Nor does Jones cite Illinois cases for points of federal law. Jones cites only People v. Meredith, 405 N.E.2d 1306 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) and People v. Young, 337 N.E.2d 40 (Ill. App. Ct.), for principles of Illinois state law in addressing the procedural question of waiver. Jones cites Meredith and Young in addressing the issue of waiver, and neither Weathers nor Young address federal law. See Weathers, 338 N.E.2d at 881-884; Young, 337 N.E.2d at 41-43.

The doctrine of plain error is applied to remedy errors so plain and prejudicial that failure to object to them is not a waiver for purposes of appeal. People v. Young (1975), 33 Ill. App.3d 443, 447. Due to the gravity of the error, and in the interests of justice, we believe defendant's failure to raise the issue in his motion does not waive it on appeal.

Nevertheless, the appellate court may consider assignments of error relating to seriously prejudicial arguments of counsel, even though no objection was made at trial. ( People v. Young (1975), 33 Ill. App.3d 443, 447, 337 N.E.2d 40.) Even though the court may relax the waiver rule, the case should not be reversed unless the closing argument of the prosecutor, which was not objected to at trial, is so prejudicial and inflammatory that it deprives the defendant of a fair trial and was a material factor in the guilty verdict of the jury. People v. Young (1975), 33 Ill. App.3d 443, 447, 337 N.E.2d 40.

See People v. Pugh (1951), 409 Ill. 584, 100 N.E.2d 909; People v. Ramey (1974), 22 Ill. App.3d 916, 317 N.E.2d 143. People v. Young (1975), 33 Ill. App.3d 443, 337 N.E.2d 40, cited by Belvedere, does not support his position that the prosecutor's argument amounted to an expression of the prosecutor's personal opinion that defendants were guilty of murder because the argument made in Young is distinguishable from the argument in the pending case. In Young, the prosecutor stated:

• 4 Under the plain error doctrine, the appellate court may consider assignments of error relating to seriously prejudicial arguments of counsel although no objection was made at trial and no post-trial motion was filed. ( People v. Young, 33 Ill. App.3d 443, 337 N.E.2d 40.) In the case before us pertinent parts of the prosecutor's closing arguments are as follows:

The general rule is the court may relax the waiver rule but a conviction should not be reversed unless the closing argument of the prosecutor not objected to at trial is so prejudicial and inflammatory as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial and was a material factor in the guilty verdict of the jury. People v. Young, 33 Ill. App.3d 443, 337 N.E.2d 40; People v. Briggman, 21 Ill. App.3d 747, 316 N.E.2d 121. Two portions of the prosecutor's closing arguments are in issue here.

Rather, the prosecutor remarked that defendant was presumed innocent and that the State carried the burden of proving its case. See People v. Griggs (1977), 51 Ill. App.3d 224, 226-27, distinguishing People v. Young (1975), 33 Ill. App.3d 443, 446-47. Defendant argues that the prosecutor's remarks diminished the presumption of innocence also by stating that, although defendant was entitled to certain rights or presumptions, he was not innocent.

ditional knowledge or information about the case which has not been disclosed to the jury. State v. Kaufman, supra; State v. Harrison, 367 So.2d 1 (La. 1979); State v. Hamilton, 356 So.2d 1360 (La. 1978); State v. May, 339 So.2d 764 (La. 1976) (recognizing the stated rule but finding that the prosecutor's comment did not imply to the jury that he had personal knowledge of facts not presented to them indicating the defendant's guilt); see also United States v. Diharce-Estrada, 526 F.2d 637 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Lamerson, 457 F.2d 371 (5th Cir. 1972); Gradsky v. United States, 373 F.2d 706 (5th Cir. 1967); McMillian v. United States, 363 F.2d 165 (5th Cir. 1966); United States v. Roberts, 618 F.2d 530 (9th Cir. 1980); Cleveland Paper Co. v. Banks, 15 Neb. 20, 16 N.W. 833 (1883); State v. Gundersons, 26 N.D. 294, 144 N.W. 659 (1913); State v. Thayer, 124 Ohio St. 1, 176 N.E. 656 (Ohio 1931); Thompson v. State, 318 So.2d 549 (FLa.App. 1975), cert. denied, 333 So.2d 465 (1976); People v. Young, 33 Ill. App.3d 443, 337 N.E.2d 40 (Ill.App. 1975); People v. Montevecchio, 32 Mich. App. 163, 188 N.W.2d 186 (1971); ABA Standards, supra; 3 Wharton's Criminal Procedure §§ 523, 524 (12th ed. 1975). The prosecuting attorney's argument in the present case was not as subtle as an expression of belief in guilt implying access to additional evidence.

Even when no objection is made, however, inflammatory rhetoric warrants reversal when it prevents the defendant from receiving a fair trial or causes substantial interference with the fundamental integrity of the judicial process. (See, e.g., People v. Romero (1967), 36 Ill.2d 315, 320; People v. Young (1975), 33 Ill. App.3d 443, 447-48.) After examining the arguments to which no objections were made, we conclude that they did not so substantially undermine the fairness of the defendant's trial as to warrant reversal.

As the defendant asks us to consider this issue despite the lack of objection, he contends that prosecutorial misconduct in closing arguments can be considered plain error. See People v. Young, 33 Ill. App. 3d 443, 445-47, 337 N.E.2d 40, 41-43 (1975); People v. Slaughter, 84 Ill. App. 3d 88, 94, 404 N.E.2d 1058, 1063 (1980); People v. Morgan, 20 Ill. 2d 437, 441-42, 170 N.E.2d 529, 531 (1960). Alternatively, he argues that his attorney was ineffective for failing to object.