Opinion
2012-06-20
The PEOPLE, etc., respondent, v. Dukieem M. WILSON, appellant.
Thomas N.N. Angell, Poughkeepsie, N.Y. (Steven Levine of counsel), for appellant. William V. Grady, District Attorney, Poughkeepsie, N.Y. (Kirsten A. Rappleyea of counsel), for respondent.
Thomas N.N. Angell, Poughkeepsie, N.Y. (Steven Levine of counsel), for appellant. William V. Grady, District Attorney, Poughkeepsie, N.Y. (Kirsten A. Rappleyea of counsel), for respondent.
DANIEL D. ANGIOLILLO, J.P., ARIEL E. BELEN, SHERI S. ROMAN, and SANDRA L. SGROI, JJ.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Dutchess County (Greller, J.), rendered April 21, 2011, convicting him of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, upon his plea of guilty (Hayes, J.), and imposing sentence. The appeal from the judgment brings upon for review the denial, after a hearing (Hayes, J.), of that branch of the defendant's omnibus motion which was to suppress physical evidence.
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.
“ ‘[A]s a general matter, the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred,’ even if the underlying reason for the stop was to investigate another matter unrelated to the traffic violation” ( People v. Sluszka, 15 A.D.3d 421, 423, 790 N.Y.S.2d 55, quoting People v. Robinson, 97 N.Y.2d 341, 348–349, 741 N.Y.S.2d 147, 767 N.E.2d 638;see Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89). Here, the police had probable cause to stop the vehicle in which the defendant was a passenger upon observing that it failed to signal when leaving the curb and entering a public highway ( seeVehicle and Traffic Law § 1163[d] ).
Additionally, “[t]he credibility determinations of the Supreme Court following a suppression hearing are entitled to great deference on appeal and will not be disturbed unless clearly unsupported by the record” ( People v. Smith, 77 A.D.3d 980, 981, 910 N.Y.S.2d 492 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v. Spann, 82 A.D.3d 1013, 1014, 918 N.Y.S.2d 588). Here, contrary to the defendant's contentions, the testimony of the officers at the hearing was not unbelievable ( cf. Matter of Robert D., 69 A.D.3d 714, 716–717, 892 N.Y.S.2d 523). Based on the officers' testimony, the hearing court properly concluded that the frisking of the defendant which resulted in the seizure of a gun was supported by the requisite predicate of reasonable suspicion by the police that the defendant might be armed ( see e.g. People v. Batista, 88 N.Y.2d 650, 649 N.Y.S.2d 356, 672 N.E.2d 581;People v. Benjamin, 51 N.Y.2d 267, 271, 434 N.Y.S.2d 144, 414 N.E.2d 645;People v. Caicedo, 69 A.D.3d 954, 893 N.Y.S.2d 609;People v. Zingale, 246 A.D.2d 613, 667 N.Y.S.2d 300).