Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Superior Court County of Los Angeles, Super. Ct. No. NA065483, James B. Pierce, Judge.
Roderick W. Leonard, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Jaime L. Fuster, April S. Rylaarsdam, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
GILBERT, P.J.
Dwayne T. Williams appeals a judgment following conviction of burglary, with findings of a prior serious felony conviction and service of three prior prison terms. (Pen. Code, §§ 459, 667, subd. (a), 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d), & 667.5, subd. (b).) We modify the judgment to award Williams 116 days of additional presentence conduct credits, but otherwise affirm.
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
David, Resham, and Anil Singh lived in an upstairs apartment at 787 West Sepulveda Boulevard in San Pedro. On April 22, 2005, Resham and Anil were at their places of employment. David left the apartment that afternoon to meet Anil and drive him home.
We refer to the victims and other witnesses by their first names, not from disrespect, but to ease the reader's task.
Mirna Castaneda lived in an apartment across the street from the Singhs' apartment. That afternoon, she observed Williams walking up and down the stairway between the Singhs' apartment and a white Mercedes automobile in which a female passenger sat. Mirna saw Williams lean his shoulder into the door of the Singhs' apartment and enter the apartment. During one walk of the stairway, Williams carried a black object that resembled a videotape recorder.
Mirna telephoned her husband Luis and reported her observations. He quickly returned home and saw Williams speak to the passenger in the white Mercedes, walk the stairway, and enter the Singhs' apartment. Luis summoned police officers.
Within a short time, Los Angeles police officers arrived at the Singhs' apartment. An officer saw Williams inside the apartment, and ordered him outside. After arresting Williams, police officers entered the apartment and found it ransacked. The doorjamb of the exterior wooden door had been broken and pieces of it lay on the floor.
Police officers detained Sade Chapman, the passenger in the white Mercedes. Officers searched the automobile and found two wristwatches in the trunk and an "X-box" gaming console on the rear floorboard.
David and Anil Singh returned home during the arrest and investigation. They continued driving, however, because they believed it "best if [they] stayed out of [a police matter at their apartment building]." After stopping to purchase alcohol, David and Anil returned to the apartment building. They did not know Williams nor had they given him permission to enter their apartment. David and Anil identified the wristwatches and gaming toy found in the automobile as their possessions. One wristwatch had been a gift to David and the other wristwatch had been broken for some time.
At trial the parties stipulated that Williams's stepfather owned the white Mercedes automobile.
Sade Chapman testified that Williams's mother was her godmother and that Williams was driving her home to Hesperia that day. She stated that they met David and Anil Singh in a convenience store and that Williams spoke with Anil. Afterwards, they drove to the Singh apartment "to get weed." Chapman testified that Williams did not take any objects from the Singh apartment nor did he open the trunk of the automobile.
The jury convicted Williams of burglary, and the trial court found that he suffered a prior serious felony conviction for burglary and served three prior prison terms. (§§ 459, 667, subd. (a), 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d), & 667.5, subd. (b).) The trial court sentenced Williams to a total prison term of sixteen years, consisting of a doubled four-year midterm for burglary, and eight years for sentence enhancements. The trial court imposed a restitution fine, parole revocation fine, and court security fee. (§§ 1202.4, subd. (b), 1202.45, & 1465.8, subd. (a)(1).) It awarded Williams 377 days of actual custody credits and 72 days of conduct credits.
Williams appeals and contends that the trial court erred by: 1) excluding evidence that David Singh possessed six medicinal marijuana plants, and 2) awarding only 72 days of conduct credits.
DISCUSSION
I.
Williams argues that the trial court denied him due process of law and the right to present a defense by excluding evidence that David Singh possessed medicinal marijuana in his apartment. He contends that evidence of the marijuana is relevant because it corroborates his purpose at the Singh apartment. (People v. Freeman (1994) 8 Cal.4th 450, 491 [". . . 'Evidence is relevant when no matter how weak it may be, it tends to prove the issue before the jury.' [Citation]"].) Williams adds that the evidence is relevant to impeach David and Anil's credibility concerning their testimony that they did not use narcotics that day.
The trial court possesses broad discretion to determine the relevance of evidence. (Evid. Code, § 350; People v. Crittenden (1994) 9 Cal.4th 83, 132.) Evidence that allows only speculative inferences, however, is irrelevant evidence and is inadmissible. (People v. Cornwell (2005) 37 Cal.4th 50, 81; People v. Babbit (1988) 45 Cal.3d 660, 681-682.)
The trial court did not err by excluding evidence of the medicinal marijuana as irrelevant. Williams entered the Singhs' apartment by breaking the wooden doorway when the Singhs were not there. He proceeded up and down the stairway and a neighbor observed him carrying a black object. When police officers arrived, Williams retreated into the apartment until the officers ordered him out. They later discovered the Singhs' personal property in Williams's automobile. The Singhs testified that they did not know Williams and had not given him permission to enter their apartment and take their property. Evidence of the marijuana plants is also irrelevant to the Singhs' testimony that they did not use narcotics on the day of the burglary. "'[E]vidence which produces only speculative inferences is irrelevant evidence.' [Citation.]" (People v. Babbitt, supra, 45 Cal.3d 660, 682.)
People v. Reeder, supra, 82 Cal.App.3d 543, and People v. Taylor, supra, 112 Cal.App.3d 348, are not helpful to Williams. Reeder concluded that evidence that defendant disliked his codefendant is relevant to establish that defendant would not commit a crime with him. (People v. Reeder, supra, 82 Cal.App.3d 543, 549-550.) Taylor concluded that evidence that the decedent was suicidal is relevant to the cause of his death. (People v. Taylor, supra, 112 Cal.App.3d 348, 365-366.) Here Williams broke into and entered the Singhs' apartment when they were not at home, and carried their property to his automobile. Evidence of the marijuana plants is irrelevant.
Moreover, the trial court did not deny Williams the right to present a defense. Chapman testified that she and Williams drove to the apartment to buy marijuana. Defense counsel argued during summation that Williams was present in the apartment to buy and smoke marijuana. (People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1325.) The trial court's ruling "merely rejected certain evidence concerning the defense" but did not preclude the defense. (Ibid.)
II.
Williams asserts that the trial court erred by limiting his precustody conduct credits pursuant to section 2933.1, subdivision (a). He points out that burglary of an unoccupied residence is not subject to the presentence conduct credit limitation. (§ 667.5, subd. (c)(21); People v. Thomas (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1122, 1125, 1129.) The Attorney General concedes that Williams is entitled to 116 additional days of conduct credit, calculated pursuant to section 4019.
The parties are correct. Section 4019 applies to presentence conduct credits where a defendant has not committed a violent felony as set forth in section 667.5, subdivision (c). (People v. Thomas, supra, 21 Cal.4th 1122, 1129.) Moreover, the conduct credit limitation of the Three Strikes law does not apply to presentence credits. (Id., at p. 1125.)
We modify the judgment to award Williams an additional 116 days of presentence conduct credits, for a total of 565 days of actual custody and conduct credits. The trial court shall amend the abstract of judgment accordingly and forward the amended abstract to the Department of Corrections. We otherwise affirm
We concur: YEGAN, J., PERREN, J.