Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, pars. 33B-1(d)(1), (2), (3), (4). Defendant raises five constitutional arguments, four of which have recently been dealt with by this court in People v. Withers (1983), 115 Ill. App.3d 1077, 450 N.E.2d 1323, appeal denied (1983), 96 Ill.2d 549. In Withers, defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment under the Act.

While this appears to be the first time this particular provision of the Illinois Act has been challenged in the federal courts, the Illinois courts have repeatedly upheld the constitutionality of the Act over objections similar to those raised here. See People v. Hartfield, 137 Ill. App.3d 679, 92 Ill.Dec. 281, 484 N.E.2d 1136 (1st Dist. 1985); People v. Coleman, 128 Ill. App.3d 538, 83 Ill.Dec. 857, 470 N.E.2d 1277 (5th Dist. 1984); People v. Tobias, 125 Ill. App.3d 234, 80 Ill.Dec. 496, 465 N.E.2d 608 (1st Dist. 1984); People v. Washington, 125 Ill. App.3d 109, 80 Ill.Dec. 554, 465 N.E.2d 666 (1st Dist. 1984); People v. Mason, 119 Ill. App.3d 516, 75 Ill.Dec. 43, 456 N.E.2d 864 (3d Dist. 1983); People v. Withers, 115 Ill. App.3d 1077, 71 Ill.Dec. 444, 450 N.E.2d 1323 (1st Dist. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1052, 104 S.Ct. 1332, 79 L.Ed.2d 726. The petitioner first argues that the Illinois statute is unconstitutional because it gives the prosecutor the discretion to decide which defendants will be sentenced under the Act.

We hold that the legislature properly exercised its authority when it determined that in the public interest, any person who committed Class X felonies on three separate occasions must be sentenced to natural life imprisonment. See People v. Withers (1983), 115 Ill. App.3d 1077, 1090-91, 450 N.E.2d 1323, cert. denied (1984), 465 U.S. 1052, 79 L.Ed.2d 726, 104 S.Ct. 1332; People v. Washington (1984), 125 Ill. App.3d 109, 116, 465 N.E.2d 666; People v. Morissette (1986), 150 Ill. App.3d 431, 443-44, 501 N.E.2d 781. • 4 Similarly, we find that the natural life sentence does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth amendment of the Constitution of the United States, and the statute does not violate the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution. ( Rummel v. Estelle (1980), 445 U.S. 263, 285, 63 L.Ed.2d 382, 397-98, 100 S.Ct. 1133, 1145; Withers, 115 Ill. App.3d at 1088-90.)

He further contends that by preventing the consideration of any mitigating evidence, the statute also violates due process of law under the Illinois State Constitution. In People v. Withers (1983), 115 Ill. App.3d 1077, 450 N.E.2d 1323, cert. denied (1984), 465 U.S. 1052, 79 L.Ed.2d 726, 104 S.Ct. 1332, this court rejected the argument that the statute improperly precluded consideration of mitigating facts. Defendant contends that Solem v. Helm (1983), 463 U.S. 277, 77 L.Ed.2d 637, 103 S.Ct. 3001, undercuts Withers.

Petitioner further argues that the statute gives the prosecutor absolute discretion as to whom he wishes to sentence to life imprisonment, and gives the prosecutor no standards or other guidance in making this decision, allowing him, at his whim, to sentence one person to spend the rest of his life in prison while another serves only a term of years. Citing to its own earlier opinions, the Illinois Appellate Court considered that argument, but rejected it also, noting that the statute applied to every defendant who met the Act's criteria, and that the Act did not violate the separation of powers doctrine with regard to judicial sentencing power. (Amended Answer, Ex. A, at 115-16) (citing People v. Mason, 119 Ill. App.3d 516, 456 N.E.2d 864 (3d Dist. 1983) and People v. Withers, 115 Ill. App.3d 1077, 450 N.E.2d 1323 (1st Dist. 1983)). While none of these state court opinions cited United States Supreme Court precedent to support their rulings on these issues, it is Petitioner's burden to establish that the state court ruling was contrary to or an unreasonable application of Supreme Court doctrine.

It is this language which defendant cites in support of his claim that the sentencing hearing was null and void, and that this cause should be remanded for resentencing. • 2 The State relies on People v. Withers (1983), 115 Ill. App.3d 1077, 1088, 450 N.E.2d 1323, for the proposition that the use of the term "may" in section 33B-2(a) of the Act indicates that the reference to a written statement by the State's Attorney as being "verified" is directory rather than mandatory because it can be read as prescribing one of the ways the prosecutor brings to the court's attention a defendant's prior convictions. ( Withers, 115 Ill. App.3d at 1088.

Chrans did not decide the cause based on a substantive consideration of the eighth amendment. Rather, insofar as the prosecutorial discretion was concerned, it adhered to the interpretation afforded the statute in People v. Withers (1983), 115 Ill. App.3d 1077, 1087-88, which was not based on an eighth amendment analysis. As to the lack of consideration of mitigating factors, Chrans relied on Rummel v. Estelle (1980), 445 U.S. 263, 63 L.Ed.2d 382, 100 S.Ct. 1133, and, again, on Withers, which also relied on Rummel in upholding the constitutionality of the Illinois Habitual Criminal Act ( People v. Withers (1983), 115 Ill. App.3d 1077, 1088-91).

The Habitual Criminal Act is one provision of the Criminal Code and has consistently withstood constitutional attacks. ( People v. McNeil (1984), 125 Ill. App.3d 876, 466 N.E.2d 1058; People v. Coleman (1984), 128 Ill. App.3d 538, 470 N.E.2d 1277; People v. Withers (1983), 115 Ill. App.3d 1077, 450 N.E.2d 1323.) During floor debates on the amendment concern was expressed by members of the legislature that the amendment would apply to career rapists to remove them from society and confine them in prison.

There we recognized that the habitual-criminal statute does not explicitly delegate to the prosecutor the power to choose which defendants shall be sentenced under its terms; rather, its provisions apply to all defendants who meet the statute's criteria of two previous Class X felony or murder convictions. ( People v. Washington (1984), 125 Ill. App.3d 109, 465 N.E.2d 666; cf. People v. Withers (1983), 115 Ill. App.3d 1077, 450 N.E.2d 1323, cert. denied (1984), 465 U.S. 1052, 79 L.Ed.2d 726, 104 S.Ct. 1332.) Accordingly, the statute places no discretion in the hands of the State to determine which defendants qualify for a term of life imprisonment; rather, precise guidelines are set forth to enable the trial judge to determine the applicability of the recidivist statute.

The habitual criminal statute has been upheld repeatedly against constitutional attacks similar to defendant's. ( People v. Taylor (1984), 102 Ill.2d 201, 464 N.E.2d 1059; People v. Washington (1984), 125 Ill. App.3d 109, 465 N.E.2d 666; People v. Tobias (1984), 125 Ill. App.3d 234, 465 N.E.2d 608; People v. Withers (1983), 115 Ill. App.3d 1077, 450 N.E.2d 1323.) In Withers, the court declared that the act did not violate the eighth and fourteenth amendments despite the fact that individual circumstances do not affect the habitual offender's sentence.