the work authorization in the form requested by the Insurer, the Insurer sued for declaratory relief (count I) and breach of contract (count II). Without filing an answer or counterclaim, the Insured filed a motion to dismiss and a motion to compel repairs. The trial court entered an order dismissing count II and granting the motion to compel to the extent of Insurer's own estimate of repair.
We first decide that the trial court's order meets the definition of an injunction. The Order compels the Insurer to take affirmative action – i.e., to physically repair the property. It is therefore an "in personam order, directing the defendant to act or refrain from acting in a specified way." Lopez v. Paredes, 653 So. 2d 472, 473 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995). Because the order under review is an injunction, we treat this matter as an appeal under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(a)(3)(B), although it was filed as a petition for certiorari. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.040(c) ("If a party seeks an improper remedy, the cause shall be treated as if the proper remedy had been sought; provided that it shall not be the responsibility of the court to seek the proper remedy.").
While the order under review has some of the characteristics of a permanent injunction that resolves the final dispute between the parties because it orders the Insurer to make repairs when the complaint contends the Insurer has no responsibility to do so, we nevertheless believe the trial court intended to enter only a temporary injunction, because the order requires the Insurer to repair only to the extent of its own estimate, which suggests to us, the judge intended further labor in this case. Treating the order as a temporary injunction, it must be reversed as the required formalities were not followed. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.610 ; City of Miami v. Santos, 278 So. 3d 822, 825 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019) (reversing a temporary injunction because the record contained no evidentiary basis and no indication that the court had considered the four necessary elements for a temporary injunction).
Reversed and remanded.