Opinion
1412 KA 16–01947
03-23-2018
The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Earl J. WILSON, Defendant–Appellant.
J. SCOTT PORTER, SENECA FALLS, FOR DEFENDANT–APPELLANT. BARRY L. PORSCH, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, WATERLOO, FOR RESPONDENT.
J. SCOTT PORTER, SENECA FALLS, FOR DEFENDANT–APPELLANT.
BARRY L. PORSCH, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, WATERLOO, FOR RESPONDENT.
PRESENT: WHALEN, P.J., SMITH, LINDLEY, NEMOYER, AND TROUTMAN, JJ.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDERAppeal from a judgment of the Seneca County Court ( Dennis F. Bender, J.), rendered August 19, 2016. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of aggravated driving while intoxicated, aggravated vehicular homicide (two counts) and manslaughter in the second degree (two counts).
It is hereby ORDERED that the case is held, the decision is reserved and the matter is remitted to Seneca County Court for further proceedings in accordance with the following memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him upon his plea of guilty of one count of aggravated driving while intoxicated ( Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192[2–a][a] ), and two counts each of aggravated vehicular homicide ( Penal Law § 125.14[1] ) and manslaughter in the second degree (§ 125.15[1] ). Defendant's conviction arises out of a fatal motor vehicle accident that occurred when the pickup truck operated by defendant collided with a motorcycle, killing both the operator of the motorcycle and the passenger on it.
We agree with defendant that County Court erred in summarily denying his motion to withdraw his plea. In support of the motion, defendant contended, inter alia, that the People violated their Brady obligation by failing to disclose the autopsy and toxicology reports of the motorcycle operator. We note at the outset that we reject the People's contention that defendant forfeited his right to raise the alleged Brady violation by pleading guilty (see People v. Ortiz, 127 A.D.2d 305, 308, 515 N.Y.S.2d 317 [3d Dept. 1987], lv denied 70 N.Y.2d 652, 518 N.Y.S.2d 1045, 512 N.E.2d 571 [1987] ; People v. Benard, 163 Misc.2d 176, 181, 620 N.Y.S.2d 242 [Sup. Ct., N.Y. County 1994] ; see generally People v. Fisher, 28 N.Y.3d 717, 722, 49 N.Y.S.3d 344, 71 N.E.3d 932 [2017] ). Brady is premised upon considerations of fairness and due process (see People v. Mangarillo, 152 A.D.3d 1061, 1064, 59 N.Y.S.3d 572 [3d Dept. 2017] ; People v. Martin, 240 A.D.2d 5, 8, 669 N.Y.S.2d 268 [1st Dept. 1998], lv denied 92 N.Y.2d 856, 677 N.Y.S.2d 86, 699 N.E.2d 446 [1998] ), and we conclude that it would undermine the prosecutor's Brady obligations if a defendant is deemed to have forfeited his or her right to raise an alleged Brady violation by entering a plea without the knowledge that the People possessed exculpatory evidence (see People v. DeLaRosa, 48 A.D.3d 1098, 1098–1099, 851 N.Y.S.2d 775 [4th Dept. 2008], lv denied 10 N.Y.3d 861, 860 N.Y.S.2d 488, 890 N.E.2d 251 [2008] ). To the extent that our prior decisions hold that a defendant, by pleading guilty, forfeits the right to raise an alleged Brady violation (see e.g. People v. Brockway, 148 A.D.3d 1815, 1816, 51 N.Y.S.3d 306 [4th Dept. 2017] ; People v. Chant, 140 A.D.3d 1645, 1648, 34 N.Y.S.3d 551 [4th Dept. 2016], lv denied 28 N.Y.3d 970, 43 N.Y.S.3d 257, 66 N.E.3d 3 [2016] ; People v. Chinn, 104 A.D.3d 1167, 1168, 960 N.Y.S.2d 788 [4th Dept. 2013], lv denied 21 N.Y.3d 1014, 971 N.Y.S.2d 496, 994 N.E.2d 392 [2013] ), they are no longer to be followed.
On the merits, the People correctly concede that they are charged with having knowledge of the reports as of the time the reports were in the possession of the State Police, which was prior to the plea proceeding, even though the reports did not come into the possession of the District Attorney until after the plea was entered (see People v. Santorelli, 95 N.Y.2d 412, 421, 718 N.Y.S.2d 696, 741 N.E.2d 493 [2000] ).
We reject the People's contention that the reports do not contain exculpatory material and that they were thus under no obligation to disclose them. Rather, we agree with defendant that evidence of the motorcycle operator's intoxication is relevant with respect to the cause of the fatal accident and defendant's culpability therefor and, here, the toxicology report states that two blood samples obtained from the motorcycle operator indicated blood alcohol concentrations of .081 and .098. Moreover, the exculpatory value of that evidence is enhanced by defendant's initial account of the accident to State Police officers at the scene, wherein defendant asserted that the accident occurred when the motorcycle was passing another vehicle and suddenly appeared "right in front of him."Contrary to the People's further contention, defendant cannot be charged with knowledge of the contents of the toxicology and autopsy reports based upon the assertions in his affidavit that State Police officers disclosed information to him that the operator of the motorcycle was intoxicated (cf. People v. Doshi, 93 N.Y.2d 499, 506, 693 N.Y.S.2d 87, 715 N.E.2d 113 [1999] ; People v. McClain, 53 A.D.3d 556, 556, 861 N.Y.S.2d 764 [2d Dept. 2008], lv denied 11 N.Y.3d 791, 866 N.Y.S.2d 617, 896 N.E.2d 103 [2008] ). We agree with defendant, moreover, that the court should not have summarily determined whether and to what extent the exculpatory information, if disclosed, would have affected defendant's decision to plead guilty (cf. Fisher, 28 N.Y.3d at 722, 49 N.Y.S.3d 344, 71 N.E.3d 932 ; People v. Drossos, 291 A.D.2d 723, 724, 738 N.Y.S.2d 724 [3d Dept. 2002] ).
We therefore hold the case, reserve decision, and remit the matter to County Court for a hearing on defendant's motion. In light of our determination, we do not address defendant's remaining contentions.