Opinion
A156743
05-27-2020
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. HOLLIE MAE CHARLOTTE WILSON, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Sonoma County Super. Ct. No. SCR 704217-1)
Defendant was convicted of property arson. On appeal, she contends insufficient evidence supports her arson conviction. She further argues the trial court provided an erroneous and prejudicial special jury instruction. We disagree and affirm the judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Statement of Facts
Rincon Valley Fire Protection District Captain Robert Bisordi responded to a "report of a vegetation fire" on the side of a freeway. When Bisordi arrived at the fire, he found "a chair burning in a drainage ditch [or] culvert . . . . [¶] . . . [¶] . . . underneath [an] overpass." The chair was a large "lazy boy style" chair that was approximately a few feet wide and possibly four or five feet long when reclined. He did not know how the chair ended up in the culvert or how long it had been there. Bisordi noticed a tent was "outside of the culvert . . . approximately 50 feet" away. A foot trail, approximately six inches wide, existed between the tent and the culvert. The tent was close to the Caltrans freeway fencing and adjacent to the tent was "a small campfire and a burn shelf type thing," as well as a green folding chair, a backpack, and some trash. Bisordi saw defendant emerge from the tent. No other individuals appeared to be living near the culvert, although there was a nearby business that engaged in recycling and trash handling.
Bisordi asked defendant "if she knew about the fire or anything there." Defendant did not respond to Bisordi's question and went back into her tent.
California Highway Patrol Officer Brian Wood also spoke to defendant. Wood noticed defendant appeared to have black soot on her person. He asked her whether she knew anything about "the chair and the fire." Defendant informed him she had "no knowledge of the chair or the fire."
Wood took defendant into custody, and Wood again spoke with defendant during the booking process. During that conversation, defendant continued to deny knowledge of the chair and fire. B. Procedural Background
Defendant was charged by amended information with property arson (Pen. Code, § 451, subd. (d); count 1) and misdemeanor unauthorized lodging (§ 647, subd. (e); count 2). The amended information further alleged defendant committed the arson offense while on felony probation (§ 1203, subd. (k)) and had a prior strike and a prior serious or violent felony conviction (§ 667, subds. (a), (d), (e)).
All statutory references are to the Penal Code.
At trial, defendant did not contest she burned the chair. Rather, the trial focused on whether defendant owned the chair. Officer Wood testified, "[b]ased on where [defendant's] personal belongings were such as her backpack and where she was staying in the tent," that he did not believe the burning chair "was a part of her campsite." He reached this conclusion based on his "experience as a law enforcement officer with homeless individuals or campsites" and the fact that the burning chair "was in the culvert 30 to 50 feet away" from defendant's campsite. He further testified he did not recall seeing any trails from the campsite to the culvert that had matted down grass in the dimensions of the "lazy boy chair."
The prosecutor dismissed count 2, and a jury found defendant guilty of count 1. The court found true the prior conviction allegations. The court sentenced defendant to six years eight months in prison. Defendant timely appealed.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Defendant contends insufficient evidence supports the arson conviction because there was no evidence regarding who owned the chair. We disagree.
1. Relevant Law
"To assess the evidence's sufficiency, we review the whole record to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime . . . beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.] The record must disclose substantial evidence to support the verdict—i.e., evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.] In applying this test, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the jury could reasonably have deduced from the evidence. [Citation.] 'Conflicts and even testimony [that] is subject to justifiable suspicion do not justify the reversal of a judgment, for it is the exclusive province of the trial judge or jury to determine the credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity of the facts upon which a determination depends. [Citation.] We resolve neither credibility issues nor evidentiary conflicts; we look for substantial evidence. [Citation.]' [Citation.] A reversal for insufficient evidence 'is unwarranted unless it appears "that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support" ' the jury's verdict." (People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 357.)
Arson "only require[s] proof that the property . . . burned [does] not belong to" the defendant. (See In re L. T. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 262, 264.) "The Penal Code definition of property that is applicable to the arson statute contains no requirement that the object belong to anyone." (Id. at p. 265.)
2. Analysis
Here, the jury could reasonably have concluded defendant did not own the chair at issue. The chair was not in the immediate vicinity of defendant's campsite, and Officer Wood testified he did not recall seeing any indication that the chair was moved from the campsite to the culvert. Nor was any of defendant's property by the chair. Officer Wood testified, based on his experience and the distance between defendant's campsite and the chair, that the chair was not part of her personal property. And defense counsel acknowledged there was circumstantial evidence "both ways" as to whether defendant owned the chair based on its location. In addition, Officer Wood testified defendant repeatedly disclaimed any knowledge of the chair when asked about the chair and the fire.
Defendant asserts the proximity of the chair to her encampment, the trail between her campsite and the culvert, and the lack of other individuals in the immediate area indicate defendant took possession of the chair and used it. While such evidence suggests a jury could have concluded defendant owned the chair, it is insufficient to justify reversal. " 'If the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact's findings, reversal of the judgment is not warranted simply because the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding.' " (People v. Westerfield (2019) 6 Cal.5th 632, 713.)
Defendant further argues her statements to the police officers that she did not have information about the chair or fire may have been solely related to the fire rather than ownership of the chair. But no evidence in the record indicates defendant was only disclaiming knowledge of the fire. Rather, Officer Wood testified defendant stated she had no knowledge of the chair or the fire in response to his questioning. Accordingly, substantial evidence supports the judgment. B. Special Jury Instruction
The trial court provided the jury with a special instruction, which read: "Burning trash that does not belong to Defendant is arson if the Defendant acted willfully and maliciously. To be arson, there is no requirement that the property belong to anyone." Defendant contends the instruction was argumentative and inaccurate. We disagree.
1. Relevant Background
At the instructional conference, defense counsel requested the trial court include as part of CALCRIM No. 1515 optional bracketed language stating "a person does not commit arson if his or her own property" is burned. The prosecutor objected on the grounds that the evidence did not support an inference that defendant owned the chair.
The trial court agreed to include the optional bracketed language in CALCRIM No. 1515. In response, the prosecutor requested a special instruction based on the "related issues" section to CALCRIM No. 1515, which provided: "Burning trash that does not belong to the defendant is arson. There is no requirement for arson that the property belong to anyone." (CALCRIM No. 1515, Related Issues.) The prosecutor argued the additional instruction was necessary because defense counsel implied to the jury that the chair must belong to someone despite the arson statute imposing no such requirement. The prosecutor asserted the instruction would clarify her burden of proving that the chair did not belong to defendant.
Defense counsel opposed the special instruction. After extensive argument by counsel, the trial court took the matter under advisement. The trial court subsequently gave the requested special instruction.
2. Analysis
Defendant first contends the supplemental language to CALCRIM No. 1515 was argumentative because it directed the jury to a guilty verdict. " 'An instruction is argumentative when it recites facts drawn from the evidence in such a manner as to constitute argument to the jury in the guise of a statement of law. [Citation.] "A jury instruction is [also] argumentative when it is ' "of such a character as to invite the jury to draw inferences favorable to one of the parties from specified items of evidence." [Citations.]' " [Citation.]' [Citation.] Instructions should not 'relate particular facts to a legal issue.' [Citation.] ' "In a proper instruction, '[what] is pinpointed is not specific evidence as such, but the theory of the defendant's [(or the prosecution's)] case.' " ' " (People v. Mullins (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 594, 608-609.)
Here, the special instruction did not draw facts from the case but rather provided a neutral statement of the law, taken verbatim from the "related issues" section of CALCRIM No. 1515. And, in the context of the entire instruction, it provided a counterbalance to the optional language of CALCRIM No. 1515, included at defense counsel's request, that, "A person does not commit arson if the only thing burned is his or her own personal property . . . ."
While defendant appears to assert the court should have provided an additional instruction regarding how abandoned property could become someone's property, defendant does not claim defense counsel requested such an instruction. (People v. Ramsey (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 621, 630 ["Generally, the burden of requesting supplemental or clarifying instructions falls on the defendant, and failure to request such instructions waives the contention of error."].)
Next, defendant contends the statement of law is inaccurate as applied to this case. She contends the instruction informed the jury "that if something was trash, [defendant] did not own it, and the crime of arson was complete." The instruction does not, in fact, inform the jury that trash cannot be owned by defendant and thus would support an arson conviction. Rather, the instruction specifies, "Burning trash that does not belong to Defendant is arson . . . ." (Italics added.) It then clarifies, "To be arson, there is no requirement that the property belong to anyone." Both of these are accurate statements of the law.
Defendant also argues the case referenced in the notes to CALCRIM No. 1515 in support of the special jury instruction, In re L. T., supra, 103 Cal.App.4th 262, is distinguishable. While In re L. T. did not involve a claim by the juvenile that she owned the burned trash, we find the distinction meaningless for purposes of this analysis. The issue is whether the facts of this case support the instruction.
The relevant test is whether the instruction is "supported by substantial evidence, that is, evidence sufficient to deserve jury consideration." (People v. Marshall (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 39.) As discussed above, the prosecution offered substantial evidence to support its theory that the chair was abandoned property. The trial court thus did not err by giving the instruction.
Moreover, even if the instruction was given in error, we find such error harmless. (See People v. Flood (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 502-503 [instructional error that improperly describes or omits an element of an offense is subject to harmless error review].) There is no indication in the record the jury convicted defendant of arson based on burning property belonging to her. And, to the contrary, the jury was specifically instructed, "A person does not commit arson if the only thing burned is his or her own personal property . . . ." On this record, "[t]here is no reasonable likelihood the jury was confused and misconstrued or misapplied the instruction[s] [citation], and defendant's argument to the contrary is speculation." (People v. Harrison (2005) 35 Cal.4th 208, 252.) Accordingly, we find no cause for reversal. C. Cumulative Error
We further note in response to a jury question asking, "[I]f you light your own property on fire on other's property (state), is that arson," the court again referred the jury to the relevant instruction that specifically stated burning one's own property is not arson. (People v. Pearson (2013) 56 Cal.4th 393, 414 ["We presume that jurors understand and follow the court's instructions."].) --------
Finally, defendant contends the cumulative effect of the errors in her case require reversal of the judgment. " 'Under the cumulative error doctrine, the reviewing court must "review each allegation and assess the cumulative effect of any errors to see if it is reasonably probable the jury would have reached a result more favorable to defendant in their absence." ' [Citation.] 'The "litmus test" for cumulative error "is whether defendant received due process and a fair trial." ' " (People v. Mireles (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 237, 249.)
Because we conclude the trial court did not err and substantial evidence supported the judgment, we reject defendant's claim of cumulative error.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
/s/_________
Margulies, J. We concur: /s/_________
Humes, P. J. /s/_________
Banke, J.