Opinion
May 31, 1988
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Kings County (Beldock, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
At 12:46 A.M. on March 13, 1986, a 1981 Cadillac El Dorado was stolen by two males. Approximately five minutes later, two New York City Housing Police officers observed the car and the officers followed it and its operator into a parking lot. The defendant exited the driver's side of the pursued vehicle and fled into a housing project. One of the officers immediately gave chase without ever losing sight of the defendant. After first looking into the car and ascertaining that there were no other occupants, the other officer joined in the pursuit. The defendant was arrested at 12:57 A.M. after a brief struggle with the officers. After the administration of Miranda warnings, the defendant informed the officers that he had come to the aid of the owner of the vehicle who was being beaten, and that an unknown male thereafter offered him a ride.
The defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to establish that he knew that the vehicle had been stolen, a necessary element of criminal possession of stolen property in the first degree (see, Penal Law former § 165.50). We disagree.
Where, as here, the defendant, who was observed in exclusive possession of the vehicle within minutes after it was reported stolen, took flight when approached by the police, put up a struggle when apprehended and made a false statement to the police, the verdict of guilty as to criminal possession of the stolen automobile was supported by an adequate factual basis (see, People v Johnson, 65 N.Y.2d 556, 562, rearg denied 66 N.Y.2d 759). Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution and indulging in all reasonable inferences in the People's favor, the evidence was legally sufficient to support the finding that the defendant knowingly possessed a stolen automobile valued in excess of $1,500 (see, People v Ford, 66 N.Y.2d 428, 437; People v Marin, 65 N.Y.2d 741, 742). Nor was the conviction against the weight of the evidence (see, CPL 470.15). Under the circumstances, the trial court was not required to charge the jury as to the inference arising from the recent and exclusive possession of the fruits of the crime (see, People v Baskerville, 60 N.Y.2d 374, 382-383).
We find no improvident exercise of discretion with respect to the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury according to the defendant's requests to charge. The charge as given conveyed the appropriate rules of law and contained the substance of the defendant's request to charge on flight (see, People v Dory, 59 N.Y.2d 121, 129; People v Bryant, 122 A.D.2d 220, lv denied 68 N.Y.2d 810; see also, People v Porrata, 119 A.D.2d 704, 705).
We find no improvident exercise of discretion in the trial court's refusal to grant the defendant's mistrial motions. Although the first witness mentioned the word "robbery", the court immediately gave a careful curative instruction to the jury (see, People v Young, 48 N.Y.2d 995, 996, rearg dismissed 60 N.Y.2d 644; People v Wheeler, 114 A.D.2d 688, 689). The prosecutor's summation stayed within the four corners of the evidence (see, People v Ashwal, 39 N.Y.2d 105, 109-110).
We have reviewed the defendant's other contentions and find them to be without merit. Bracken, J.P., Brown, Weinstein and Rubin, JJ., concur.