Opinion
SC: 164910 COA: 356475
05-12-2023
PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Rodrick Devonte WILLIAMS, Defendant-Appellant.
Order
On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the October 6, 2022 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.
Welch, J. (concurring). While I believe that defendant has presented a significant legal question regarding the constitutionality of the automatic waiver statute, MCL 600.606, possibly implicating the continued viability of our decision in People v Hana , 443 Mich. 202, 504 N.W.2d 166 (1993), denial is appropriate here, given that defendant cannot demonstrate that his counsel was ineffective or that the trial court committed plain error.
Defendant was convicted in 2016 after a jury trial of first-degree felony murder, armed robbery, carjacking, and larceny in a building. At the sentencing hearing, the prosecutor moved to sentence defendant to life in prison without the possibility of parole. The judge denied the prosecutor's motion and sentenced defendant to a prison term of 35 to 60 years for the murder conviction, in addition to other term-of-years sentences for his other offenses. On direct appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed defendant's convictions and sentences. Defendant has now sought leave to appeal here, challenging the constitutionality of his prosecution as an adult and asserting that his counsel was ineffective for failing to object to his prosecution as an adult.
Defendant was also convicted of second-degree murder, but this was merged with his felony-murder conviction.
Because defendant was 16 at the time he was charged with enumerated crimes set forth under MCL 600.606(2), his case was subject to MCL 764.27, which automatically waives jurisdiction for certain charges against juveniles from the family division of the circuit court to the general circuit court. MCL 764.27 ; MCL 600.606(1) and (2).
Defendant was specifically charged with first-degree felony murder, MCL 750.316(1)(b) ; armed robbery, MCL 750.529 ; and carjacking, MCL 750.529a, all of which are listed under MCL 600.606(2)(a) as crimes that automatically elevate a juvenile case to the circuit court with general criminal jurisdiction.
MCL 600.606(1) was revised in 2021, along with other statutes involving juveniles, to raise the age for juveniles in the state from "less than 17" to "less than 18." 2019 PA 107, effective October 1, 2021. At the time defendant was charged, the age range for automatic waivers was 14 to under 17.
In Hana , this Court examined the constitutionality of MCL 712A.4, which sets forth the process of waiving family division jurisdiction over juvenile defendants to circuit courts with criminal jurisdiction so that the juvenile can be tried as an adult. Specifically, the defendant in Hana claimed that the waiver procedures were unconstitutional. As part of our holding, we opined:
There have been some changes in the statutory language since the version in effect at the time of Hana ; however, the relevant provision still dictates the general waiver of jurisdiction.
In cases where a juvenile is waived to an adult criminal court, the juvenile is still afforded a right to jury trial and the presumption of innocence, and he is therefore not truly subjected to a harsher penalty because guilt is not yet established. Moreover, we are unaware of a constitutional right to be treated as a juvenile. Rather, and in derogation of the common law, juvenile justice procedures are governed by statutes and court rules that the probate courts are required to follow in the absence of constitutional infirmity. [ Hana , 443 Mich. at 220, 504 N.W.2d 166.]
In dissent, Chief Justice CAVANAGH (joined by Justice LEVIN ) astutely noted:
While there are no doubt instances where it is necessary to waive jurisdiction over certain juvenile offenders, the decision to waive cannot be characterized as being consistent with the philosophy underlying the juvenile court system. In reality, the decision to waive juvenile court jurisdiction is not a decision to rehabilitate , but, rather, a decision to punish the juvenile upon conviction. Thus, the juvenile should be afforded the traditional due process protections in judicial waiver proceedings enjoyed by adults accused of crime. [ Id. at 228, 504 N.W.2d 166 ( CAVANAGH , C.J., dissenting).]
Notably, the automatic waiver provision in MCL 600.606 was not directly at issue in Hana because the defendant in that case was convicted before the effective date of MCL 600.606, though the Court noted that the defendant otherwise would have fallen under its terms. Id. at 214 n. 43, 504 N.W.2d 166.
In this case, defendant has conceded that existing caselaw permits the prosecution of a juvenile as an adult. He does not assert that he was entitled to a hearing or any particular procedure in his case. Instead, he argues that, pursuant to changes in the law since Hana , notably Miller v Alabama , 567 U.S. 460, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012), juveniles should not be prosecuted as adults.
Defendant is correct that the law regarding juveniles in our criminal justice system has evolved considerably since Hana was decided in 1993. The United States Supreme Court has, for the better part of two decades, consistently held that children are constitutionally different from adults for sentencing purposes. See Miller , 567 U.S. at 471, 132 S.Ct. 2455 ; see also People v Parks , 510 Mich. 225, 235, 987 N.W.2d 161 (2022). Particularly, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that juveniles have both diminished culpability and greater prospects for reform. Miller , 567 U.S. at 471, 132 S.Ct. 2455. In 2005, the Supreme Court held in Roper v Simmons , 543 U.S. 551, 578-579, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005), that, under the Eighth Amendment, the death penalty could not be imposed on juveniles because that punishment was reserved only for the worst offenders, which could not include juveniles.
Five years later, the Court, using similar logic, held that juvenile nonhomicide offenders could not receive life-without-parole sentences under the Eighth Amendment. Graham v Florida , 560 U.S. 48, 74, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010). And, in another landmark decision, the Court in Miller held that juveniles convicted of homicide offenses, like defendant here, could not be automatically subjected to life-without-parole sentences. Miller , 567 U.S. at 477, 132 S.Ct. 2455. Instead, juveniles are entitled to a specialized sentencing procedure, like the one defendant received here, where the sentencing court is required to consider the unique characteristics of youth before imposing the harshest sentence available for juvenile offenders. Id. at 472, 477-478, 132 S.Ct. 2455.
Recently, this Court clarified and expanded the protections afforded to juveniles that the Supreme Court provided in Roper , Graham , and Miller . In People v Stovall , 510 Mich. 301, 322, 987 N.W.2d 85 (2022), we held "that a parolable life sentence for a defendant who commits second-degree murder while a juvenile violates Article 1, § 16 of the Michigan Constitution," which prohibits cruel or unusual punishment and provides broader protection to Michigan citizens than the Eighth Amendment. In so holding, we acknowledged that there were "important mitigating ways that children are different from adults," even when committing a grave offense. Id. at 315, 987 N.W.2d 85. In People v Taylor , 510 Mich. 112, 119-120, 987 N.W.2d 132 (2022), we determined that prosecutors had the burden of proof to demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence, that juveniles should receive a life-without-parole sentence. In People v Boykin , 510 Mich. 171, 196, 987 N.W.2d 58 (2022), we determined that sentencing courts were required to consider youth as a mitigating factor at sentencing hearings where a defendant who committed first-degree murder was sentenced to a term-of-years, like defendant here. And lastly, in People v Parks , 510 Mich. at 232, 987 N.W.2d 161, we held that the mitigating characteristics of youth articulated in Miller scientifically applied to 18-year-olds in the same manner as juveniles and thus rendered automatic life-without-parole sentences for those aged 18 unconstitutional under the Michigan Constitution. In so doing, we once again reinforced that the characteristics of youth matter in sentencing and that juveniles are different than adults. Id. at 247-255, 987 N.W.2d 161.
As an additional matter, this Court and the United States Supreme Court have repeatedly reiterated that juveniles have diminished culpability compared to adults because of the inherent malleability and plasticity of adolescent brains, a finding supported by a clear scientific consensus. See, e.g., Parks , 510 Mich. at 249-253, 987 N.W.2d 161 ; Miller , 567 U.S. at 477, 132 S.Ct. 2455. This body of caselaw has also reinforced that juveniles are particularly capable of being rehabilitated, an ideal that Justice CAVANAGH also noted in his Hana dissent. See Miller , 567 U.S. at 478, 132 S.Ct. 2455 (stating that mandatory life without parole "disregards the possibility of rehabilitation even when the circumstances most suggest it"); Parks , 510 Mich. at 265, 987 N.W.2d 161 ("And because an 18-year-old defendant has a ‘child's capacity for change,’ as articulated in Miller , 567 U.S. at 473, 132 S.Ct. 2455, it is particularly antithetical to our Constitution's professed goal of rehabilitative sentences to uniformly deny this group of defendants the chance to demonstrate their ability to rehabilitate themselves."); Stovall , 510 Mich. at 320-321, 987 N.W.2d 85 (reasoning that access to rehabilitative programs in prison is vital for juvenile offenders because they both need that opportunity and are receptive to it). The scientific consensus regarding youth brain development and capacity for rehabilitation undermined centuries of jurisprudence that automatically allowed juveniles to be condemned to either a lifetime behind prison walls or the death penalty.
Acknowledging that youth are different from adults, the United States Supreme Court in Miller held that each juvenile defendant's characteristics and circumstances must be individually analyzed at sentencing and that automatic sentencing processes for juveniles fail to consider "[the juvenile's] chronological age and its hallmark features—among them, immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences." Miller , 567 U.S. at 477, 132 S.Ct. 2455. See also Boykin , 510 Mich. at 189, 987 N.W.2d 58 ("We thus hold, consistent with the Supreme Court's repeated recognition of youth's effect on sentencing and our own sentencing jurisprudence, that in all sentencing hearings conducted [for first-degree murder post- Miller ], trial courts are to consider the defendant's youth and must treat it as a mitigating factor."); Stovall , 510 Mich. at 312, 987 N.W.2d 85 (stating that "a sentencer must have discretion to impose a lesser sentence on a juvenile" after the constitutionally mandated process of considering the offender's youthful qualities); Taylor , 510 Mich. at 135, 987 N.W.2d 132 (noting that juveniles are less deserving of the most severe punishments under Miller , and thus "all juvenile offenders are entitled to a discretionary sentencing procedure when it comes to [life without parole] sentencing"); Parks , 510 Mich. at 267, 987 N.W.2d 161 (holding that the 18-year-old defendant's sentence was unconstitutional because he was not given the benefit of the post- Miller "individualized sentencing procedure enshrined in Michigan law").
Given the significant changes in the constitutionality of automatic procedures for juveniles in the punishment phase of criminal proceedings since 1993, the underpinnings of Hana appear to be called into question. Specifically, the Hana Court's conclusion that it was "unaware of a constitutional right to be treated as a juvenile," Hana , 443 Mich. at 220, 504 N.W.2d 166, has been significantly undermined by this Court's and the United States Supreme Court's explicit constitutional findings that juveniles are different from adults. And because juveniles must be treated on an individual basis at the sentencing phase of criminal proceedings, even for severe offenses, the constitutionality of this state's automatic waiver provision likewise may be called into question. However, considering the facts of this case, I do not believe that a different process would have benefited this defendant. See People v Carines , 460 Mich. 750, 763-764, 597 N.W.2d 130 (1999). Likewise, defendant cannot establish that his counsel was ineffective when binding precedent would have rendered any objection futile. People v Riley (After Remand) , 468 Mich. 135, 142, 659 N.W.2d 611 (2003) ("Ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be predicated on the failure to make a frivolous or meritless motion."); People v Ericksen , 288 Mich App 192, 201, 793 N.W.2d 120 (2010) ("Failing to advance a meritless argument or raise a futile objection does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel."). Nonetheless, defendant has raised important questions about the constitutionality of MCL 600.606 that this Court could perhaps consider in a future appeal.