Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Ct. No. BA345823 Sam Ohta, Judge.
Linn Davis, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle and Ryan M. Smith, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
ASHMANN-GERST, J.
Appellant Addiel Zuniga appeals from his conviction of kidnapping, assault with a deadly weapon, assault with a firearm, and felon in possession of a firearm. He contends that the trial court erred in admitting the preliminary hearing testimony of the victim after finding her unavailable. He also contends that no substantial evidence supports the judgment. We independently determine that the prosecution exercised due diligence to locate the witness, but she was unavailable, and thus, the admission of her prior testimony was not error. We also find substantial evidence to support the verdicts, and affirm the judgment. However, we have discovered an error in the abstract of judgment, and we shall order the trial court to issue an amended abstract that conforms to the trial court’s pronouncement of sentence.
BACKGROUND
1. Procedural Background
In a six-count felony information, appellant was charged in count 1 with kidnapping Sheila Aparicio (Aparicio) to commit robbery, in violation of Penal Code section 209, subdivision (b)(1). The information alleged that appellant personally used a handgun in the commission of the kidnapping, within the meaning of section 12022.53, subdivision (b). Appellant was charged in count 2 with assault with a deadly weapon (a firearm), in violation of section 245, subdivision (a)(1), and in count 3, assault with a firearm in violation of section 245, subdivision (a)(2). In count 4, the information charged appellant with a violation of section 12021, subdivision (a)(1), felon in possession of a firearm. In counts 5 and 6, appellant was charged with making criminal threats in violation of section 422. In addition, the information alleged as to counts 1, 2, 3, and 4, that appellant had suffered a prior felony conviction, for which he did not remain free of prison custody for five years before committing the current crimes.
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
The trial court granted the prosecution’s motion to dismiss count 2, and the jury returned guilty verdicts on counts 1, 3, 4, and 5. In addition, the jury found true the allegation that appellant had personally used a firearm in the commission of the kidnapping alleged in count 1. The jury was unable to reach a verdict on count 6, and the trial court dismissed it at the request of the prosecution. The trial court also dismissed the allegation as to counts 1, 2, 3, and 4, that appellant had suffered a prior felony conviction.
The trial court denied appellant’s motion for new trial, and on January 22, 2010, sentenced him to an indeterminate term of life in prison on count 1, plus a 10-year enhancement pursuant to section 12022.53, subdivision (b), to be served before the seven-year minimum period of the indeterminate life term. The court imposed the upper term as to each of the remaining counts, running consecutively the three-year term as to count 4, felon in possession of a firearm, and staying the terms for counts 3 and 5 under section 654. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal.
The abstract of judgment erroneously states that appellant was sentenced to 25 years to life plus the 10-year enhancement. We notified counsel of our intention to order the correction of the abstract, and neither party has objected.
2. Due Diligence Hearing
Prior to trial, the trial court heard foundational evidence pursuant to Evidence Code section 240, regarding the unavailability of Aparicio, in order to determine whether her preliminary hearing testimony would be admitted at trial under the hearsay exception of Evidence Code section 1291. The prosecution presented the testimony of District Attorney Investigator Jonathan Buchholz, whose duties included locating witnesses, and Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department Detective Angel Rodriguez, who had been responsible for Aparicio’s appearance at the preliminary hearing in December 2008.
Detective Rodriguez testified that he had tried to subpoena Aparicio prior to the preliminary hearing, but was unable to do so, because she had moved, and he did not have her correct address. He telephoned her instead, and she appeared for the preliminary hearing without his having to subpoena her. He described her as a very cooperative witness.
Detective Rodriguez did not have any difficulty contacting Aparicio, until May 2009. At the preliminary hearing, she told Detective Rodriguez that she would be leaving the country shortly to go to Mexico, and that she had already postponed her departure by two weeks to appear and testify. She assured him that she would appear for trial, and would return from Mexico immediately if he asked her to do so.
Detective Rodriguez did not ask for information about her trip, such as an address in Mexico, or the name of the person she was visiting. Aparicio had given him an e-mail address and telephone number, and he had received e-mails from her since September 1, 2008, prior to the preliminary hearing. After the preliminary hearing, he remained in communication with her by e-mail. On February 12, 2009, she e-mailed that she was in Mexico, and asked how things were going, apparently referring to the trial. She wrote that she would be back in April and would call the deputy district attorney handling the case. Detective Rodriguez sent an e-mail to her March 20, 2009, and she replied the next day. The police report showed an alternate address, her boyfriend’s house on 227th Street in Torrance, and although she was not always there, she responded to messages Detective Rodriguez left there. He testified that until May 26, 2009, he believed that she would appear for trial. He did not think he would be unable to contact her, because she was eager to testify, receptive to coming back to court, and she replied to any messages he left.
Detective Rodriguez unsuccessfully tried to locate Aparicio before trial. The cell phone number he had for her was not a good number, and he did not find her at her place of employment. He acknowledged that he had not obtained identification from her, and that she had no government issued identification, except an “X” number, which is a temporary identification number issued by the Department of Motor Vehicles. He did not verify that she was in this country lawfully, and he had obtained no contact information about family members.
Such numbers, also referred to at trial as “x-ray” numbers, may be given to undocumented immigrants and others without social security numbers.
Investigator Buchholz testified that Investigator Gibson began searching for Aparicio on May 19, 2009, and documented his search in a log kept by all District Attorney investigators who worked on the search. The log included Aparicio’s date of birth and any known addresses, which were entered into JDIC, a criminal database with such information as warrants, driver’s licenses, car registration, guns owned, and restraining orders. No match was found for her. On May 20, 2009, Investigator Gibson went to the boyfriend’s house on 227th Street, but he was unable to obtain access to the building. The same day, he went to Nicola’s Bar, the victim’s last known place of employment, and spoke to the owner and employees, but none of them recognized her name.
Investigator Gibson then ran Aparicio’s telephone number through Consolidated Lead Evaluation and Reporting (CLEAR), a consumer database built with information obtained from credit card use, containing addresses, social security numbers, dates of birth, telephone numbers, and information regarding relatives and neighbors. He obtained two addresses, one in Paramount on Marcelle Street, and the other in Long Beach on North St. Mary’s Court.
Investigator Buchholz then took over the search. On May 21, 2009, he went to a Torrance address and spoke to Alejandra Ibarra, who said that Aparicio had been her roommate, but had moved out in March 2009. She had no forwarding information.
Investigator Buchholz then went to the Long Beach address, but there was no response from any of the four apartments there, and no directory of residents. Next, he went to the Paramount address, where he spoke to a man who said that Aparicio was his brother’s ex-girlfriend, and that she had lived there on and off about four or five months before. Investigator Buchholz left his business card, but did not receive word back from him.
On May 27, 2009, Investigator Buchholz found Aparicio’s X number, ran it through JDIC, and found her name with a birth date which was different from the date he had in his file. The District Attorney’s office supplied him with another Paramount address on Georgia Avenue. On May 26, he went to the Long Beach address on St. Mary’s Court, and spoke to a resident there, but he did not recognize the name, and said that there were no other women living in the building. On June 5, he “googled” the Georgia Avenue address in Paramount, but it did not appear to exist, and on June 12, 2009, he ran the new birth date through CLEAR, which produced a different address on Georgia Avenue, as well as one in Goleta.
On June 12, 2009, Investigator Buchholz went to the new Georgia Avenue address and spoke to the homeowner here. He said that Aparicio had moved out nine months to a year earlier, and that he had no forwarding information, but thought she was working as a prostitute in Lynwood, on Long Beach Boulevard near Bertha Street, near a carwash and a new elementary school. The same day, Investigator Buchholz went back to the Marcelle Street address in Paramount, and spoke to the mother of Aparicio’s former boyfriend, but she had no contact information, and said that she had last spoken to Aparicio in December 2008, just before she went to Mexico to see her son.
The same day, Investigator Buchholz went to the area in Lynwood where he was told Aparicio might be working as a prostitute, did a visual check of the area, and visited four motels; but her name did not appear on any registries, and no one there recognized her name. On June 18, he ran a license plate number reported as the victim’s car in the case, and found it registered to the Paramount homeowner. Investigator Buchholz also checked the e-mail address she had given a detective, and discovered that the name attached to it was Leslie Saldivar. He sent an e-mail to that address, and because it belonged to someone else, he stated that Aparicio was needed in court, and requested the recipient to provide any information on her. He included his and the District Attorney’s contact information, but he received no response. He did not attempt to contact her ex-boyfriend.
Investigator Buchholz then ran another JDIC check and found a child born in 2001. On July 28, 2009, he obtained an address on Olive in Long Beach, but the address did not exist. He knocked on doors in the neighborhood, but no one was familiar with Aparicio’s name. He then contacted the property manager for the address in Goleta, and on August 6, the manager reported back that he had not found the name Sheila Aparicio on any lease there.
In September 2009, Investigator Gibson was reassigned to the matter. Using the social security number the District Attorney had for Aparicio, he sent an unsuccessful inquiry to the Employment Development Department. The next day, he ran another CLEAR check, which produced two new addresses. Investigator Gibson went to both addresses, but was unable to make contact with anyone at either of them.
The CLEAR search also produced another Sheila Aparicio with a different social security number and birth date and an address in Pico Rivera. He telephoned her, spoke to her daughter, obtained her license number and photograph, and ruled her out as the witness in this case.
The day before trial, Investigator Gibson checked to see whether Aparicio was in custody, called the Los Angeles County USC Medical Center to see if she was a patient, and checked birth and death certificates, registrar of voters, and real estate records. He found only the deed to the house belonging to the Sheila Aparicio who lived in Pico Rivera. He also checked ICE (Immigration and Customs Enforcement), without success. The day of trial, he again checked arrest records, but her name did not come up.
3. Aparicio’s Testimony
The trial court found Aparicio to be unavailable, and her testimony was read to the jury from the preliminary hearing transcript. She testified that on June 28, 2008, she was employed as a lap dancer at Nicola’s Bar, located on Grace Place at Gerhart Avenue. She saw appellant at the bar that night. He asked her for her telephone number, telling her that he wanted a private dance for his friend.
Aparicio left work at approximately 2:05 a.m. She spoke to appellant by telephone soon afterward, and told him she was in the parking lot. He arrived a few minutes later with his friend, but got out of the car by himself, told her he sold “crystal, ” and asked who she knew who used drugs. When she got out of her car, he asked how much she would charge for a dance with his friend, and when she replied that she could not do it, he said, “Please, I need you to do it now, ” pulled out a pistol, and hit her with it. He then cocked it several times, uttered obscenities, threatened to kill her if she did not tell him where the money was, and asked questions about her money, personal belongings, identity, and whether her car had LoJack.
Appellant then forced Aparicio into the passenger side of her car, holding the gun to her side, ordered her to lean forward, and told her not to scream. He drove to the area of Whittier Boulevard, followed by his friend in his car. As he drove, he hit her with the gun several times, causing her to bleed and leaving a lump on her head. He then ordered her out of the car and onto the ground, and while his friend pointed the gun at her, he placed her bags, papers, work clothes, and telephone into his car. Before leaving, he put the gun to her head, cocked it, and told her she could do nothing to him because she had no papers and he would kill her.
At approximately 6:00 a.m., Aparicio telephoned the police, went to the station, and gave a report. She did not go to the police earlier, because he threatened to kill her, and said that he would get out on bail and find her. She was afraid for herself and her son.
4. Other Prosecution Evidence
Los Angeles County Deputy Sheriff Troy Krautkramer testified that he and his partner Yvette Reyes took Aparicio’s report. He noticed an injury to her face, a redness on her cheeks—more so on the left side.
Calli Keep, Sprint security supervisor and custodian of records, testified regarding calls to and from Aparicio’s cell phone between shortly before 1:00 a.m. and shortly after 2:00 a.m., on June 28, 2008. There were several calls made from Aparicio’s number to a number identified later as appellant’s, and from appellant’s to Aparicio’s number.
Appellant’s parole agent, Luis Robles testified that appellant wore a GPS device on his ankle, which produced reports of appellant’s whereabouts. On June 28, 2008, from midnight to sometime after 2:00 a.m., appellant was in the area of Whittier Boulevard and Gerhart Avenue, near Nicola’s Bar. He arrived just after midnight, and left at 12:38 a.m. He then traveled away from the bar, but returned. The GPS monitor recorded appellant barely moving between approximately 2:18 a.m. and 2:23 a.m., at a shopping center located at Eastmont Avenue and Whittier Boulevard. He then traveled to the area of a motel near Whittier Boulevard and Third Street, one block north of Grace Place, the street where the bar is located, arriving at 2:24 a.m. He remained there for two hours.
Detective Rodriguez testified that he viewed the area of the bar, the parking lots next to it and across the street, and the shopping centers on Eastmont and Whittier. He timed trips shown on appellant’s GPS report.
The parties stipulated that appellant had been previously convicted of a felony on August 10, 2004, in Los Angeles Superior Court case No. BA260817, and that the GPS reports generated by appellant’s tracker were accurate and reliable as to time, location, and speed.
5. Defense Evidence
Deputy Krautkramer testified that Aparicio did not tell him about the numerous calls between her and appellant, or that she was in fear for her life. She did not mention a conversation about methamphetamine or a lap dance request. She told him she had been hit in the face with the gun, but did not mention other blows or a threat. She appeared upset and distraught.
Defense investigator Daniel Woolsey testified that he also timed defendant’s travels for the early morning hours of June 28, 2008, with results that varied from those obtained by Detective Rodriguez.
DISCUSSION
I. Availability of Aparicio
Appellant contends that the trial court violated his right to confrontation under the federal and state Constitutions by admitting Aparicio’s prior testimony after finding her unavailable to testify. (See U.S. Const., 6th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. 1, § 15.)
The constitutional right of confrontation is not absolute, but subject to an exception which permits the admission of prior testimony, such as preliminary hearing testimony, of an unavailable witness. (People v. Herrera (2010) 49 Cal.4th 613, 621 (Herrera), citing Chambers v. Mississippi (1973) 410 U.S. 284, 295, and People v. Cromer (2001) 24 Cal.4th 889, 897 (Cromer).) This traditional exception is codified in Evidence Code section 1291, subdivision (a)(2), which “provides that ‘former testimony, ’ such as preliminary hearing testimony, is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if ‘the declarant is unavailable as a witness, ’ and ‘[t]he party against whom the former testimony is offered was a party to the action or proceeding in which the testimony was given and had the right and opportunity to cross-examine the declarant with an interest and motive similar to that which he has at the hearing.’ Thus, when the requirements of section 1291 are met, the admission of former testimony in evidence does not violate a defendant’s constitutional right of confrontation.” (Herrera, supra, at p. 621, fn. omitted.)
Before the exception can be applied, the prosecution must demonstrate that the witness is unavailable, and that a good-faith effort was made to obtain the witness’s presence at trial. (Ohio v. Roberts (1980) 448 U.S. 56, 65; Cromer, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 897.) “[U]nder California law the prosecution must show reasonable or due diligence in locating the witness.” (Cromer, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 897, fn. omitted.)
We review the trial court’s determination of due diligence de novo, considering “‘the timeliness of the search, the importance of the proffered testimony, and whether leads of the witness’s possible location were competently explored.’ [Citations.]” (Herrera, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 622.) “[D]iligence has been found when the prosecution’s efforts are timely, reasonably extensive and carried out over a reasonable period.” (People v. Bunyard (2009) 45 Cal.4th 836, 856.) In contrast, diligence was lacking where the prosecution’s efforts were “perfunctory or obviously negligent.” (Id. at p. 855.) To the extent the evidence is disputed, “the trial court’s resolution of disputed factual issues, often by determining the credibility of witnesses, is reviewed deferentially on appeal under the substantial evidence standard.” (Cromer, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 902.)
Appellant contends that the prosecution failed to establish that the search for Aparicio was timely or that leads were competently explored. We disagree. The prosecution’s efforts were extensive, carried out over the entire period between the preliminary hearing and trial, and were not perfunctory. Although “[t]he prosecution is not required ‘to keep “periodic tabs” on every material witness in a criminal case...’” (People v. Wilson (2005) 36 Cal.4th 309, 342, citation omitted), the prosecution did just that in this case. After the preliminary hearing in late 2008, Detective Rodriguez remained in communication with Aparicio by e-mail until late May 2009. As soon as he lost contact with her, district attorney investigators undertook an exhaustive search for her.
In essence, appellant contends that the prosecuting authorities were negligent. He argues that because there was reason to believe that Aparicio was an undocumented alien, and she expressed her intention to go to Mexico, the prosecution should have learned Aparicio’s true identity and obtained information about where she intended to go in Mexico. With her identity and location, the prosecution could have obtained the assistance of Mexican authorities to compel her attendance at trial, under a treaty with the Mexican government. (Cf. People v. Sandoval (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1425, 1439–1440.)
Although Detective Rodriguez knew Aparicio intended to go to Mexico, he also knew that she had been a very cooperative witness, who had kept in touch and had assured him that she would appear for trial. “[T]he prosecution is not required, absent knowledge of a ‘substantial risk that this important witness would flee, ’ to ‘take adequate preventative measures’ to stop the witness from disappearing. [Citations.]” (People v. Wilson, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 342.) Suspicion is not knowledge. There was no evidence that Aparicio presented a substantial flight risk. (Cf. People v. Louis (1986) 42 Cal.3d 969, 989 [prosecution agreed to release witness on his own recognizance, knowing he was a criminally insane, convicted felon who habitually failed to appear in court], disapproved on other grounds in People v. Mickey (1991) 54 Cal.3d 612, 672, fn. 9.)
In the alternative, appellant argues, the prosecution could have sought leave to examine Aparicio conditionally, pursuant to section 1336. A conditional examination is not an alternative to demonstrating due diligence; its admissibility at trial is subject to the same showing that the witness is unavailable. (See §§ 1345, 882.) Further, a preliminary hearing may amount to a conditional examination, and may be video-recorded at the request of either party. (People v. Ware (1978) 78 Cal.App.3d 822, 828.) In our view, although not video-recorded, the preliminary hearing in this case amounted to a conditional examination, as Aparicio’s testimony was thorough, and defense counsel cross-examined her extensively.
“When a material witness for the defendant, or for the people, is about to leave the state..., the defendant or the people may apply for an order that the witness be examined conditionally.” (§ 1336, subd. (a).) “[T]he testimony may be video-recorded.” (§ 1343.)
As appellant suggests, one purpose of cross-examination is to compel the witness “‘to stand face to face with the jury in order that they may look at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the manner in which he gives his testimony whether he is worthy of belief.’ [Citation.]” (Barber v. Page (1968) 390 U.S. 719, 721.) Video-recording the preliminary hearing satisfies this purpose. (People v. Ware, supra, 78 Cal.App.3d at p. 832.) However, appellant has not suggested that a video of Aparicio’s demeanor while testifying would have made any difference in the result. There was no evidence that she was a felon, a perjurer, or otherwise unworthy of belief. Her testimony was corroborated by Deputy Krautkramer’s observation of Aparicio’s injuries, the GPS report of appellant’s whereabouts between 12:30 and 4:30 a.m. on June 28, 2008, and Aparicio’s cell phone records.
Appellant contends that the prosecution’s failure to notify the defense that Aparicio might have been an undocumented alien deprived him of his ability to conduct discovery in order to learn her true identity and obtain information about her background. Appellant overstates the matter. He was put on such notice by Aparicio herself, who testified that appellant told her she could not go to the police because she had no papers. The record does not reflect that in the six-month interval between the preliminary hearing and trial, appellant sought such discovery, or that he moved for a video-recorded deposition, as he might have done under sections 1336 and 1343. Nor is there evidence that the prosecution “hid” Aparicio’s identity from him as he argues.
In sum, we agree with the trial court that the prosecution established due diligence with evidence that its efforts to locate Aparicio were timely and reasonably extensive, and that its leads were competently explored over a reasonable period. (See Herrera, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 622; People v. Bunyard, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 856.) Thus, the trial court did not err in admitting the former testimony.
II. Substantial Evidence Supports the Judgment
As we have concluded that Aparicio’s former testimony was properly admitted, we need not reach appellant’s contention that without her testimony, substantial evidence did not support the verdicts. Appellant also contends that there was insufficient evidence even with the former testimony, such that he was denied due process under the United States Constitution.
When a criminal conviction is challenged as lacking evidentiary support, “the court must review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 578.) We must presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the jury could reasonably deduce from the evidence. (People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1053.)
First, appellant argues that the testimony was not worthy of belief, because “[t]he prosecution’s failure to ascertain the true identity of its star witness made it impossible for the defense to investigate the background of the witness in order to challenge her credibility at trial.” We reject appellant’s first point, because he refers to no evidence in the record to support his argument. He does not contend that he attempted to discover the identities of the people who knew Aparicio, or that his attempts were in any way thwarted. We find no evidence that a defense investigator was unable to find or speak to the ex-boyfriend, his mother, Aparicio’s employer, and the two ex-roommates found by the prosecution, and appellant has not shown why her background among these people was insufficient to discover evidence of her credibility.
Second, appellant contends that Aparicio was unworthy of belief due to the following evidence and appellant’s own inferences: The amount of money she reported stolen seems too large to be a lap dancer’s tips; the timing and number of Aparicio’s cell phone calls did not match the Sprint records; Aparicio’s version of the events was more detailed at the preliminary hearing than it had been to the police months earlier, and included more facts; her report of injuries conflicted with Deputy Krautkramer’s observations; because Aparicio testified that the gun looked like a police pistol, it must have been a semiautomatic; appellant could not have cocked the gun several times, as she testified, because the bullets would have popped out of a semiautomatic; and finally, Aparicio’s version of the timing and location of the events conflicted with other evidence.
Appellant’s second argument must fail as well, because it is not the function of the reviewing court to weigh the evidence, resolve conflicts in the evidence, or draw our own factual inferences. (People v. James (1977) 19 Cal.3d 99, 107.) All reasonable inferences must be drawn in favor of the judgment. (People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 342.) Further, we do not substitute our own evaluation of the witness’s credibility, unless the testimony was inherently improbable. (People v. Mayberry (1975) 15 Cal.3d 143, 150.)
Appellant argues that Aparicio’s testimony was so fraught with uncertainty and contradictions that her version of events was inherently improbable. To be inherently improbable, there must exist a physical impossibility, or the testimony must appear to be false without resort to inferences or deductions. (People v. Mayberry, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 150.) Appellant’s argument does not meet that test. He argues that Aparicio’s timeline did not fit the GPS evidence, and that prosecution evidence of the time it might have taken to travel from the parking lot near the bar to the shopping center should be disregarded. He then infers from the GPS evidence that the crime must have occurred, if at all, during the less than six minutes that appellant was at the shopping center, concluding that it was impossible for appellant to have done all that Aparicio alleged in that time.
Aparicio may have exaggerated, forgotten, intentionally omitted, or lied about some details of the crime, how she earned her tips, or the kind of gun appellant used. Even if the jury thought so, it was not required to disbelieve all of Aparicio’s testimony. (See People v. Maxwell (1979) 94 Cal.App.3d 562, 576 [jury may reject part of witness’ testimony as false, but believe other parts].)
We do not agree that Aparicio’s testimony was inherently improbable. Aparicio testified that appellant robbed her at gunpoint after transporting her to another location, threatened to kill her, and struck her with a gun. A GPS tracker showed appellant in the area where the crime occurred at approximately the time Aparicio said it occurred. She may have intentionally or unwittingly omitted the number of calls to and from appellant, but Sprint records established that calls were made. She may have mistaken the number of blows appellant dealt, but Deputy Krautkramer saw redness on both her cheeks. A few minutes may seem quick for a single robber, but Aparicio testified that appellant’s accomplice participated.
We conclude that such evidence was sufficient to support the verdicts.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. On our own motion, the trial court is ordered to issue an amended abstract of judgment reflecting the sentenced pronounced by the trial court, as stated herein, and to forward a copy of the amended abstract to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.
We concur: DOI TODD, Acting P. J., CHAVEZ J.