Opinion
06-17-2016
The PEOPLE of The State of New York, Respondent, v. Cammesoa M. WILLIAMS, Defendant–Appellant.
David J. Farrugia, Public Defender, Lockport (Joseph G. Frazier of Counsel), for Defendant–Appellant. Niagara County District Attorney's Office, Lockport (Laura T. Bittner of Counsel), for Respondent.
David J. Farrugia, Public Defender, Lockport (Joseph G. Frazier of Counsel), for Defendant–Appellant.
Niagara County District Attorney's Office, Lockport (Laura T. Bittner of Counsel), for Respondent.
PRESENT: CENTRA, J.P., PERADOTTO, LINDLEY, DeJOSEPH, AND NEMOYER, JJ.
Opinion
MEMORANDUM: Defendant appeals from a judgment revoking the sentence of probation previously imposed upon her conviction of attempted criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (Penal Law §§ 110.00, 265.03 [3] ) and imposing a determinate term of imprisonment, followed by a period of postrelease supervision. Defendant failed to preserve for our review her contention that her admission to the probation violations was not voluntary inasmuch as she failed “to move to withdraw [her] admission ... or to vacate the judgment revoking the sentence of probation on that ground” (People v. Rodriguez, 74 A.D.3d 1858, 1859, 902 N.Y.S.2d 488, lv. denied 15 N.Y.3d 809, 908 N.Y.S.2d 169, 934 N.E.2d 903 ; see People v. Carlisle, 120 A.D.3d 1607, 1607, 992 N.Y.S.2d 828, lv. denied 24 N.Y.3d 1082, 1 N.Y.S.3d 9, 25 N.E.3d 346 ; see generally People v. Lopez, 71 N.Y.2d 662, 665–666, 529 N.Y.S.2d 465, 525 N.E.2d 5 ). This case does not fall within the narrow exception to the preservation doctrine (see Lopez, 71 N.Y.2d at 666, 529 N.Y.S.2d 465, 525 N.E.2d 5 ), and we decline to exercise our power to review defendant's contention as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice (see CPL 470.15[3][c] ).
Contrary to defendant's further contention, in light of her numerous admitted violations, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in revoking the sentence of probation and imposing a term of imprisonment followed by a period of postrelease supervision (see e.g. People v. White, 75 A.D.3d 1003, 1003–1004, 905 N.Y.S.2d 805, lv. denied 15 N.Y.3d 956, 917 N.Y.S.2d 116, 942 N.E.2d 327 ). Although we agree with defendant that her waiver of the right to appeal encompasses the sentence of probation but does not encompass her challenge to the sentence imposed following her violations of probation (see People v. Johnson, 77 A.D.3d 1441, 1442, 907 N.Y.S.2d 899, lv. denied 15 N.Y.3d 953, 917 N.Y.S.2d 113, 942 N.E.2d 324 ; People v. Dexter, 71 A.D.3d 1504, 1504–1505, 897 N.Y.S.2d 355, lv. denied 14 N.Y.3d 887, 903 N.Y.S.2d 775, 929 N.E.2d 1010 ), we nevertheless reject her contention that the sentence is unduly harsh and severe. We perceive no basis upon which to modify the sentence as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice (see CPL 470.15[6][b] ; see generally People v. Handley, 134 A.D.3d 1509, 1510, 21 N.Y.S.3d 902 ).
It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.