Opinion
March 30, 1995
Appeal from the Supreme Court, New York County (Alvin Schlesinger, J.).
Defendant's speedy trial motion was properly denied. The 23-day period from May 8, 1991, when the court issued a bench warrant, to May 31, 1991, when the People ascertained that defendant was incarcerated, is chargeable to the People for failure to show that they exercised due diligence in locating defendant (People v. Luperon, 85 N.Y.2d 71, 75-76). Also chargeable to the People, as they concede, is the 46-day period from June 27, 1991, when they announced that they were not ready to proceed to trial as scheduled, to August 12, 1991, when the court returned from vacation (People v. Smith, 82 N.Y.2d 676). The 16-day period that defendant's release motion under CPL 30.30 (2) (a) was pending, from September 4, 1991 to September 20, 1991, is excludable as motion practice (People v. Shannon, 143 A.D.2d 572, lv denied 73 N.Y.2d 860). The record reveals that defendant explicitly consented to the seven-day adjournment from August 28, 1991 to September 4, 1991 to accommodate defense counsel's vacation schedule (People v. Liotta, 79 N.Y.2d 841), and, although the People erroneously concede on appeal the 21-day period from September 20, 1991, when defendant withdrew his release motion, to October 11, 1991, when the People answered ready and defendant moved to dismiss on speedy trial grounds, here, too the record clearly shows that defendant consented to the adjournment (People v. Ali, 209 A.D.2d 227). In sum only 144 days were chargeable to the People, and defendant was not deprived of his right to a speedy trial.
Concur — Rubin, J.P., Ross, Nardelli, Williams and Tom, JJ.